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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
that the Fourth Circuit interprets section 34-4 as providing the only exemption
for unliquidated tort claims in Virginia. Debtors no longer can protect
pending personal injury recoveries from creditors by filing voluntary petitions
in bankruptcy before reducing those claims to payment.
PAUL GRIFFITHs
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Filing Period Extensions for Pro Se
Litigants in Civil Appeals
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) (Rule 4(a))' establishes the time
period in which a litigant may appeal as of right in civil cases. 2 Rule 4(a)
allows an appellant thirty days from entry of judgment to file a proper
notice of appeal.3 Rule 4(a) also permits the district court to grant an
additional thirty day extension for filing late notices of appeal, 4 provided an
is the only Virginia exemption for personal injury claims, considerations of fairness no longer
should force courts to ignore the clear meaning of § 34-17 and Zimmerman v. Morgan. See supra
notes 52-57 and accompanuing text (stating that § 34-17 and Zimmerman decision combine to
preclude amendment of exemption schedules); VA. CODE § 34-17 (1984); Zimmerman v. Morgan,
689 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1982).
1. FED. R. APP. P. 4. Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (the Rules)
has its origin in former rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which, before the
adoption of the Rules, controlled the timing of appeals. See 9 J. MooRE, B. WARD, J. LUCAS,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 204.01[l] (2d ed. 1983) (discussing history of Rule 4) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE]. Congress adopted the Rules on July 1, 1968. See Orders of the Supreme Court
of the United States Adopting the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, July 1, 1968, 389 U.S.
1063 (1967). See generally Cohn, TnE PROPOSED FEDERAL RuLEs OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 54
GEO. L. J. 431 (1966) (discussing history of uniform procedural rules and authority of Supreme
Court to promulgate appellate rules).
2. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). Rule 4(a) allows 30 days from the entry of judgment to file an
appeal, and 30 days in which to seek an extension upon a showing of good cause or excusable
neglect. Id.; see infra note 6 (discussing excusable neglect standard). Rules 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4)
control premature notices of appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). Rule 4(a)(3) controls the timing
of cross-appeals by the opposing party. Id.; see Ward, The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
28 FED. B.J. 100, 101-102 (1968) (discussing rule 4(a)). Rule 4(b) controls the timing of appeals
in criminal cases. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(b). See generally Note, Timely Appeals and Federal
Criminal Procedure, 49 VA. L. REv. 971, 972-995 (1963) (discussing timing problems under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
3. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). See infra note 4 (text of rule 4(a)). While rule 4 governs timing
of appeals, rule 3 controls the actual mechanics of filing a notice of appeal. See FED. R. APP.
P. 3. Under rule 3, the appellant must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court
within the time limits of rule 4. FED. R. APP. P. 3(a). The notice of appeal shall designate the
party taking the appeal, the judgment from which the party is appealing, and the name of the
court of appeal. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c). Rule 3 states that courts should not dismiss an appeal
for mere informality. Id.
4. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5); see FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). Rule 4(a)(1) provides in part
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appellant requests the extension by motion within sixty days of judgment5
and can show good cause or excusable neglect. 6 Courts face a problem when
an appellant manifests the intention to appeal, but fails to make a motion
for an extension of time within the prescribed period. 7 Appellants often
In a civil case in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right from a district court
to a court of appeals the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the
clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from;
FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(l). Rule 4(a)(5) provides
The district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend
the time for filing notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the
expiration of the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a). Any such motion which is filed
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the court otherwise
requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed
time shall be given to the parties in accordance with local rules. No such extension
shall exceed 30 days past such prescribed time or 10 days from the date of the entry
of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). The appellant must send the notice of appeal or motion for an
extension of time to the district court. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(I). Rule 4(a)(l) provides, however,
that if the appellant mistakenly files the notice in the court of appeals the clerk may transfer
the appeal to the district court. Id.
5. FED. R. App. P. 4(a). Under rule 4(a), the appellant must file motion with the district
court requesting the extension of time. Id. The appellant must await the entry of a final
judgment before seeking appellate review of the case. Id. The appellant may not file the motion
later than 30 days after the initial filing period, a total of 60 days from the entry of judgment.
Id. If the district court allows the extension of time, the appellant has 10 days from the date
of the order in which to file. Id.
6. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). Former rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allowed the appellant to establish excusable neglect on the basis of failure to learn of the entry
of judgment. See FED. R. Crv. P. 73(a) (1948). In 1966, the Supreme Court amended rule 73(a)
eliminating the requirement that the appellant base excusable neglect on failure to learn of the
court's entry of judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a) advisory committee note (1967). The 1966
amendment allowed courts to grant an extension of time for excusable neglect of any type. Id.
The Supreme Court incorporated the 1966 amendment to rule 73(a) into former rule 4(a). See
FED. R. App. P. 4(a) (1978); supra note 1 (discussing origin of rule 4(a) in former rule 73(a)).
In 1979, the Advisory Committee suggested amending the rule to its present form requiring
good cause or excusable neglect to cover situations in which the appellant seeks an extension
before the expiration of the initial appeal period. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) advisory committee
note. The Fourth Circuit has held that the appellant has the burden of establishing excusable
neglect. See Craig v. Garrison, 549 F.2d 306, 307 (4th Cir. 1977), rev'd 722 F.2d 1167 (4th Cir.
1983) (en banc). The advisory committee notes to former rule 73(a) state that the district court
has power to extend time whenever an obvious injustice would otherwise result. See FaD. R.
Civ. P. 73(a) advisory committee note (1967). Thus, when an appellant reasonably depended
on the regular course of mail delivery but the notice of appeal arrived two days after the
expiration of the appeals period, a basis for excusable neglect may exist. See Sanchez v. Board
of Regents of Texas Southern University, 625 F.2d 521, 522 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Calkins,
The Emerging Due Diligence Standard for Filing Delayed Notice of Appeal in Federal Courts,
19 W.Arra L.J. 609, 613 (1983) (discussing decision in which court adopted strict standards
for accepting motions that are untimely due to excusable neglect); MooRE, supra note 1,
204.13[l] at 4-89 (discussing Rule 4(a)(5) good cause and excusable neglect standard).
7. See, e.g., Campbell v. White, 721 F.2d 644, 645-46 (8th Cir. 1983) (notice of appeal
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manifest an intent to appeal by filing a notice after the initial thirty day
period, but within the second thirty day period when the court may grant
an extension. 8
Traditionally, most federal courts have treated a notice of appeal filed
after the first thirty day period as an implicit motion for an extension of
time.9 In 1979, however, the Supreme Court adopted an amended rule 4(a)(5)
two days late held fatal to appeal in absence of motion for an extension); Brooks v. Britton,
669 F.2d 665, 667 (l1th Cir. 1982) (failure to move for extension of time held fatal to appeal);
Pettibone v. Cupp, 666 F.2d 333, 334-35 (9th Cir. 1981) (notice of appeal two days late held
fatal to appeal in absence of motion for extension); Ryals v. Estelle, 661 F.2d 904, 905-06 (5th
Cir. 1981) (appeal dismissed because appellant filed notice of appeal 21 days late with no
motion for extension); Mayfield v. United States Parole Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th
Cir. 1981) (notice of appeal filed three days late with no motion for extension of time held
fatal to appeal). But see Grimm v. Shippen, 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1724, 1725 (9th
Cir. 1981) (granting appeal despite lack of motion for extension to appeal), vacated No. 81-
4427 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1982); Griffin v. George B. Buck Consulting Actuaries, Inc., 573 F.
Supp. 1134, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court adopted reasoning of Shah panel and allowed pro se
litigant's untimely notice of appeal to serve as a motion for an extension of time in which to
file an appeal); see infra note 57 (analysis of Grimm and Buck decisions.)
Other courts established procedures for notifying untimely appellants of the need to move
for an extension after the initial 30 day period. For example, in Campbell v. White, the Eighth
Circuit ordered district court clerks to screen notices of appeal for timeliness and to advise pro
se litigants when an extension motion was appropriate. See 721 F.2d at 647 (8th Cir. 1983).
The Campbell court also ordered district court clerks to begin notifying all litigants of the 30
day appeal deadline and the 60 day period in which a motion for an extension must be filed.
Id. See also Shah v. Hutto, 704 F.2d 717, 720 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting practice in one district
court of screening appeal notices for timeliness and informing pro se litigants of need for
extension motion).
8. FED. R. App. P. 4(a). Rule 4(a) provides for two consecutive 30 day periods in which
an appeal must be filed or an extension granted. Id. An appellant must file a notice of appeal
within the first period unless good cause or excusable neglect prevents filing. Id. After the first
30 day period, the rule grants appellants 30 days in which to obtain an extension from the court
for filing a notice of appeal. Id. See Silvia v. Laurie, 594 F.2d 892, 893 (1st Cir. 1979) (court
has no jurisdiction over appeal when appellant fails to file timely notice of appeal). Untimely
notice thus results when the appellant files after the first 30 day period but before the expiration
of the second 30 day period. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) & (5) (placing time limitations on
filing of appeals and on motions for an extension for filing of appeals).
9. See, e.g., Moorer v. Griffin, 575 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1978) (pro se appellant's
untimely notice of appeal allowed district court to consider whether notice was untimely due to
excusable neglect); Craig v. Garrison, 549 F.2d 306, 307 (4th Cir. 1977) (court could not treat
notice of appeal by pro se litigant as untimely until appellant had opportunity to establish
excusable neglect), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1167 (4th Cir. 1983); Sanchez v. Dallas Morning News, 543
F.2d 556, 557 (5th Cir. 1976) (allowed district court to entertain tardy notice of appeal as
motion for extension of time), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 911 (1979); Stirling v. Chemical Bank,
511 F.2d 1030, 1032 (2d Cir. 1975) (appellant's filing of notice of appeal within extension period
and prima facie showing of excusable neglect allowed district court to treat notice as motion
for extension of time); Alley v. Dodge Hotel, 501 F.2d 880, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (appellant
may meet filing requirement of rule 4(a) by substantial unequivocal effort to file), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 958 (1975); Torockio v. Chamberlain Mfg. Co., 456 F.2d 1084, 1087 (3d Cir. 1972)
(district court could consider motion to validate untimely filing occurring within 30 day extension
period), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1340 (1973).
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that granted courts special extension powers with regard to requests for
extensions filed in the last ten days of the extension period.'0 After the
amendment to rule 4(a)(5), courts construed the rule to compel dismissal of
late notices of appeal filed without a motion for extension of time" for lack
of jurisdiction,12 including some courts that previously had treated late appeal
notices as implicit motions for extension. 3 In Shah v. Hutto,14 the Fourth
Circuit convened en banc 15 to rehear argument on a case in which a Fourth
Circuit panel held that the 1979 amendment to rule 4(a)(5) did not affect the
circuit's prior practice of allowing an untimely notice of appeal to serve as
a motion for an extension of time.' 6
(5th Cir. 1981) (motion for extension of time is express requirement); Mayfield v. United States
Parole Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir. 1981) (amendment to Rule 4(a)(5) requires
motion for extension of time).
10. See Orders Of The Supreme Court: Amendments To The Federal Rules Of Appellate
Procedure, Order Of April 30, 1979, 441 U.S. 969, 975 (1979). The amendment to rule 4(a)(5)
also clarified the requirement that an appellant request an extension of time in the form of a
motion. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). The amendment also allowed for courts to accept motions
made ex parte. Id.; see supra note 4 (text of rule); infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text
(comparison of former rule 4(a)(5) with amended rule).
11. See, e.g., Campbell v. White, 721 F.2d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 1983) (amendment to rule
4(a)(5) mandates filing of motion to obtain extension of time); Pryor v. Marshall, 711 F.2d 63,
65 (6th Cir. 1983) (amendment requires appellant to make motion for extension of time); Brooks
v. Britton, 669 F.2d 665, 667 (lth Cir. 1982) (amendment prohibits informal or implicit
motions for extension of time); Wyzik v. Employee Benefit Plan of Crane Co., 663 F.2d 348,
348 (1st Cir. 1981) (amendment precludes treating untimely notice of appeal as substantial
equivalent of motion to extend time); Bond v. Western Auto Supply Co., 654 F.2d 302, 304
12. See supra note 11 (listing cases in which failure to file motion for extension of time
led to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction). The courts often speak of the requirement of a timely
filing of a notice of appeal as "mandatory and jurisdictional." See Browder v. Director, Dep't
of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (30 day time limit of rule 4(a) is mandatory and
jurisdictional). The timely notice of appeal is not jurisdictional in the sense of subject matter
jurisdiction, but in the sense of a jurisdictional prerequisite, a precondition to the court's
exercise of the jurisdiction which already exists. See MooRE, supra note 1, at 204.02[2 at 4-14
(use of term "jurisdictional" may be unfortunate because of connotations).
13. See supra note 7 (cases barring untimely notice of appeal filed without separate
motion for extension); Sanchez v. Board of Regents of Texas Southern Univ., 625 F.2d 521
(5th Cir. 1980) (permitting untimely appeal without separate motion for extension, but with
prospective holding that 1979 amendment to rule 4(a)(5) henceforth requires separate motion
for extension before untimely appeal would be allowed); infra notes 59-65 and accompanying
text (discussing reasoning of Sanchez court).
14. 722 F.2d 1167 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2355 (1984).
15. Id. A majority of the circuit judges in active service may order a rehearing en banc.
FED. R. App. P. 35(a). The rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will be granted only to
maintain uniformity of decisions in the circuit, or to reconsider a question of exceptional
importance. Id.
16. See 722 F.2d at 1167. The panel decision in Shah was consistent with Fourth Circuit
holdings prior to the 1979 amendment that an untimely notice of appeal could serve as a motion
for an extension of time. See Craig v. Garrison, 549 F.2d 306, 307 (4th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 722
F.2d 1167 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc); infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (analysis of
Craig).
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In Shah, the appellants, incarcerated pro se 7 plaintiffs, brought a civil
rights suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. 8 The clerk of the court filed judgment against appellants on August
25, 1981.19 The court informed the appellants of the thirty day time limit for
filing notices of appeal. 2 The appellants mailed notice of appeal September
22, 1981. 21 As a result of an apparent delay in the postal service, the clerk
of the district court did not receive and file the notice until September 25,
1981, one day after the appeal period had expired. 22 Unaware that the notice
of appeal had been received untimely, 23 the appellants failed to file for an
extension of time as permitted by rule 4(a)(5).
24
In the panel decision of Shah v. Hutto,25 the Fourth Circuit held that
the late notice of appeal could serve as a motion for extension of time.
26
The court examined the Advisory Committee Notes ("Notes")2 7 regarding
the 1979 amendment to rule 4(a)(5) and concluded that the purpose of the
amendment was to correct a problem unrelated to the case before the panel.
28
17. 722 F.2d at 1168. Pro se means "for himself" or self-representation. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (5th ed. 1979).
18. 722 F.2d at 1168, 1169. In Shah, the appellants were inmates at the Virginia State
Penitentiary in Richmond. Id. The appellants brought their action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976). Id. at 1167.
19. 722 F.2d at 1167.
20. Id.
21. Id. The appellants mailed the notice of appeal from the Virginia State Penitentiary in
Richmond. See id. at 1169.
22. See id. at 1169.
23. Id. Both the majority and the dissent of the panel decision in Shah suggested that the
district courts should set up a system by which the clerks of the court would notify appellants
that notices had failed to meet time requirements. 704 F.2d at 720 (majority); id. at 723
(dissent). The Eighth Circuit has ordered the clerks of district courts to furnish written notices
to all litigants regarding the 30 day limitation period and the need for a motion for extension
thereafter. See Campbell v. White, 721 F.2d 644, 647 (8th Cir. 1983). In addition, the Eighth
Circuit ordered clerks to screen notices of appeal for untimeliness and advise pro se litigants
when an extension motion is appropriate. Id. Other courts have suggested similar systems. See
Pryor v. Marshall, 711 F.2d 63, 65 n.4, (6th Cir. 1983) (mechanism to inform pro se litigants
of untimely appeal would be helpful); United States v. Lucas, 597 F.2d 243, 245 (10th Cir.
1979) (same). But see Mayfield v. United States Parole Comm'n., 647 F.2d 1053, 1055 n.5
(10th Cir. 1981) (courts have no positive duty to inform appellants of untimely motions of
appeal).
24. See 722 F.2d at 1169; see also 704 F.2d at 719.
25. 704 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1983).
26. See 722 F.2d at 1167-68; 704 F.2d at 720-721.
27. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) advisory committee notes.
28. See 704 F.2d at 719. The notes of the advisory committee addressed the situation that
confronted the Second Circuit in In re Orbitec Corp. Id.; see 520 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1975); FED.
R. App. P. 4(a)(5) advisory committee notes. The appellant in In re Orbitec Corp., failed to file
a notice of appeal along with a motion for an extension of time. See 520 F.2d at 360. The
Second Circuit interpreted rule 4(a)(5) to require appellants to file both documents prior to the
expiration of the 60 day period. Id. at 362; see infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text
(discussion of In re Orbitec Corp.).
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The Shah panel reasoned that the Notes did not seek to change the practice
of allowing untimely notices of appeal to serve as motions for an extension
of time.29 The dissent reached the opposite result, arguing that the Notes 0
and the reasoning of opinions in other circuits3 ' compelled a strict construc-
tion of rule 4(a)(5) as amended. However, the majority of the panel concluded
that the 1979 amendment to rule 4(a)(5) did not alter the practice of allowing
untimely notices of appeal to serve as motions for extension of time.3 2 The
Fourth Circuit reheard Shah en banc six months after the panel decision
issued. 33 The en banc court reversed the panel decision and held that rule
4(a)(5) as amended in 1979 required an explicit motion for extension of time
after the initial appeal period.
3 4
In reversing the panel decision in Shah, the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the rationale of Craig v. Garrison,35 a preamendment Fourth Circuit
decision allowing an untimely notice of appeal to serve as a motion for
extension of time, conflicted with the requirements of the 1979 amendment. 6
Craig involved an appellant who filed notice of appeal three days after the
thirty day statutory period had lapsed.37 The appellant failed to request an
The requirement in Rule 4(a)(5) that extensions be granted only upon motion derives from
the rationale that the opposing party must be notified in order to contradict an assertion by the
appellant of excusable neglect. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) advisory committee notes (citing cases
requiring motion for extension).
29. See 722 F.2d at 1169; 704 F.2d at 720. The Shah panel noted that the Advisory
Committee made no mention of the widespread practice of allowing untimely notices of appeal
to serve as motions for extension of time. 704 F.2d at 720. See supra note 9 and accompanying
text (discussing practice of allowing untimely notice to serve as motion for extension).
30. See 704 F.2d at 722 (Hall, J., dissenting). The dissent in Shah compared the text of
preamendment rule 4(a)(5) with the text of the current rule and concluded that the amendment
reemphasized the requirement of a formal motion. Id. Prior to the 1979 amendment, rule 4(a)
provided that in civil cases involving an appeal as of right
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district
court within 30 days of the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from...
Upon a showing of excusable neglect, the district court may extend the time for filing
the notice of appeal by any party for a period not to exceed 30 days from the
expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this subdivision. Such an extension
may be granted before or after the time otherwise prescribed by this subdivision has
expired; but if a request for an extension is made after such time has expired, it shall
be made by motion with such notice as the court shall deem appropriate.
FED. R. App. P. 4(a) (1978); see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing cases allowing
untimely notice to serve as motion for extension of time under former rule 4(a)).
31. 704 F.2d at 723 (Hall, J., dissenting); see supra note 11 (cases holding that amended
rule requires formal motion).
32. 722 F.2d at 1167; 704 F.2d at 721.
33. 722 F.2d at 1167.
34. 722 F.2d at 1168-69. The en banc court in Shah voted 6-4. Id. Judge Hall, who
dissented from the panel majority, wrote the Shah en banc opinion. Id. at 1167. Judge
Haynesworth, author of the panel opinion, wrote the Shah dissent. Id. at 1169.
35. 549 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1977).
36. 722 F.2d at 1167.
37. 549 F.2d at 307. The Craig opinion does not reveal the reason for the late arrival of
the notice of appeal. See id.
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extension of time pursuant to rule 4(a)(5).1s The Craig court held that courts
should not hold a pro se petitioner to the same standards as a member of
the bar. 9 Craig further held that the district court could not deny an appeal
as untimely without first inquiring of the litigant whether the delay was the
result of excusable neglect.4°
The Shah court overruled the Craig holding that courts may treat an
untimely notice of appeal from a pro se litigant as a motion for extension
of time in which to file.41 The Shah majority reviewed the Notes to inquire
whether an implicit request for additional time could satisfy the rule 4(a)(5)
requirement of a motion.42 The Shah court concluded that the literal language
of rule 4(a)(5) and the Notes require a party to file an explicit motion for
extension of time,43 both for a request within the initial thirty day appeal
period and within the thirty days following expiration of the appeal period."4
Citing decisions in other circuits which strictly construe the motion require-
ment of rule 4(a)(5), 45 the Shah majority adopted the rule that courts may
no longer treat a notice of appeal filed alone as a motion for an extension
of time.
46
The Shah majority additionally rejected the panel decision's holding that
a court must afford pro se litigants an opportunity to correct the effect of
untimely notices of appeal. 47 Adopting a strict reading of rule 4(a)(5), the
court held that dismissal is mandatory when a party fails to meet the
requirements of rule 4(a)(5).48 The Shah court concluded that no justification
38. Id. The Craig court speculated that the defendant may have been unaware of the
requirements of rule 4(a). Id.
39. Id. Craig accords with other cases holding pro se litigants to less stringent standards
than members of the bar. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (courts should
hold pro se appellants to less stringent standards in pleadings than members of bar); Moorer v.
Griffin, 575 F.2d 87, 89 (6th Cir. 1978) (same); Alley v. Dodge Hotel, 501 F.2d 880, 883 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (courts should deal liberally with those untrained in law), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958
(1975); Cramer v. Wise, 494 F.2d 1185, 1186 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).
40. 549 F.2d at 307. Craig held that courts must inform a pro se appellant of the
requirements of rule 4(a). Id. Although the burden of establishing excusable neglect remains
with the appellant, Craig held that courts must provide the appellant an opportunity to establish
excusable neglect. Id.
41. 722 F.2d at 1168; see supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (discussing Craig).
42. See 722 F.2d at 1168; FED. R. APP,. P. 4(a) advisory committee notes (derivation of
requirement that party must make request for extension of time by motion after initial 30 day
period).
43. See 722 F.2d at 1168. Cf. 704 F.2d at 723 (Hall, J. dissenting) (allowing notice of
appeal to serve as implicit extension contravenes literal reading of rule 4(a)(5)).
44. See 722 F.2d at 1168; see also supra note 28 (advisory notes explanation of motion
requirement for extension request made after 30 day appeal period).
45. See 722 F.2d at 1168; supra note 7 (cases strictly construing motion requirement of
rule 4(a)(5)).
46. See 722 F.2d at 1168; infra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing rule 4(a)(5)
motion).
47. See 722 F.2d at 1168; supra note 39 (cases holding that pro se litigants are subject to
less stringent standards than members of bar).
48. 722 F.2d at 1168. The majority of decisions construing the filing requirements of rule
[Vol. 42:447
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existed for treating an untimely notice of appeal that did not manifest the
appellant's desire for an extension of time as a motion for extension of
time.
4 9
The four judges joining in the dissent disagreed with the majority's
reading of the 1979 amendment to rule 4(a).10 The dissent criticized the
majority's application of the amended rule to the facts in Shah.-" Noting
that the 1979 amendment added nothing to the pre-1979 requirement of a
motion for an extension, the dissent maintained that the drafters of the
amendment did not intend to eliminate the common practice of allowing
untimely notices to constitute implicit motions under the rule. 52 The dissent
concluded that, as a matter of law, the Shah panel decision was correct.
5 3
In addition to arguing against a strict construction of the rule 4(a)(5)
motion requirement, the dissent noted that the appellants had taken all
necessary steps to secure an appeal.5 4 According to the dissent, the appellants
were unaware that the delay in postal service had rendered their appeal
untimely, and the appellants therefore did not take advantage of their rights
to obtain extensions for good cause.55 The dissent concluded that the implicit
motion for extension of time contained in the untimely filing satisfied the
motion requirement of rule 4(a)(5).
5 6
The Shah majority correctly noted that the rule of Craig, adopted by
the panel decision in Shah, represents an anomaly among circuit decisions
construing the post amendment rule 4(a)(5).57 The Shah majority follows the
4(a) since the 1979 amendment have involved pro se appellants. See id. (citing federal appeals
court cases involving pro se litigants); see also supra note 7 (discussing recent cases construing
rule 4(a)(5) filing requirements).
49. 722 F.2d at 1168-69. The majority opinion in Shah implied that something short of a
formal motion might suffice as a motion for extension, provided the appellant manifested a
request for additional time. See id.; infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text (discussing
elements constituting sufficient request for extension under rule 4(a)(5)).
50. 722 F.2d at 1169 (Haynesworth, J., dissenting). The Shah dissent made a more
extensive statement of its reasoning in the panel majority opinion. Id. at 1170; see 704 F.2d at
717-721.
51. 722 F.2d at 1169.
52. Id. at 1169-1170.
53. Id.; see 704 F.2d at 720 (rule 4(a)(5) becomes trap for inexperienced unless motion
requirement is construed to include implicit motion for extension).
54. 722 F.2d at 1169.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1169-70.
57. Id. at 1168. All circuit courts that have considered the 1979 amendment to rule 4(a)(5)
have required that litigants request extension by motion. See, e.g., Campbell v. White, 721 F.2d
644, 645 (8th Cir. 1983) (meaning of 1979 amendment to rule 4(a)(5) unambiguously requires
motion); Nelson v. Foti, 707 F.2d 170, 171 (5th Cir. 1983) (pro se litigants no longer entitled
to less stringent treatment in wake of 1979 amendment to rule 4(a)(5)); see also supra note 7
(citing cases requiring formal motion for extension). But see Grimm v. Shippen, 32 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1724, 1725 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ninth Circuit granted appeal despite lack of
motion for extension to appeal), vacated No. 81-4427 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1982). Grimm resembled
Shah procedurally, except that the Grimm appellants were not proceeding pro se. See 32 Fed.
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logic of all circuits that have considered the issue of whether rule 4(a)(5)
requires a separate motion."8 In the earliest circuit decision construing the
amended rule 4(a)(5), Sanchez v. Board of Regents of Texas Southern
University, 9 the Fifth Circuit held that the amended rule 4(a)(5) put an end
to the traditional practice of treating untimely notices of appeal as implicit
motions for an extension of time.60 The Sanchez court compared the text of
the former rule 4(a)(5) with the amended rule and concluded that the newer
rule prevented the court from treating an untimely notice of appeal as an
implicit motion for an extension of time.6' The Sanchez court relied on the
Advisory Committee's explicit statement that an appellant must make a
motion for a extension of time no later than thirty days after the expiration
of the original appeal period. 62
A comparison of former rule 4(a)(5) with the amended text substantiates
the Sanchez court's statement that the amended rule required a motion in
R. Serv. 2d at 1725. The Grimm appellants filed an untimely notice of appeal but, unaware
that the notice was tardy, failed to file a motion for extension. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that
the 1979 amendments to rule 4(a)(5) did not limit the power of the court to disregard procedural
irregularities to avoid unfairness to litigants. Id. The court cautioned that an untimely notice
of appeal ordinarily would serve as a motion for extension only in cases involving pro se
litigants. Id. at 1725. The court dismissed the appeal in Grimm because the appellants had legal
representation. Id. In all respects, however, the Grimm court indicated that given facts similar
to those in Shah, the Ninth Circuit also would allow an untimely notice of appeal to serve as a
motion for an extension of time. Id. Since the Grimm decision, however, the Ninth Circuit has
interpreted rule 4(a)(5) restrictively. See Pettibone v. Cupp, 666 F.2d 333, 335 (9th Cir. 1981)
(notice of appeal not equivalent to motion for extension of time); see also Griffin v. George B.
Buck Consulting Actuaries, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court did not
require separate motion for extension of time).
The Second Circuit has not yet construed the effect of amended rule 4(a)(5) on untimely
notices of appeal. In Griffin v. George B. Buck, Consulting Actuaries, Inc., however, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York allowed a pro se litigant's untimely written
notice of appeal to serve as a motion for extension of time within which to file the appeal,
where the delay occurred due to withdrawal of appellant's counsel. See 573 F. Supp. at 1134,
1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The George B. Buck court relied on the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
the panel decision in Shah. Id. at 1135-1136.
58. See supra note 57 (discussing cases adopting strict view of amended rule 4(a)(5)).
59. 625 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1980).
60. Id. at 523. The Sanchez decision was the first rule 4(a)(5) case that the Fifth Circuit
decided after the 1979 amendments. See id. The Sanchez holding was prospective only. Id. The
appellant in Sanchez mailed a notice of appeal to the district court 28 days after the court
entered final judgment. See id. at 522. The notice of appeal arrived in the office of the clerk
of the district court two days after the appeal period expired. Id. The appellees moved to
dismiss the appeal and the district court granted appellee's motion. Id.
61. Id. at 522-23. See supra notes 4 & 30 (texts of former and amended rule 4(a)(5)). The
Sanchez court noted that commentators had criticized the liberal pre-amendment interpretation
of rule 4(a)(5). 625 F.2d at 523. The Sanchez court also observed that while the appellant's
deposit of the notice of appeal in the mail was not equivalent to filing notice with the clerk of
the district court, the appellant reasonably had a right to rely on the due course of mail delivery,
and that reasonable reliance constituted grounds for excusable neglect. Id. at 522.
62. Id. at 523. The Sanchez court stated that its former practice of allowing an untimely
notice of appeal to serve as a motion for an extension of time arguably was a judicial gloss on
the former rule 4(a). Id.
[Vol. 42:447
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
addition to the motion requirements of the original rule. 63 The conclusion of
the Sanchez court, however, is without merit. The 1979 amendment to rule
4(a)(5) does not prevent courts from treating an untimely notice of appeal
as an implicit motion for an extension of time. 64 A close examination of the
Advisory Committee's rationale for the revision of rule 4(a)(5)65 and of the
policies underlying rule 466 reveals that the reasoning of the Shah dissent is
substantially correct.
Prior to the amendment, rule 4(a)(5) provided that if an appellant could
show excusable neglect, the district court could extend the time for filing a
notice of appeal for a period not to exceed thirty days from the original
filing time.67 The former rule 4(a)(5) also provided that the court could grant
the extension either before or after the initial thirty day period had passed. 6
If the appellant requested the extension after the initial thirty day period,
however, the rule required the appellant to make the request by motion.
69
The amended rule 4(a)(5) provides that if the appellant can show good cause
or excusable neglect, the district court can extend the time for filing a notice
of appeal. 70 The amended rule requires that the appellant request the exten-
sion by filing a motion not later than thirty days after the expiration of the
original appeal period. 7' By requiring the appellant to file a motion after the
initial appeal period had expired, the former rule 4(a)(5) implied that a
motion during the initial period was unnecessary.72 Thus, while the amended
rule more explicitly requires an appellant to file a motion to request an
extension of time, the former rule 4(a)(5) already required a motion.73 As
the Shah dissent suggests, the drafters of the 1979 amendment were not
concerned with the form of the necessary motion for extension, and for this
reason the Notes do not address the practice of allowing untimely notices of
appeal to be treated as motions for an extension of time.7 4
63. See supra notes 4 and 30 (texts of former and current rule 4(a)(5)); supra notes 59-62
and accompanying text (Sanchez analysis).
64. See Shah, 704 F.2d at 721 (amendment to rule 4(a)(5) does not overrule prior practice
of treating untimely notice as motion for extension of time).
65. See FED. R. App. P. 4 advisory committee note (1979) (situation of In re Orbitec
Corp. prompted revision of rule 4(a)(5)); infra notes 75-78 and accompanying test (In re Orbitec
Corp. analysis).
66. See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text (discussing policies of Rules).
67. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a) (1978); supra note 30 (text of former rule 4(a)(5)).
68. See supra note 30 (text of former rule 4(a)(5)).
69. See id.
70. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5); supra note 4 (text of rule 4(a)(5)); supra note 6 (discussing
excusable neglect standard).
71. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5); supra note 4 (text of rule 4(a)(5)).
72. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a) advisory committee note (1978) (advisory committee expressly
provides that amendment negates any implication that appellant may make informal application
for extension of time to court); supra note 30 (text of former rule 4(a)(5)).
73. 722 F.2d at 1168; see supra notes 4 & 30 (texts of former and current rule 4(a)(5)
both require appellant to make requests for extension of time by motion).
74. See 722 F.2d at 1168 (advisory committee notes to rule 4(a)(5) fail to mention practice
of allowing late notices of appeal to serve as motions for extension of time).
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In contrast to the Shah majority's finding that the 1979 rule 4(a)(5)
amendment addressed appellants' motion procedures, the Advisory Commit-
tee discussed the amendment in terms of a remedy to a different problem
that confronted courts applying rule 4(a)(5). In In re Orbitec Corporation,7s
the appellant made a timely motion for extension of time in which to file a
notice of appeal, but the extension period expired before the appellant
appealed. 76 The district court in Orbitec refused to extend the appeal deadline
beyond the second thirty day period.7 7 On appeal of the district court's
order, the Second Circuit held that rule 4(a)(5) clearly required a notice of
appeal to be filed within the second thirty day period, even though an
appellant might file a motion for extension so late in the extension period
that the sixty day limit on notices of appeal could prevent appellant from
taking advantage of the extension .7 As the Shah dissent observed, the Notes
contemplate that an amended rule would reverse the result in Orbitec by
allowing the district court to admit an appeal after the thirty day grace
period, provided there had been a timely motion for an extension of time.79
Both the existence of a motion requirement prior to the amendment and the
Advisory Committee's failure to address the practice of treating untimely
notices as motions for an extension of time indicate that the amendment to
rule 4(a)(5) does not mandate the restrictive interpretation of rule 4 that the
Shah majority adopted.
Further, a restrictive reading of amended rule 4(a)(5) would not serve
the rule's procedural purposes of notice and particularity. The amendment
requires the appellant to apply for an extension by a motion pursuant to
rule 7(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 0 Rule 7(b)(1) requires
75. 520 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1975); see FED. R. App. P. 4 advisory committee note (situation
of In re Orbitec Corp. prompted revision of rule 4(a)(5)).
76. 520 F.2d at 359, 360. The appellant in In re Orbitec Corp. sought an appeal from a
decision in a bankruptcy trial. See id. at 359. The appellant's attorney withdrew from the case
after an argument over fees. Id. at 360. Proceeding without an attorney, the appellant alleged
that a law clerk for the trial court misinformed the appellant that the court had not yet reached
a decision in the case. Id. The law clerk denied the allegations of the appellant. Id. On April
3, 1975, the appellant learned that the court had entered judgment on February 28, 1975. Id.
On April 18, 1975, 48 days after final judgment but within the period in which the court could
grant an extension of time, the appellant movec" for an extension. Id. at 359. The appellant
failed to file a notice of appeal during the same period. Id. at 360.
77. Id. at 360.
78. Id. at 361. The appellant in In re Orbitec Corp. argued that she could not have filed
a notice of appeal unless the court granted her the motion for an extension of time in which to
appeal. Id. at 360. The appellant also argued that the court should allow the motion for an
extension of time to serve as a notice of appeal. Id. at 361. The Second Circuit noted that
inherent powers under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure authorized the court to treat
the motion for extension as notice of appeal, but the Second Circuit refused to do so because
of the appellant's repeated delays during the course of the trial. Id. at 362.
79. See 722 F.2d at 1169; see also FED. R. App. P. 4(a) advisory committee note
(amendment should remedy confusion displayed in In re Orbitec Corp.); supra note 76-78
(discussing Orbitec opinion).
80. FED. R. App. P. 4(a) advisory committee note; see FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). Rule
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that the motion be in writing and state with particularity the grounds for
the motion.' The writing requirement of rule 7(b)(1) satisfies the procedural
necessity for notice of the motion to all interested parties. s2 Rule 7(b)(1)
requires particularity insofar as the appellant must state the grounds for the
motion to sufficiently apprise the court of the appellant's position.13 The
obligation to specify the grounds of the motion does not require the appellant
to designate grounds that are beyond the party's knowledge.14 In determining
7(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls pleadings and the proper form for
motions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 7. A motion is a request to the court for an order. See Dobie,
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REv. 261, 267 (1939).
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). Rule 7(b)(1) states that a court's written notice that a party
has made an oral motion fulfills the writing requirement. Id.; see United States v. 363 Cases,
More or Less, "Mountain Valley Mineral Water," 143 F. Supp. 219, 223 (W.D. Ark. 1956)
(although motion for directed verdict should be in writing, oral statement of grounds is sufficient
compliance with rules); see also Raughley v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 230 F.2d 387, 391 (3d Cir.
1956) (requirement that motion be in writing provides simple procedure without too much
emphasis on form and informal request for reargument with no notice is not sufficient).
Rule 7(b)(1) requires parties to state grounds for a motion with particularity. FED. R. CIV.
P. 7(b)(1); see Steingut v. National City Bank of New York, 36 F. Supp. 486, 487 (E.D.N.Y.
1941). In Steingut, the plaintiff moved to have the district court remand the case to the New
York Supreme Court. See 36 F. Supp. at 487. The defendants objected that the plaintiffs
motion failed to state with particularity the grounds for the motion. Id.; see infra note 82 and
accompanying text (particularity requires only that motion apprise court of party's position).
The Steingut court held that the requirement of particularity was not a matter of mere form
but was real and substantial. 36 F. Supp. at 487. The court also stated that it would overlook
a party's failure to comply with the particularity rule if the failure was inadvertent. Id. The
Steingut court held that the plaintiff's failure to state with particularity the grounds for the
motion was not inadvertent and dismissed the motion. Id. at 488.
82. See 5 C. WRIHm & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1191, at
33 (1969) (writing requirement ensures that parties are informed of motion); supra note 81
(court's written notice of hearing of oral motion fulfills writing requirement which provides
procedure without strict emphasis on form).
83. See United States v. 363 Cases, More Or Less, "Mountain Valley Mineral Water,"
143 F. Supp. 219, 223 (W.D. Ark. 1956) (motion for directed verdict may lack precise statement
of grounds as long as motion sufficiently apprises court of party's position). Cf. United States
v. 64.88 Acres of Land, 25 F.R.D. 88 (W.D.Pa. 1960). In 64.88 Acres, the government filed a
motion for a new trial in a land condemnation case, 25 F.R.D. 88 at 89 (W.D. Pa. 1960). The
government alleged as grounds for a new trial prejudice on the part of witnesses, procedural
grounds, and excessive verdict. Id. Counsel for the government argued that the grounds were
sufficient to advise the court of the government's position. Id. The court held that only the
excessive verdict ground met the rule 7(b)(1) requirement of particularity. Id. The court held
that the requirement of particularity demanded reasonable specification by the moving party.
Id. at 90-91; see also McGarr v. Hayford, 52 F.R.D. 219, 221 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (reasonable
specification requires only that court be able to understand movant's position).
84. See Alcaro v. Jean Jordeau, Inc., 3 F.R.D. 61, 61 (D.N.J. 1942). The plaintiff in
Alcaro filed a motion for a new trial after the court rendered judgment for the defendant. Id.
The motion listed five different grounds, the last ground stating that the plaintiff based the
motion on whatever grounds she might discover in typing the notes of testimony. Id. The
plaintiff later amended the motion to assert that the trial court failed to charge the proper law.
Id. The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's motion for lack of particularity. Id. The court
overruled the defendant's motion to strike noting that the plaintiff's attorney drafted the motion
without access to the charge of the court. Id.; see also 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
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when a motion will be dismissed for lack of particularity, courts focus on
whether the lack of particularity has prejudiced the opposing party. 5
As the Shah panel majority indicated, the late notice of appeal under
rule 4 satisfies the requirements of notice and particularity that courts have
adopted in deciding what qualifies as a motion under rule 7(b)(1).16 The
notice of appeal is a writing that explicitly manifests the intention of the
appellant to appeal and implicitly protects the appellant's right to appeal.1
7
The notice of appeal informs the court and the opposing party that the
appellant intends to appeal. 88 To require that the appellant specify grounds
for an extension of time when the appellant is unaware that his appeal is
untimely is to require the impossible. 9 The only acceptable grounds for a
motion for an extension of time are good cause and excusable neglect.9
Under facts like those in Shah, the untimely notice of appeal fulfills the
requirement of particularity by apprising the court of the appellant's posi-
tion. 91 The court, therefore, is able to comprehend the grounds of the motion
82, § 1192, at 37 (obligation to particularize grounds of motion does not require impossibilities).
85. See King v. Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D. 474, 477 (D.R.I. 1969). In King, the plaintiff
filed a motion with the court requesting the court to vacate an order of dismissal. Id. The
defendant argued that the plaintiff's motion lacked the requisite specificity under rule 7(b)(l).
Id. The court ruled that while the plaintiff's motion was not in compliance with the specificity
requirements of rule 7(b)(1), the opposing counsel was aware of the grounds of the motion. Id.
Since the court found counsel had notice of the grounds, the court allowed the motion. Id.; see
also Monjar v. Higgins, 39 F. Supp. 633, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 132 F.2d 990 (2d Cir.
1943). The plaintiff in Monjar objected to the defendant's motion for dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, arguing that the motion failed to meet the specificity requirements of rule 7(b)(1).
See id. The court allowed the motion, ruling that because the plaintiff already knew the grounds
for the motion, the lack of specificity did not prejudice the plaintiff. Id.
86. See 704 F.2d at 720-21. While the Shah panel decision did not discuss rule 7(b)(1),
the court determined that an untimely notice of appeal is an implicit motion for an extension
of time. Id. The Notes to the 1979 amendment state that appellants are to make motions for
an extension of time in accordance with rule 7(b)(1). FED. R. App. P. 4 advisory committee
notes.
87. 722 F.2d at 1170 (Haynesworth, J., dissenting).
88. See FED. R. Apr. P. 3 (clerk of district court must notify opposing party of court's
receipt of notice of appeal).
89. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (obligation of particularity does not require
appellant to designate grounds beyond appellant's knowledge); supra note 83 and accompanying
text (particularity requirement need only inform court of appellant's position). The appellants
in Shah were unaware that the notice of appeal was untimely because of a delay in postal
service. See 704 F.2d at 719. Courts have held reliance on the due course of mail delivery to be
reasonable and may consider an appellant's reliance on mail as a factor in determining excusable
neglect. See, e.g., Pryor v. Marshall, 711 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir. 1983) (delay in mail delivery
may constitute excusable neglect); Sanchez v. Board of Regents of Texas Southern Univ., 625
F.2d 521, 522 (5th Cir. 1980) (reliance on mail delivery may provide grounds for excuse of
untimely filing of appeal); Halfen v. United States, 324 F.2d 52, 54 (10th Cir. 1963) (untimely
filing excused where appellant mailed appeal in time for delivery under normal circumstances).
90. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (court may grant extension of time upon finding of good
cause or excusable neglect); see supra note 6 and accompanying text (excusable neglect standard).
91. See Kenney v. Fox, 132 F. Supp. 305, 307 (W.D. Mich. 1955), aff'd 232 F.2d 288
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855 (1956). In Kenney, the district court held that because a
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and should be free to consider the motion despite mere technical infirmities. 92
The question of possible prejudice to the opposing party raises the policy
considerations of the Rules, and particularly of rule 4(a)(5).93 The purposes
of the Rules are to promote simplicity in procedure and to ensure the just
resolution of disputes.9 4 The Rules are not a rigid code that courts should
construe without regard to the circumstances. 9 The time limitations of rule
4(a) establish a reliable limit for the parties, 96 as well as guard against dilatory
tactics. 97 The basic rationale underlying rule 4(a) is to provide a finite period
for litigation. 98 Subsection (5) of rule 4(a), however, balances the policies
favoring finality with the desire to protect the rights of appellants.9 The
thirty day grace period of rule 4(a)(5) protects appellants who, for good
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim presented a single definite question, rule 7 required
no further explanation other than the presence of the motion itself. See 132 F. Supp. at 307.
92. See McGarr v. Hayford, 52 F.R.D. 219, 221 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (court should avoid
basing decision on technicalities if court can understand grounds of motion); United States v.
363 Cases, More Or Less, "Mountain Valley Mineral Water," 143 F. Supp. 219, 223 (W.D.
Ark. 1956) (movant need not observe technical precision in stating grounds for motion but need
only fairly apprise court of movant's position); supra note 83 and accompanying text (appellant's
request for extension need only apprise court of appellant's position).
93. See Prettyman, The New Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure-A General View, 28
FED. B.J. 97, 97 (1969) (appellate rules should provide detail to help practitioner understand
mechanics of process but should not hinder solution of minor problems). Judge Prettyman was
the Chairman for the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules. Id.; see also Ward, supra note
2, at 101 (task of advisory committee was to develop rules that were fair and simple and that
eliminated unjust expense and delay); FED. R. App. P. 4(a) advisory committee note (courts
should not insist on literal compliance with rule 4 filing requirements over interests of fairness).
94. See In re Orbitec Corp., 520 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that rigidity of
former rule 4(a)(5) time limit conflicts with rule's purpose); see also Annual Report of the
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, at 7 (1958) (discussing purpose of
proposed Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).
95. Fallen v. Untied States, 378 U.S. 139, 142 (1964). In Fallen, an incarcerated pro se
appellant mailed a notice of appeal from prison. Id. at 141. A delay in the mails caused the
notice of appeal to arrive four days late. Id. The Court, discussing the predecessor to rule 4(b),
determined that the Rules should ensure the just determination of proceedings. Id. at 142. The
Court further stated that courts should construe the rules to secure simple and fair administration
of justice. Id.
96. See C-Thru Products, Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 397 F.2d 952, 955 (2d Cir. 1968). The
appellee in C-Thru Products argued that the appeal was untimely because the court had not
entered an order allowing an extension within the 60 day appeals period. Id. at 954-55. The
Second Circuit held that the time limitations of rule 4 served to set a period on which the
parties to an action could rely, not to force a court into hasty decisions and destruction of the
appellant's rights. Id. at 955.
97. See Files v. City of Rockford, 440 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1971). The Files court
determined that the basic reason for the rule 4(a) time limitations is to provide a definite point
at which litigation ends. Id.
98. See id.; supra note 96 (discussing policy of rule 4(a)).
99. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text (discussing balance between interests of
finality and appellant's rights). See generally Note, Failure to File Timely Notice of Appeal in
Criminal Cases: Excusable Neglect 41 NoTRE DAma LAW. 73, 75-78 (1965) (discussing balance
of interests of finality and appellant's rights in context of criminal trials).
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cause or excusable neglect, fail to meet the initial deadline.10 Allowing an
untimely notice to satisfy the motion requirement for an extension will not
prejudice the opposing party's right to notice of appeal since the appellant
must file either a notice of appeal or a motion for an extension of time
within the aggregate sixty day period allowed in rule 4(a)(5).10 1 The Shah
decision, however, prejudices the rights of the appellant who makes an
untimely appeal and in good faith fails to file an explicit motion for an
extension of time.102
In Shah v. Hutto, the Fourth Circuit overruled en banc the holding in
Craig v. Garrison that courts may treat an untimely notice of appeal as an
implicit motion for an extension of time. 03 Whether the plaintiff is pro se
or a member of the bar, a mere notice of appeal will be void if the court
receives the notice after the initial thirty day filing period without a separate
motion for an extension.1 4 The Shah decision adopts an unduly rigid
construction of the 1979 amendment to rule 4(a)(5).10s Since Shah bars
district courts from recognizing good faith attempts by appellants seeking to
discharge the filing and notice requirements of rule 4(a)(5), the holding
promotes neither the interests of the appellant nor those of the opposing
party.' 6 The Shah court ruled consistently with courts in most other circuits
in adopting a strict interpretation of the amended rule.' 7 In doing so, the
court eliminated the good faith exception formerly available to pro se litigants
who make substantial attempts to meet the timing requirements of rule
4(a)(5) but fail to submit a motion for extension of time.
RIcHARD B. EARLs
FRANcIs MIE SHAFFER
100. See FED. R. ApP. P. 4(a)(5) (court may grant extension of time upon finding of good
cause or excusable neglect).
101. See supra note 8 (requirement of notice of appeal or motion for extension of time);
supra note 88 (clerk of court must inform opposing party that appellant intends to appeal).
102. See 722 F.2d at 1169 (Haynesworth, J., dissenting) (court must interpret requirements
of rule 4(a) flexibly to avoid unjust impairment of appellant's rights). See also 704 F.2d at 720
(rigid interpretation of rule 4(a) motion requirement traps unwary appellants).
103. See 722 F.2d at 1168.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 1167-1168.
106. Id.; see supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text (discussing policies underlying rule
4(a)); Alley v. Dodge Hotel, 501 F.2d 880, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Alley, the pro se appellant
sent a motion for an extension of time to the district court. Id. at 885. A discrepancy developed
over whether the motion arrived on the last permissible day or one day late. Id. The court held
that because the appellant was proceeding pro se, considerations of fairness demanded that the
court accept the motion and allow the appellant to demonstrate that the delay was not entirely
the appellant's fault. Id. at 884, 886.




B. In Personam Jurisdiction over
Nonresident Insurers
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution imposes limitations on the power of a court to exercise in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.' Due process requires
that the nonresident defendant maintain sufficient "minimum contacts" with
the forum state to support the court's assertion of personal jurisdiction.
2
Courts typically employ a two part inquiry to determine whether a particular
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.3 First,
the court examines the language of the state long arm statute4 to determine
1. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); Kulko v.
California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme
Court reiterated that the due process clause prohibits state courts from rendering judgments
against nonresident defendants whose rights the court is not authorized to adjudicate. 444 U.S.
at 291. A court is authorized to render a valid judgment against the defendant when the
defendant has received adequate notice of the suit. Id.; Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950). The court also must have personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant. 444 U.S. at 291; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
2. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1940) (defendant's domicile in forum state is sufficient to bring absent
defendant within forum state's jurisdiction). In International Shoe, the Supreme Court replaced
the original jurisdictional test of Pennoyer v. Neff with the minimum contacts approach coupled
with the requirement of fair play and substantial justice. 326 U.S. at 316; see Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878) (states possess exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within borders but cannot exercise direct jurisdiction over persons and property outside
state lines). Minimum contacts confer upon the state the power to exercise jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant because contacts provide a substitute for the defendant's presence within
the territory. See 326 U.S. at 316-17. The determination of whether the defendant maintains
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state for the state to exercise jurisdiction is not
simply a mechanical or a quantitative test. Id. at 319. Rather, a finding of jurisdiction is
dependent upon the quality and nature of the defendant's activities within the forum state. Id.
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court stated that the minimum contact requirement served
two functions. 444 U.S. at 291-92. First, the minimum contacts requirement protects defendants
from having to litigate in a distant or inconvenient forum. Id. at 292. Second, the requirement
of minimum contacts further operates to keep state sovereignty intact. Id. See generally Lilly,
Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85 (1983) (analyzing current
standards and limitations in personal jurisdiction suits involving domestic and alien nonresident
defendants).
3. See, e.g., Raffaele v. Campagni Generale Maritime, 707 F.2d 395, 396 (9th Cir. 1983)
(court first must apply state long arm statute to determine whether defendant's conduct creates
cause of action under statute and then must consider whether application of statute is consistent
with due process); Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Argo Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651, 653 (8th Cir.
1982) (court must determine whether facts presented satisfy statutory requirements and whether
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction satisfies due process); Craig v. General Finance Corp.
of Illinois, 504 F. Supp. 1033, 1036 (D. Md. 1980) (application of Maryland's long arm statute
is two step process requiring court to determine whether statute authorizes service on nonresident
defendant and whether service of process violates due process).
4. See Prejean v. Sonatrach Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir. 1981) (court achieves
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant by service of process under state long arm statute). The
Prejean court maintained that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
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whether the facts presented satisfy the statutory requirements for the court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction.5 The court then considers whether the
defendant's contacts with the forum state suffice as minimum contacts for
the purpose of satisfying due process requirements.6 The minimum contacts
inquiry should focus primarily on the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation.7 In August v. HBA Life Insurance Co.,8 the Fourth
Circuit utilized such a two part inquiry to determine whether a Virginia court
could exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurance company
based on an insurance policy issued to a nonresident who later came to
reside in Virginia.9
In August, an Arizona insurance company, HBA Life Insurance (HBA),
issued to Scott August (August), also a resident of Arizona, a health
insurance policy that covered August and his family.'0 In September 1977,
the Augusts moved to Virginia and established residency." While residing in
Virginia, August paid four monthly premiums due on the insurance policy
with checks drawn on a Virginia bank. 2 In December 1977, August filed a
claim under the HBA policy on behalf of Mrs. August, who had received
medical treatment and hospitalization. 3 In a letter to August, HBA stated
that the policy did not cover Mrs. August's medical expenses because of
limitations expressed in the provisions of the policy.14 HBA enclosed in the
defendant who has minimum contacts with the state only if the state long arm statute authorizes
the court's assertion of jurisdiction. Id. at 1264. A federal court in a diversity action may assert
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when consistent with the long arm statute of the
forum state. Brown v. Flowers Indus. Inc., 688 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1275 (1983); see FED. R. Crv. P. 4(d)(7) and (e) (governing personal service upon non
inhabitant of forum state). A federal court must follow the state court's construction of the
state's long arm statute or interpret the statute in the same manner as the state's highest court
would have interpreted the statute. See DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1264-65
(5th Cir. 1983) (federal court may exercise jurisdiction where state court could have done so);
Prejean, 652 F.2d at 1264-65 n.3 (federal court required to follow state's highest court in
interpreting state long arm statute). See generally Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight
Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 63 U. ILL. L. F. 533 (1963) (comprehensive evaluation
of Illinois long arm statute after eight years of judicial interpretation and construction).
5. See Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 699, 708 (1982)
(approving district court's finding that defendant had sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania to
fall within Pennsylvania long arm statute). See also Copiers Typewriters Calculators v. Toshiba
Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 318-21 (D. Md. 1983) (interpreting and applying Maryland's long arm
statute).
6. See id. (applying minimum contact standards enunciated in Supreme Court rulings
and followed in lower court opinions to determine whether court's exercise of personal jur-
isdiction over defendant comports with due process).
7. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
8. 734 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1984).
9. Id. at 170-73.




14. Id. In August v. HBA Life Ins. Co., HBA Life Ins. Co. (HBA) denied the insurance
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letter an elimination rider 5 which confirmed that the policy did not cover
the losses resulting from Mrs. August's physical condition. 6 August, how-
ever, did not sign the elimination rider.
7
August subsequently instituted an action against HBA in the Circuit
Court of King and Queen County, Virginia, based on HBA's disclaimer of
coverage.' 8 August served HBA with process under Virginia's long arm
statute. 9 The state court rendered a default judgment for the Augusts in
April 1981, after HBA failed to file responsive pleadings.
20
In July 1981, the Augusts filed a petition for bankruptcy in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 2' In pursuing
the default judgment against HBA, the Augusts submitted to the bankruptcy
court a complaint for turnover of property. 22 HBA moved to dismiss the
complaint, maintaining that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over
the property sought in the complaint. 23 The bankruptcy court determined
that HBA did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Virginia to satisfy
due process requirements. 24 The bankruptcy court accordingly ruled that the
claim by August for essentially two reasons, both of which related to the terms of the policy.
Id. at 170. First, HBA asserted that Mrs. August's illness, which required hospitalization,
originated prior to the effective date of the policy. Id. HBA also claimed that Mrs. August had
an extensive history of medical problems that the Augusts failed to disclose on the application
for the policy. Id.
15. See generally 13A J. APPLEMiAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7539 (discussing
insurance policy modification by riders). A rider or endorsement issued in connection with the
execution of an insurance policy becomes part of the insurance agreement. See Lumbermens
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Sutch, 197 F.2d 79, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1952) (court must read insurance policy
and endorsement in conjunction with each other to determine intent of parties).
16. 734 F.2d at 170. The elimination rider in August omitted from coverage under the
original policy losses resulting from disease peculiar to the female organs suffered by Sharon
August. Id.
17. Id. at 173.
18. August v. HBA Life Insurance Co., No. 82-0175-R, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Va. May 26,
1982).
19. 734 F.2d at 170; see VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1 (1983) (Virginia long arm statute); infra
note 29 (text of § 8.01-328.1).
20. August, No. 82-0175-R, slip op. at 1-2.
21. 734 F.2d at 169.
22. Id. at 170; see In re August, 17 B.R. 628 (E.D. Va. 1982) (August's filing of complaint
for turnover of property); 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (1984) (stay of action against codebtor after order
of relief under bankruptcy code); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (1984) (in complaint for turnover
of property, bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over all debtor's property regardless of
where property is located).
23. Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Motion To Dismiss at 9-10, August v. HBA
Life Ins. Co., 17 B.R. 628, 629 (E.D. Va. 1982). In August, HBA asserted that the state court
ruling which awarded a money judgment to the Augusts was void for want of personal
jurisdiction over HBA. Id. HBA argued, therefore, that the bankruptcy court could not maintain
the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) because the court lacked jurisdiction over the money
award. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (1984) (bankruptcy court maintains jurisdiction over all debtors
property).
24. See 17 B.R. at 630-31 (August bankruptcy court's discussion of minimum contacts).
In addition to International Shoe and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., the bankruptcy
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
state court default judgment was invalid and ordered the August's complaint
dismissed for lack of jurisdictionY In a memorandum opinion, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia affirmed the
judgment of the bankruptcy court.
26
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district
court. 27 The Fourth Circuit used a bifurcated approach in considering whether
HBA maintained sufficient contacts with Virginia to support the state court's
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over HBA. 2s The Fourth Circuit first
examined the language of section 8.01-328.1 of Virginia's long arm statute29
to establish that the statute provided authority for the assertion of jurisdic-
tion.30 The Fourth Circuit then reviewed relevant Supreme Court decisions
for guidance in determining whether HBA's contacts with Virginia satisfied
established due process standards. 3' Following an assessment of HBA's
court in August relied heavily upon Danville Plywood Corp. v. Plain and Fancy Kitchens, Inc.
Id. at 630-31; see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (upholding
jurisdiction based on insurance contract consummated in forum state); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (announcing minimum contacts approach to personal
jurisdiction determination); Danville Plywood Corp. v. Plain and Fancy Kitchens, Inc., 218 Va.
533, 535, 238 S.E.2d 800, 801-02 (1977) (finding insufficient contacts to satisfy due process
requirements for state's assertion of jurisdiction). In Danville Plywood, an agent for Danville
Plywood called on Fancy Kitchens, Inc., a nonresident corporation at the corporation's place
of business. 238 SE.2d at 801. In response to Danville Plywood's solicitation, Fancy Kitchens
placed an order for plywood panels. Id. at 534. Fancy Kitchens received allegedly defective
goods from Danville Plywood and declined to pay for the goods. Id., 238 S.E.2d at 802. Fancy
Kitchens' single contact with the state of Virginia was the order placed for plywood panels in
response to Danville Plywood's solicitation. Id. at 535, 238 S.E.2d at 802. Danville Plywood
subsequently instituted an action to recover the price of the goods. Id. at 534, S.E.2d at 802.
In determining whether Virginia could exercise jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled
that Fancy Kitchens' acceptance of the purchase order in Virginia, and Kitchens' agreement to
ship the panels F.O.B. buyer did not satisfy the minimum contact requirement. Id. at 535,
S.E.2d at 802. The bankruptcy court in August believed that the facts in Danville Plywood
were similar to the August facts because HBA had no contacts with Virginia except for the
insurance policy issued to the Augusts. 17 B.R. at 631.
25. 17 B.R. at 631.
26. August, No. 82-0175-R, slip op. at 1.
27. 734 F.2d at 173.
28. See id. at 170-73.
29. See id. at 171. Section 8.01-328.1 of the Virginia Code provides in part: "A. A court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause
of action arising from a person's: 1. Transacting any business in this Commonwealth; 7.
Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this Commonwealth at the
time of contracting . . ." VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1 (1983).
30. 734 F.2d at 171-72.
31. Id. at 172-73. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297-98 (1980) (defendant subject to jurisdiction of court sitting in forum state where defendant
has delivered products into stream of commerce with expectation that product will be purchased
by consumers in forum state); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (exercise of
jurisdiction sustainable when defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957) (jurisdiction based on single insurance contract consummated in forum state); Interna-
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contacts, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction over HBA satisfied due process requirements.3 2
In addressing section 8.01-328.1 of Virginia's long arm statute, the
Fourth Circuit expressed considerable doubt that the statute would apply to
the facts as presented if the statute was interpreted strictly. 3 The Fourth
Circuit submitted, however, that courts have construed Virginia's long arm
statute to extend the assertion of personal jurisdiction to the limits imposed
by the due process clause.3 4 Virginia's long arm statute thus may confer
jurisdiction in a Virginia court when a defendant's act constitutes a business
transaction within the meaning of the statute and gives rise to a cause of
action. 35 The Fourth Circuit suggested that courts should liberally construe
section 8.01-328.1 to support long arm jurisdiction in all insurance contract
cases as long as assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign insurer is consistent
with due process.36 The Fourth Circuit determined that the critical issue,
therefore, was whether HBA maintained sufficient minimum contacts with
Virginia to satisfy due process requirements. 37
The Fourth Circuit began its inquiry into the sufficiency of HBA's
contacts with Virginia by examining the due process standard enunciated in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.31 In International Shoe, the Supreme
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (Supreme Court's pronouncement of
requirement of minimum contacts as predicate to state's assertion of jurisdiction).
32. 734 F.2d at 173.
33. Id. at 171. The August court observed that § 8.01-328.1 of the Virginia Code permits
a court sitting in the state to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the
defendant has transacted business in the state or entered into an insurance agreement within
the state. Id.; VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1 (1983); supra note 29 (text of § 8.01-328.1). The Fourth
Circuit expressed doubt about the applicability of § 8.01-328.1 to the facts in August because
the court recognized that the parties had not consummated the insurance agreement within
Virginia nor had HBA transacted business in the state. See 734 F.2d at 171; VA. CODE § 8.01-
328.1 (1983); supra note 29 (text of § 8.01-328.1).
34. 734 F.2d at 171, citing Danville Plywood v. Plain & Fancy Kitchens, Inc., 218 Va.
533, 534, 238 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1977) (Virginia's long arm statute grants Virginia courts
jurisdiction over causes of action arising out of defendant's business transaction within state);
see John J. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 740, 180 S.E.2d 664, 667,
(1971) (purpose of Virginia's long arm statute is to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
to fullest extent permissible under due process); supra note 29 (text of Virginia long arm
statute).
35. See VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1 (1983); supra note 29 & 34 (text and interpretation of
Virginia long arm statute).
36. 734 F.2d at 171-72. In HBA's brief filed with the Fourth Circuit in August, HBA
argued that Virginia's statutory authority excludes from Virginia's jurisdiction foreign insurers
that have entered into insurance contracts outside of Virginia with nonresidents of the state.
Brief for Appellee at 23, August v. HBA Life Insurance Co., 734 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1984); see
VA. CODE §§ 38.1-64, -67, -339, -98.1 (1983) (Virginia statutes governing insurance transactions
in Virginia). HBA asserted that the Virginia statutes which the Augusts cited, authorizing
jurisdiction based on insurance contracts delivered or issued in Virginia, could not confer
jurisdiction over HBA because the instant parties had entered into the insurance agreement in
Arizona. Brief for Appellee, supra at 22-23; see §§ 38.1-64, -67, -339, -98.1 (1983) (Virginia
statutes cited by HBA in asserting that intent of statutory authority is to exclude from Virginia
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Court laid the foundation for modern jurisdictional analysis by requiring the
defendant to have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state as a
precondition to the state's assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant. 39 As acknowledged by the August court, the International Shoe
test further provides that traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice govern maintenance of the suit.
40
In addition to the standards set forth in International Shoe, the Fourth
Circuit referred to the standard announced in Hanson v. Denkla,41 which
suggests that jurisdiction lies in the forum state when the defendant pur-
posefully has availed itself of the privileges of transacting business within
the forum state.42 The Fourth Circuit, in considering the purposeful availment
jurisdiction foreign insurers not transacting business in Virginia). The Fourth Circuit in August
addressed individually each provision that HBA cited and concluded that Virginia's long arm
statute differs in its purpose from the statutes cited by HBA. 734 F.2d at 171. The Fourth
Circuit explained that the Virginia legislature intended Virginia's long arm statute, unlike the
cited statutes, to confer jurisdiction in Virginia courts to the extent permissible under the due
process clause. Id. at 171-72.
37. 734 F.2d at 172.
38. Id.; see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1957) (announcing
minimum contacts approach to personal jurisdiction inquiry).
39. See 326 U.S. at 316 (nonresident defendant must maintain minimum contacts with
forum state as predicate to state's assertion of jurisdiction).
40. 734 F.2d at 172; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (subjecting nonresident defendant to jurisdiction
of court sitting in forum state must be "reasonable").
41. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
42. 734 F.2d at 172; see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). In Hanson, a
resident of Pennsylvania set up a trust with a Delaware trust company. 357 U.S. at 238. The
trust's settlor subsequently moved to Florida where she executed a power of appointment in
favor of her grandchildren. Id. at 239. Upon the settlor's death, a dispute arose between the
beneficiaries. Id. at 240. A Florida state court suit ensued in which the court determined that
the trust and power of appointment were ineffective under Florida law. Id. at 242. In determining
whether the Florida court had jurisdiction over the Delaware trust company, the Supreme Court
on certiorari observed that the defendant trust company had no contacts with Florida except
for the receipt of occasional instructions from the trust's settlor while the settlor resided in
Florida. Id. at 252. The Supreme Court stated that the defendant satisfies the minimum contacts
requirements for in personam jurisdiction by purposefully availing itself of the opportunity to
engage in business activities within the forum state. Id. at 253. The Hanson Court further
maintained that a person's unilateral activity with the nonresident defendant does not satisfy
minimum contact requirements. Id. The Court ruled that the Delaware trust company had no
contacts with Florida that would suffice as minimum contacts to sustain the jurisdiction of the
Florida court. Id. at 251. See generally Kuland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause
And The In Personam Jurisdiction Of State Courts From Pennoyer To Denckla: A Review, 25
U. Cm. L. Rav. 569, 610-23 (1958) (discussing Hanson).
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a nonresident
defendant is amenable to suit in the forum state when it was foreseeable that the defendant's
product would be utilized in the forum state. 444 U.S. 286, 295-96 (1980). The Supreme Court
reasoned that if foreseeability was a proper test of jurisdiction then the defendant seller would
be amenable to suit in every state where the defendant could foresee the possibility of goods
entering that market. Id. The Court stated that a foreseeability test thus would cause a
defendant's product to serve as the defendant's agent subjecting the defendant to the jurisdiction
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test stated that HBA did not purposefully avail itself of the privileges of
conducting business in Virginia because HBA had no choice but to accept
the premiums sent by August from Virginia.4 3 The Fourth Circuit similarly
concluded that HBA had not satisfied the purposefulness test of World- Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,4 which presupposes jurisdiction when the
defendant has introduced its product into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that the product will be utilized in the forum state. 45 The August
court maintained that the language of the insurance policy indicated that
HBA foresaw the possibility that the policyholder might relocate in another
state. 46 The Fourth Circuit recognized, however, that under World-Wide
Volkswagen, foreseeability is not a sufficient standard for sustaining a court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction.4 7 In rejecting foreseeability as a permissible
criterion for upholding jurisdiction, the World-Wide Volkswagen court em-
phasized that the defendant's affiliation with the forum state must be such
that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into a court of
of the state where the product caused injury. Id. at 296. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court
suggested that a standard superior to a foreseeability test is whether the defendant reasonably
could anticipate being haled into court in the forum state based on the defendant's affiliation
with the state. See id. at 297 (defendant's conduct and connection with forum state must be
such that defendant reasonably could anticipate being amenable to suit in state); see also Kulko
v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978) (jurisdiction should lie in defendant's
state of domicile since defendant could not reasonably anticipate being amenable to suit in
California); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) (defendant's affiliation with forum
state of Delaware was not such that defendant had reason to expect to be brought before a
Delaware court).
43. 734 F.2d at 172.
44. Id. at 173; see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98
(1980); see infra note 45 (discussion of World-Wide Volkswagen).
45. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (state has not exceeded jurisdictional
powers by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident defendant when defendant delivers product
into stream of commerce with expectation that consumers in forum state will purchase product).
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an Oklahoma
court could exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants, a New York auto retailer and
its wholesaler, in an action arising out of an automobile accident in Oklahoma involving an
allegedly defective auto sold by the defendants. Id. at 268. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court
implied that a defendant manufacturer or distributor should not be amenable to suit based on
an isolated occurrence resulting from use of the defendant's product in the forum state. Id. at
297. The Court maintained, however, that a court reasonably may exercise jurisdiction over a
manufacturer or distributor which intends to serve directly or indirectly that particular market.
Id. In World- Wide Volkswagen, the defendant wholesaler distributed automobiles in New York,
New Jersey, and Connecticut and the defendant retailer sold automobiles only in New York.
Id. at 298. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court reasoned, therefore, that the defendants could
not reasonably expect to be brought before an Oklahoma court and should thus not be subject
to the jurisdiction of that state. Id. at 298-99.
46. 734 F.2d at 172. The provision of the policy in August, which suggested the possibility
of the policyholders' relocation, provided that HBA would not adjust the premium rates paid
by August unless HBA readjusted all policies similar in nature and held by persons residing in
the same state. Id. at 170.
47. Id. at 173; see World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295; supra notes 42 and 45
(discussion of personal jurisdiction standards enunciated in World-Wide Volkswagen).
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that state. 4s The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that the foreseeability
of the Augusts' move to Virginia along did not create sufficient minimum
contacts between HBA and Virginia.
49
In further analyzing HBA's contacts with Virginia, the Fourth Circuit
relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance
Co.10 In McGee, a California resident obtained a life insurance policy from
an Arizona insurer which then transferred the policy obligation to a Texas
48. 444 U.S. at 297; see supra notes 42 and 45 (discussing foreseeability and reasonable
expectation tests addressed in World-Wide Volkswagen).
49. 734 F.2d at 173. The August court noted that some case law exists sustaining a court's
exercise of jurisdiction over out-of-state liability insurers based on accidents and attendant
injury within the forum state caused by automobiles covered by the insurer. Id. at 172-73; see
Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 159 F. Supp. 155, 156-59 (E.D. La. 1958)
(upholding Louisiana jurisdiction based on statute permitting service of process on nonresident
liability insurer). The Fourth Circuit referred to Pugh because Pugh and automobile liability
insurance cases similar to Pugh imply that foreseeability is a suitable criterion for upholding
jurisdiction. See 734 F.2d at 172-73; Pugh, 159 F. Supp. at 158-59 (single accident within forum
state constitutes sufficient contact with forum state to justify maintenance of suit over nonres-
ident liability insurer having no contacts with forum state); see also Bevins v. Coment Casualty
Co., 71 Ill. App. 3d 758, 28 Ill. Dec. 333, 390 N.E.2d 500, 504-05 (1979) (liability insurer
agreeing to insure driver against all liability in any state, amenable to suit in West Virginia
based on single contact arising out of insure's automobile accident in West Virginia). Foresee-
ability, as a criterion for upholding jurisdiction, may be implied in Pugh and similar cases
because insurers with no contacts with the forum state are subject to the jurisdiction of the
state by virtue of a policyholder having committed a wrong there. See 159 F. Supp. at 158-59.
Pugh, however, did not consider foreseeability as a standard for upholding jurisdiction. See id.
at 155-56. Rather, Pugh involved the issue of the validity of Louisiana's direct action statute,
which authorizes Louisiana jurisdiction over nonresident liability insurers whose policyholders
have been sued in Louisiana. Id. at 158-59; see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3474 (West Supp.
1978). For a recent discussion addressing jurisdiction over an auto liability insurer based on a
single contract arising out of an auto accident within the forum state, see Rossman v.
Consolidated Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 505, 508-09 (E.D. Va. 1984) in which the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia relied in part on August and Pugh in
upholding jurisdiction over a nonresident auto liability insurer.
In Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Louisiana's direct action statute. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-74
(1954). The Louisiana direct action statute provided for jurisdiction in a Louisiana court over
suits in which either the insurer issued the policy in Louisiana or the injury occurred in the
state. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West Supp. 1978). The Watson Court, in determining
that the direct action statute did not violate due process, reasoned that Louisiana had a
legitimate interest in protecting the legal rights of persons injured within its borders. 348 U.S.
at 73; cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (upholding constitutionality of
Massachusetts statute authorizing service of process over nonresident defendants in proceedings
arising out of accidents or collisions on Massachusetts highways in which nonresident defendant
involved). Because August does not address the validity of a direct action statute, direct action
statute decisions provide little guidance in assessing the sufficiency of contacts in relation to
due process jurisdictional standards. See 734 F.2d at 170-73; Note, Direct Action Statutes: Their
Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problems, 74 HARv. L. REv. 357, 360-63 (1960) (direct action
statutes are legislatively created right of action intended to protect legal rights of injured parties).
50. 734 F.2d at 172-73; see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221-23
(1957); infra notes 51-57 & 95-104 and accompanying text (discussion of McGee and comparison
of McGee to August).
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insurer."' Upon the death of the insured, the beneficiary of the policy filed
a claim that the Texas insurer refused to pay. 2 The beneficiary then filed
suit in a California state court and the state court rendered a judgment
against the Texas insurer.5 3 In determining whether the beneficiary could
enforce the state court judgment, the McGee Court held that California
could exercise jurisdiction over the Texas insurer based on the substantial
connection between the insurance contract and the state of California.5 4 The
Fourth Circuit distinguished McGee from August, noting that in August the
parties did not consummate the insurance agreement within the forum state
nor had HBA negotiated the contract with the knowledge that the Augusts
were moving to Virginia.55 The August court stated, however, that the McGee
ruling would support in personam jurisdiction over HBA if August had
executed the elimination rider.5 6 The Fourth Circuit submitted that the
execution of the solicited rider would suffice as a minimum contact conferring
jurisdiction over HBA1
7
The Fourth Circuit concluded, however, in contrast to the district's view,
that the elimination rider substantially modified the provisions of the policy
even though August never executed the rider. In reversing the judgment of
the district court, the Fourth Circuit explained that the elimination rider
materially altered the policy by excluding coverage existing in the original
policy. 9 The August court further maintained that a significant relationship
existed between the Augusts' cause of action and HBA's solicitation of the
elimination rider despite the fact that August never signed the rider.6 Based
primarily on HBA's solicitation of the elimination rider, the Fourth Circuit
held that the Virginia state court properly exercised long arm jurisdiction
over HBA. 61
51. 355 U.S. at 221.
52. Id. at 222.
53. Id. at 221.
54. Id. at 223. The McGee Court determined that the delivery of the policy in California,
the mailing of the premiums from the same state, and the death of the insured in California
constituted sufficient contacts with the forum state to confer jurisdiction. Id. The Court also
emphasized that the state of California had an interest in providing the plaintiff with a forum.
Id. The McGee Court further suggested that if the foreign insurer were not amenable to suit in
the forum state, the insurer effectively would be judgment proof from individuals with moderate
claims because policyholders would be unwilling to seek redress in distant forums. Id; see
Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950) (due process does not forbid state
from subjecting nonresident insurer to jurisdiction of state court to protect state residents from
having to seek redress on moderate claims in distant states).
55. 734 F.2d at 172.





61. Id. The Fourth Circuit in August mentioned that the August's residency in Virginia
and the continuation of the policy from Virginia via monthly premium payments further
supported upholding jurisdiction over HBA. Id.
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The dissenting opinion in August disagreed with the majority's deter-
mination that the solicitation of the elimination rider provided a sufficient
contact with Virginia.6 2 The dissent argued that the purpose of the rider was
not to alter the policy but only to clarify the provision of the policy which
disclaimed coverage. 6 The dissent asserted, moreover, that because HBA
mailed the rider after the Augusts filed a claim under the policy, the
solicitation of the rider could not operate as a contact with the forum state.
64
Finally, the dissent contended that the solicitation of the rider was not a
business transaction between the parties because August never signed the
rider. 65 The dissent suggested that the absence of a business transaction in
the forum state made August distinguishable from McGee because the
insurance agreement in McGee had been consummated in the forum state.
66
The divergence between the majority and the dissent reflects a general
inconsistency among courts in determining whether a single contact with the
forum state is sufficient to constitute minimum contacts for the purpose of
establishing personal jurisdiction. 6 When a single contact, out of which the
plaintiff's suit arises, confers jurisdiction, the state is exercising "specific
jurisdiction" over the defendant. 68 In exercising specific jurisdiction, the
court's authority to adjudicate the matter arises out of the relationship
between the litigation and the defendant's contacts with the forum state.
69
With "general jurisdiction," the court of a state has power to adjudicate
the claim based on the defendant's contacts with the forum state that are
unrelated to the litigation.7 0 In a series of recent cases addressing personal
jurisdiction issues, the Supreme Court reemphasized that a distinction exists
62. Id. at 173-74 (Hall, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 174.
64. Id.
65. Id. The August dissent noted that the Supreme Court has stated that mere solicitation
in a state by a foreign corporation does not alone subject that corporation to the state's
jurisdiction. Id. at 174 n.2, citing Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 264,
267-68 (1917); Green v. Chicago Burlington & Quincy Ry. :Co., 205 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1907).
66. 734 F.d at 174 (Hall, J., dissenting); see McGee, 355 U.S. at 221 (insurance agreement
entered into in forum state of California); supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (discussion
of McGee); infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text (comparison of McGee to August).
67. Compare Mississippi Interstate Exp. Inc., v. Transp. Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1012 (5th
Cir. 1982) (California defendant's single nonfortuitous contract entered into with Mississippi
corporation satisfied minimum contact requirement necessary for Mississippi court to exercise
personal jurisdiction) with Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Const. Co., 597 F.2d
596, 603 (7th Cir. 1979) (single contract entered into by West Virginia corporation not sufficient
contact for Wisconsin to assert jurisdiction), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980). See generally
Note, Minimum Contacts and Contracts: The Breached Relationship, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1639 (1983) (survey of circuit courts' application of Supreme Court personal jurisdiction
precedent in minimum contact cases based on contract between nonresident defendant and party
within forum state).
68. See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HAv. L. REv. 1121, 1144-64 (1966) (discussing developments in specific jurisdiction cases).
69. See id. at 1144-45 (defining specific jurisdiction).
70. See id. at 1136-44 (discussing general jurisdiction).
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between specific and general jurisdiction. 7' Moreover, the Court suggested
that a court of a state may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant
based on contacts less substantial than those required for the assertion of
general jurisdiction. 72
The Supreme Court determined in the companion cases of Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine 3 and Calder v. Jones7 4 that the relationship which existed
among the defendants, the forum and the litigation satisfied the minimum
contact requirement to assert specific jurisdiction over the defendants. 75 In
Keeton, the plaintiff brought a libel suit against the defendant, Hustler
Magazine, Inc., in the United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire claiming to have been libeled in five separate issues of the
magazine.76 Hustler's contacts with New Hampshire consisted of the monthly
marketing of ten to fifteen thousand copies of the defendant's magazine.77
In determining whether New Hampshire could assert jurisdiction over Hus-
tler, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's monthly sale of magazines
in the state satisfied the minimum contacts requirement of due process. 78
71. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (1984) (specific jurisdiction
analysis); Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1486 (1984) (same); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872-73 (1984) (general jurisdiction analysis); infra
notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussion of Keeton); infra notes 82-88 and accompanying
text (discussion of Calder); infra note 80 (discussion of Halo.
72. See Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1481 (less substantial activities in forum state sufficient to
support jurisdiction where cause of action arises out of those activities).
73. 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
74. 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
75. See Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1481-82 (defendant Hustler's monthly sale of magazines in
New Hampshire constitutes minimum contact sufficient to sustain jurisdiction in New Hampshire
district court); Calder, 104 S. Ct. at 1486-88 (defendants' intentional conduct calculated to have
impact in California subjects defendants to jurisdiction of California court); see also Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (minimum contacts inquiry should focus on relationship
among defendant, forum and litigation).
76. 104 S. Ct. at 1477. Although the plaintiff in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine was not a
resident of New Hampshire, the plaintiff brought the suit in that state because New Hampshire
was the only state with a statute of limitations that did not bar her otherwise untimely libel
suit. Id. The Supreme Court in Keeton stated that although a plaintiff's residence may be
relevant to the determination of jurisdiction, a plaintiff's lack of residence in the forum state
will not defeat jurisdiction. Id. at 1481. However, the Keeton Court further recognized that the
plaintiff's residence in the forum state may be an important consideration in the jurisdictional
inquiry when the defendant's contact with the forum state results from the defendant's
relationship with the plaintiff. Id. In August, HBA's only contact with Virginia resulted from
HBA's relationship with the Augusts. 734 F.2d at 170, 172. The Fourth Circuit in August
apparently gave considerable weight in the jurisdictional inquiry to the plaintiff's residence in
the forum state. See 734 F.2d at 172-73; infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (analysis of
Fourth Circuit's reasoning in August).
77. 104 S. Ct. at 1477.
78. Id. at 1478. In Keeton, the Court emphasized that the defendant's monthly sale of
magazines in New Hampshire was not a random or fortuitous event. Id. The Keeton Court
maintained, rather, that the defendant's activity within the state was voluntary, allowing New
Hampshire properly to assert jurisdiction. Id.; accord World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980); supra note 45 (court sitting in forum state may
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The Court noted, however, that the defendant's contacts with New Hamp-
shire normally would not suffice as minimum contacts in a suit unrelated to
the defendant's activities within the state. 79 The Keeton Court found the
contacts to be sufficient for the New Hampshire district court to assert
specific jurisdiction because the defendant's activity within the state gave
rise to the cause of action 0 In finding sufficient contacts, the Court reasoned
that sustaining the New Hampshire district court's jurisdiction resulted in no
unfairness to the defendant because the defendant, having purposefully
entered that market, could have anticipated being haled before a New
Hampshire court."
The purposefulness of the defendant's activities in the forum state
similarly provided a controlling factor in the Calder opinion.8 2 In Calder,
the plaintiff brought a libel suit in a California court against the editor and
a reporter for National Enquirer, Inc. for erroneous statements made in the
corporation's national weekly newspaper.83 Although the defendants wrote
and edited the article at the corporation's principal place of business in
Florida, the article appeared in the newspaper, which has its largest circula-
reasonably exercise jurisdiction over manufacturer or distributor which serves directly or
indirectly that particular territory).
79. 104 S. Ct. at 1481.
80. Id. at 1481-82; cf. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S. Ct.
1868, 1872-73 (1984) (defendant's contacts with forum state unrelated to plaintiff's cause of
action). In Hall, the Supreme Court reiterated that when a suit does not arise out of a
defendant's contact with the forum state, a defendant's contacts must be of a continuous and
systematic nature to satisfy the minimum contact requirement for a state's assertion of general
in personam jurisdiction. See 104 S. Ct. at 1872-73. In Hall, the survivors and representatives
of four Americans killed in a helicopter crash in Peru brought a wrongful death action in Texas
against the Colombian corporation, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (Helicol), which
owned the helicopter. Id. at 1870. Helicol's contacts with Texas included the purchase of $4
million worth of helicopters, parts, and accessories from a Texas manufacturer and the sending
of personnel to the same manufacturer for training. Id. Helicol also sent its chief executive
officer to Texas to negotiate a pipeline contract with a Peruvian consortium and received checks
drawn by the consortium on a Texas bank. Id. In determining whether the corporation
maintained sufficient contacts with Texas for a Texas state court to assert general jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court indicated that the case presented a general jurisdiction question because the
suit did not arise out of Helicol's activities within Texas. Id. at 1872-73. The Hall Court held
that Helicol's contacts with Texas did not satisfy the minimum contact requirement of due
process because the contacts were not of a "continuous and systematic" nature. Id. at 1873-
74; accord Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (upholding
Ohio state court jurisdiction over foreign corporation on the basis of corporation's systematic
and continuous contacts with forum state although contacts unrelated to cause of action).
81. 104 S. Ct. at 1481-82.
82. See Calder, 104 S. Ct. at 1487 (defendants' intentional conduct calculated to have
deliberate impact in California operates to subject defendants to jurisdiction of California
court); infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (discussion of Calder).
83. 104 S. Ct. at 1484-85. In Calder v. Jones, the plaintiff joined as defendants the
National Enquirer, Inc. (Enquirer) and the corporation's local distributor. Id. at 1484. The
Calder Court did not address the constitutionality of subjecting these defendants to the
jurisdiction of a California court because neither the Enquirer nor the distributor objected to
California's jurisdiction. Id. at 1485.
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tion in California." The defendants in Calder lacked relevant contacts with
California except for their responsibility for the published article. 5 The
Calder Court, employing a specific jurisdiction analysis similar to that in
Keeton, determined that the California court could exercise jurisdiction over
the defendants based on their intentional conduct that was calculated to have
a deliberate impact in the forum state.8 6 The Calder Court, therefore, upheld
the jurisdiction of the California court based solely on the effects in
California of the defendant's conduct outside the state.8 7 Perhaps more so
than Keeton, Calder introduces a more expansive approach to the minimum
contact requirement in specific jurisdiction cases because the Calder Court
found jurisdiction despite the defendants' tenuous, but intentional, contacts
with the forum state.88 More importantly, both Keeton and Calder reem-
phasize the minimum contact approach endorsed in recent Supreme Court
decisions which suggest that a nonresident defendant is subject to the
jurisdiction of a court within the forum state when the defendant has
affiliated itself voluntarily with the forum state by transacting or soliciting
business in that state. 9
The defendant's voluntary contact with the forum state is a factor absent
84. Id.
85. Id. Defendant South, the author of the first draft of the challenged article in Calder,
made frequent business trips to California and received business phone calls made from
California. Id. Defendant Calder, the president and editor of the Enquirer, had made only two
trips to California, both of which were unrelated to the suit. Id.
86. Id. at 1486-88; see Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1478-81 (Keeton analysis of minimum
contacts). In assessing the sufficiency of the defendants' contacts with the forum state of
California, the Calder Court observed that California served as the situs of the article and of
the harm suffered. 104 S. Ct. at 1487. The Supreme Court reasoned that jurisdiction was proper
because the defendants' conduct in Florida resulted in injury to the plaintiff in California. Id.
at 1487-88. Most importantly, the Calder Court emphasized that the defendants' conduct was
directed purposefully toward creating an impact in California and that the defendants therefore
reasonably could anticipate being amenable to suit in a California court. Id. at 1487; see World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (defendant's affiliation with
forum state confers jurisdiction when defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled before
a court of state); Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978) (same).
87. See 104 S. Ct. at 1487 (jurisdiction in California court proper based on effects of
defendant's Florida activity).
88. Compare Calder, 104 S. Ct. at 1484-85 (nonresident defendant individuals having no
relevant contacts with forum state other than assistance in publication of allegedly libelous
article appearing in newspaper circulated in California are subject to jurisdiction of California
court) with Keeton 104 S. Ct. at 1477-82 (Ohio corporation marketing monthly 10,000 to 15,000
copies of corporation's magazine in forum state amenable to suit in that state). See Hanson v.
Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (jurisdiction over nonresident defendant proper when defendant
exercises privilege of conducting activities within forum state thus invoking benefits of trans-
acting business in that state); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)
(same).
89. See Calder, 104 S. Ct. at 1484-88 (upholding California jurisdiction over Florida
defendants having no relevant contacts with California except for intentional affiliation with
allegedly libelous article circulated in forum state); Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1477-82 (defendant's
monthly circulation of magazines in forum state was sufficient to uphold jurisdiction in forum
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in August.90 The defendant's contact with the state of Virginia in August
resulted when the Augusts fortuitously moved to the forum state. 9' Thus, as
the Fourth Circuit acknowledged, HBA did not purposefully avail itself of
the benefits of conducting business in Virginia. 92 The Fourth Circuit in
August nevertheless, upheld the Virginia court's assertion of jurisdiction
notwithstanding HBA's adventitious association with the forum state. 93 The
Fourth Circuit's reasoning in August, therefore, is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's rationale in recent personal jurisdiction decisions because
the Supreme Court has assigned importance to whether the defendant's
affiliation with the forum state was purposeful.94
Of the modern Supreme Court opinions delineating personal jurisdiction
standards, McGee, perhaps the Court's most expansive pronouncement of
permissible jurisdiction, most notably resembles the August decision.95 Both
the McGee Court and August court permitted states to exercise jurisdiction
over nonresident insurance companies based on isolated insurance contracts
state district court). See also Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its
Reach: A Comment On World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58
N.C. L. REv. 407, 422-33 (1980) (reviewing recent Supreme Court pronouncements of due
process limitations on long arm jurisdiction and concluding that Court has espoused conduct-
oriented approach to minimum contact analysis requiring defendant to have voluntarily estab-
lished contacts with forum state).
90. See 734 F.2d at 170 (HBA's affiliation with Virginia resulted when Augusts unpre-
dictably moved to Virginia).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 172; see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (jurisdiction sustainable
where defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within forum
state); supra note 42 (discussion of Hanson).
93. 734 F.2d at 170-73. But see Calder, 104 S. Ct. at 1487 (recognizing that defendant's
intentional actions aimed at creating impact in forum state may sustain jurisdiction; Keeton,
104 S. Ct. at 1478 (emphasizing that defendant's contacts with forum state were voluntarily
established); Louis, supra note 89, at 422-33 (Supreme Court requires defendant to have
voluntarily established contacts with forum state as predicate to state courts' assertion of
jurisdiction).
94. Compare 734 F.2d at 170-73 (nonresident defendant's contact with forum state
fortuitously resulted when plaintiffs moved to forum state) with Calder, 104 S. Ct. at 1487
(defendant's activity in Florida aimed at creating an impact in forum state of California
constitutes sufficient contact with California for state's assertion of jurisdiction) and Keeton,
104 S. Ct. at 1478 (contacts based on defendant's purposeful marketing of thousands of
magazines in forum state satisfies due process requirement) and Louis, supra note 39 at 422-33
(Supreme Court requires voluntary contacts with forum state). See supra notes 76-81 and
accompanying text (discussion of Keeton); supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (discussion
of Calder).
95. 734 F.2d at 173 (upholding Virginia jurisdiction based on insurer's solicitation of
insurance rider mailed to policyholder residing in forum state); see McGee v. International Life
Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (subjecting out-of-state insurer to jurisdiction of California court
on grounds of substantial connection between formation of insurance contract and forum state);
see also supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text (factual discussion of August); supra notes
51-57 and accompanying text (discussion of McGee); infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text
(comparison of McGee to August); see also Lilly, supra note 2, at 89-91 (suggesting that McGee
was Court's most expansive pronouncement of permissible jurisdiction).
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held by residents of the forum state. 96 As the August dissent indicated,
however, August provides a less convincing basis for warranting a state's
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident insurer than McGee.97 The parties
in August consummated the insurance agreement outside the forum state.
98
In McGee, the insured purchased the insurance policy while residing in the
forum state of California. 9 The Texas insurer assumed the policy obligation
of the original insurer with the knowledge that the insured resided in
California.1 0c Significantly, the McGee Court upheld the California court's
assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident insurer based on what the
Court determined was a substantial connection between the insurance con-
tract and the forum state. 10' Lacking a similar connection between the
formation of the insurance agreement and the forum state, 0 2 August essen-
tially presents a situation in which the only contact connecting the litigation
with the Commonwealth of Virginia is the insured's residence. 0 3 August thus
represents a departure from strict adherence to the minimum contact standard
enunciated in McGee, which endorsed an expansive jurisdictional allow-
ance.'04
Although unsupported by Supreme Court precedent, the Fourth Circuit's
ruling in August upholding jurisdiction effectively based on the insured's
residence is in accord with an earlier case from the Municipal Court for the
District of Columbia. 05 In Security National Life Insurance Co. v. Washing-
96. See 734 F.2d at 173 (Virginia state court may exercise jurisdiction over Arizona insurer
based on insurance policy issued to Arizona resident who later came to reside in forum state of
Virginia); see also McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (California state court may exercise jurisdiction over
Texas insurer based on insurance contract consummated in forum state).
97. See 734 F.2d at 174 (Hall, J., dissenting) (August differs from McGee because in
McGee the insurer issued policy to policyholder in forum state whereas in August policyholder
obtained policy while nonresident of forum state).
98, 734 F.2d at 170. In August, Scott August obtained the insurance policy while a
resident of Arizona. Id.
99. 355 U.S. at 221.
100. See id. (Texas insurer assuming insurance obligations mailed reinsurance certificate to
policyholder in California).
101. Id. at 223.
102. See 734 F.2d at 170. In August, the Fourth Circuit maintained that a close relationship
existed between the Augusts' cause of action and HBA's solicitation of the elimination rider.
Id. at 173. The Fourth Circuit determined that HBA's solicitation of the rider was a sufficient
contact to allow Virginia to exercise jurisdiction. Id. Apparently, the Fourth Circuit believed
that the relationship between the solicitation of the rider and the Augusts' cause of action was
analogous to the situation in McGee in which the substantial connection between the formulation
of the insurance agreement and the forum state served as the basis for upholding jurisdiction.
See id. at 173 (close relationship existed between solicitation of rider and cause of action);
McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (California jurisdiction proper, based on substantial connection between
insurance policy and forum state).
103. See 734 F.2d at 170 (August obtained insurance policy in Arizona and subsequently
moved to forum state of Virginia).
104. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text (distinguishing August and McGee).
105. See Security Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Washington, 113 A.2d 749 (D.C.), appeal denied,
226 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (District of Columbia has jurisdiction over nonresident insurer
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ton, '06 the District of Columbia court determined that an out-of-state
insurer's mailing of individual insurance certificates brought the insurer
within the scope of a statute providing for service of process on foreign
insurers transacting business in the District.'0 7 The defendant insurance
company in Security National executed a group life insurance policy in
Missouri on behalf of an association. 08 A representative of the association
brought the policy back to the District of Columbia.' °9 In connection with
the group policy, the insured, a member of the association residing in the
District, received in the mail a certificate of insurance indicating the insured's
coverage under the group policy." 0 The widow of the insured eventually
brought suit as beneficiary to recover proceeds on the policy."' Although
the insurer maintained no significant contacts with the District except for
mailing the individual certificates of insurance to the insured and others, the
Security National court maintained that the statute authorizing jurisdiction
over the foreign insurer did not offend due process., 2 The Security National
court reasoned that if the out-of-state insurer was not amenable to suit under
the statute, the insured's beneficiary, and other plaintiffs similarly situated,
would have to travel to distant states to enforce their rights." 3
Like the Security National court, the Fourth Circuit in August apparently
gave great deference to the practical needs of the plaintiff." 4 In August, the
Augusts faced the burdensome alternative of having to travel to a distant
forum to litigate their claim.' 5 Recognizing implicitly the disadvantage to
the plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit seemingly concluded that Virginia had a
pursuant to District of Columbia statute authorizing service upon foreign insurers soliciting
insurance business with District of Columbia residents through mail).
106. 113 A.2d 749 (D.C.), appeal denied, 226 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
107. Id. at 751; see D.C. CoDa ANN. § 35-423 (1951) (nonresident insurers are subject to
service of process for soliciting, selling, or writing insurance on any District of Columbia
resident).
108. 113 A.2d at 750.
109. Id.
110. Id. In Security Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Washington, members of the association paid
premiums to the representatives of the association in the District of Columbia. Id. The
representatives deposited premiums from members in a special account. Id. The insurer did not
solicit directly association members, but rather, sought members through the association. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 750-51. The Security National court determined that the District of Columbia
statute protecting the rights of District residents was a proper act of the legislature despite
possible adverse effects to entities residing outside the District. Id. at 757.
113. Id. at 751; see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (state
has interest in providing plaintiff residents with forum); Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643, 649 (1950) (due process permits states to protect citizens by enacting legislation
making it unnecessary for policyholders to have to travel to insurer's residence to seek redress).
114. See 734 F.2d at 173 (Fourth Circuit's holding in August); Security National, 113 A.2d
at 751 (legislation protecting legal rights of District residents under contract with foreign insurers
is legitimate act of legislature and comports with due process).
115. See 734 F.2d at 169-70 (bankruptcy court dismissed August's complaint for turnover
of property because court determined that HBA lacked sufficient minimum contacts with
Virginia to satisfy due process); see August, 17 B.R. at 633 (same).
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compelling interest in providing the Augusts with a forum. 16 The Supreme
Court in McGee, in considering factors other than the defendant's contacts
which might justify California jurisdiction, suggested that a state's interest
in providing its residents with a forum may be a valid consideration in the
jurisdictional inquiry.17 Thus, although the August court overtly relied on
McGee in assessing the sufficiency of HBA's contacts with Virginia, the
Fourth Circuit apparently also followed McGee by assigning considerable
importance in the jurisdictional analysis to the plaintiff's interest in litigating
at home, and the state's interest in providing its residents with a forum." s
Although the August court did not address specifically the plaintiff's
and state's interests as alternative bases for jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit,
nevertheless, apparently weighed the equities of maintaining the suit in
Virginia in addition to analyzing the defendant's contacts with the forum
state." 9 HBA's solicitation of the elimination rider, the expressed justification
for jurisdiction, appears to have been the Fourth Circuit's talisman for
upholding jurisdiction based on the implicitly recognized needs of the plain-
tiff and the state's interest in adjudicating the dispute. 20 August thus
demonstrates the Fourth Circuit's preference for asserting jurisdiction based
on the reasonableness of maintaining the suit over the sufficiency of the
defendant's contacts with the forum state. 12' While the dissent would have
adhered to the requirement of minimum contacts based on the quantity and
quality of the defendant's contacts, the August majority has indicated that
it favors expansive specific jurisdiction when the interests of the plaintiff
116. See 734 F.2d at 173 (Fourth Circuit's holding in August); Vishay Intertechnology,
Inc. v. Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1069 (4th Cir. 1982) (interest of forum state is relevant
factor in minimum contact analysis). Other circuit courts have determined that a state may have
a particular interest in providing its plaintiff resident with a forum and should weigh this
consideration in the jurisdictional analysis. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Marina
Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981) (court should assess interest in forum state in
determining reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over nonresident defendant); Pedi Bares,
Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.3d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1977) (court should consider
interest of state in providing forum in determining whether jurisdiction is proper); In-Flight
Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F:2d 220, 232 (6th Cir. 1972) (state's interest in
resolving a dispute brought by plaintiff resident is important aspect of jurisdictional inquiry).
117. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (recognizing state's interest in providing forum for
residents seeking redress from out-of-state insurers refusing to pay claims).
118. See 734 F.2d at 173 (sustaining Virginia jurisdiction despite HBA's slight contacts
with Virginia); see also McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (maintaining that states have interest in
providing forum to residents with moderate claims seeking redress from out-of-state insurers);
supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's reliance on McGee in assessing
HBA's contact with Virginia in August).
119. See 734 F.2d at 173 (Fourth Circuit's holding in August). In addition to recognizing
the difficult position of the plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit may also have considered the
defendant's ability to cover the costs of litigating in a distant forum. See id.; see also von
Mehren and Trautman, supra note 68, at 1150 (considering insurers' ability to spread cost of
litigating interstate by adjusting premium charges).
120. See 734 F.2d at 173 (Fourth Circuit in August finding jurisdiction based on HBA's
solicitation of elimination rider).
121. See id.
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and the forum state favor the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant. 2 2 The Fourth Circuit's rationale in August, however,
is inconsistent with more recent Supreme Court reasoning as evidenced by
the Court's latest personal jurisdiction cases reiterating the requirement of
voluntary contacts by the defendant as a predicate to the state's assertion of
jurisdiction. 2
PETER J. WALSH, JR.
C. Qualified Immunity Defense that Fails to Meet the Collateral
Order Requirements Is Not Subject to Interlocutory Appeal
Section 1291 of Title 28 of the United States Code grants to the United
States circuit courts of appeal appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of
the United States district courts.' The final judgment rule of section 1291
requires that a district court render final judgment in a lawsuit before an
appellate court may grant an appeal. 2 An exception to the final judgment
122. See 734 F.2d at 173-74 (Hall, J., dissenting); supra notes 114-18 and accompanying
text (discussion of interest of plaintiff and forum state).
123. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (analysis of August in reference to
recent Supreme Court rulings reiterating requirement of voluntary contacts by defendant with
forum state).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). Section 1291 of title 28 of the United States Code provides
that the United States circuit courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction of all final judgments
from United States district courts. Id. Appellate review of final judgments from federal district
courts to federal courts of appeal is available as a matter of right. See Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 441 (1962); 15 C. WRIorr, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3901 (1976) (appellate review of final judgments is matter of right); Redish,
The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COL. L. REv. 89, 89-128
(1975) (discussion of appealability of lawsuits in federal courts). Section 1292(a) of title 28 of
the United States Code allows interlocutory appeal for preliminary injunctions, receiverships
and admiralty cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982). Like § 1291, § 1292(a) appeal is available as
a matter of right. See C. WRIGuT AND A. MILLER, supra, § 3901 (section 1292(a) appeal a
matter of right). Section 1292(b) of title 28 of the United States Code provides for appellate
review when the district judge and the circuit court agree that the issue, not otherwise appealable,
involves a controlling question of law on which opinions differ substantially and that interlo-
cutory appeal is necessary to accelerate the termination of the law suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1982). Interlocutory appeal under section 1292(b) is not a matter of right, but a matter of the
judge's discretion. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra, §§ 3901, 3929-31 (appeal
under § 1292(b) is permissive); see also Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARv. L. REv. 607, 617 (1974) (appeal under section 1292(b) requires
certification by trial judge); Comment, Interlocutory Appeals in North Carolina: The Substantial
Right Doctrine, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 857, 861 (1982) (§ 1292(b) appeal is discretionary).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
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rule known as the collateral order exception has developed in federal courts
for cases in which the appealed issue is separate from and collateral to the
main issue of the lawsuit and the issue is virtually unreviewable after final
judgment.' Issues under the collateral order doctrine are appealable as
interlocutory appeals. 4 One example of an issue that is appealable under the
collateral order exception is whether the defendant is immune from suit.5
Immunity from suit provides protection for public officials from the risks
and burdens of suits involving the official duties of public officials. 6 Absolute
immunity affords total immunity from suit to a public official for any
3. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (decisions that
are very important, separable from merits of case, and unreviewable at final judgment are
immediately appealable notwithstanding final judgment rule); see also 15 C. 'WRIoH, A. MLER
& E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 3911 (description of collateral order doctrine). The Cohen
collateral order doctrine comes from a line of Supreme Court cases that interpret § 1291 in a
practical rather than a technical manner. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546; see Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323, 328 (1940) (Court allowed immediate appeal for one held in contempt for
ignoring subpoena duces tecum because issue is severed from main issue of case); United States
v. River Rouge Improv. Co., 269 U.S. 411, 413 (1926) (Court ruled that within condemnation
suit some property awards were final and appealable while other awards were not final); Bank
of Columbia v. Sweeny, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 567, 569 (1828) (appeal of mandamus denial not
allowed before final judgment). The Cohen collateral order doctrine has four requirements for
immediate appeal. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. First, the district court must make final disposition
of the issue before appeal. Id. The Cohen court stated that no review before final judgment
means that there should be no review of a court decision where the district court's decision is
tentative, informal or incomplete. Id.; see 15 C. WRIrHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note
1, § 3911 (appeal available if no further consideration required by district court). The second
requirement for collateral order appeal is that the issue be collateral to and separate from the
merits of the case. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. In effect, the issue of the appeal must not affect
the merits. Id.; see 15 C. WRGnT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 3911 (explanation
of separate from and collateral to requirement of collateral order doctrine). Third, the issue
appealed must be effectively unreviewable if not reviewed immediately. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
Under this requirement, the risk of loss is too important to await final judgment. Id.; see 15
C. WRirrT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 3911 (appeal allowed where waiting may
result in irreparable injury). Fourth, a case must present a "serious and unsettled question" to
be immediately reviewable. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
4. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
5. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982) (denial of absolute immunity claim
appealable for President of United States); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508 (1979)
(denial of absolute immunity under speech and debate clause of Constitution appealable); Abney
v. United States 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (appeal of absolute immunity denial allowable under
double jeopardy clause).
6. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (immunity is protection from
suit). Legislative immunity originated in England with the Bill of Rights of 1688. 1 W.&M., 2
(1688). Originally, immunity was grounded in the common law from feudal struggles in England.
See Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and A
Critique, 72 Nw.U.L. REv. 526, 528-29 (1977) (discussion of evolution of official immunity).
Traditionally, the King was afforded absolute immunity. Id. The modem concept of immunity
developed from these early feudal traditions. Id.; see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239 n.4
(1974) (history of official immunity doctrine). The doctrine of official immunity in the United
States developed from the 1871 case of Bradley v. Fisher. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335,
347 (1871). In Bradley, a trial judge disbarred the attorney representing John Wilkes Boothe's
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official acts.7 Qualified immunity provides a lesser degree of protection than
absolute immunity by protecting the public official from suit for reasonable
acts by the official.8 The United States Supreme Court has ruled on several
occasions that lower court orders denying absolute immunity claims are
immediately appealable without a final judgment on the merits under the
collateral order exception. 9 Whether the collateral order exception applies to
qualified immunity, however, is less clear. In Bever v. Gilbertson,10 the
Fourth Circuit examined whether a state governor and other state employees
doctor for threatening the judge. Id. at 337. On review by the Supreme Court of a suit against
the judge by the lawyer, the Court held that to preserve the proper administration of justice, a
trial judge is immune from suit. Id. at 347. After Bradley, the courts extended immunity to
cover a number of public officials. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 757 (1982)
(president has absolute immunity); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 477, 492-94 (1979) (absolute
immunity for legislators under the speech and debate clause of the Constitution); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutor); Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975) (immunity for legislators in legislative acts);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975) (qualified immunity for school board members);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (qualified immunity for state governor and
executive aides); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574 (1959) (federal administrative officials have
absolute immunity); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (Postmaster General has
absolute immunity).
7. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (absolute immunity provides
complete protection from litigation).
8. See id. at 817-18 (qualified immunity protects official from suit for reasonable
discretionary acts not in violation of constitutional rights of another).
9. See Nixon vs. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982) (denial of Presidents' claim of
absolute immunity is appealable immediately); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 477, 492-94 (1979)
(absolute immunity denial appealable as within collateral order doctrine); Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (absolute immunity denial under double jeopardy clause
appealable immediately); see also Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 700 F.2d 104, 105 (3d Cir. 1983)
(denial of absolute immunity appealable for Attorney General); Chavez v. Singer, 698 F.2d 420,
421 (10th Cir. 1983) (order denying absolute immunity appealable for Department of Energy
official).
10. 724 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 349 (1984). Bever v. Gilbertson was
one of nine suits instituted by a number of terminated West Virginia Department of Highways
employees that were appealed from the Northern and Southern districts of West Virginia. Id.
at 1085. Bever was the first of the nine cases to be appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Id.; see also
Douglas v. Galloway, 568 F. Supp. 966, 968 (S.D. W.Va. 1983) (suit by West Virginia
Department of Highways employees against public officials for wrongful termination), aff'd
sub nom. England v. Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 1983). The Fourth Circuit combined
Douglas and England for review and heard the appeals concerning official immunity simulta-
neously. England v. Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140, 142 (1984). In the combined case of England,
West Virginia Department of Highways employees sued Governor Rockefeller and other public
officials for conspiring to dismiss the plaintiffs for purely political reasons. Id. The officials
moved for dismissal based on qualified and absolute immunity and the United States District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied the motions. Id. The defendants
appealed to the Fourth Circuit under the collateral order doctrine. Id. The Fourth Circuit found
that the Governor's claim of absolute immunity for acts he performed in his legislative capacity
was appealable, but that the district court properly denied the Governor's absolute immunity
because the Governor allegedly acted outside of his legislative authority. Id. at 143. On the
qualified immunity claims, the Fourth Circuit in England ruled that Bever v. Gilbertson was
dispositive in holding that orders denying qualified immunity are not appealable. Id. at 143.
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could appeal a federal district court order denying claims of qualified
immunity."
In Bever, the West Virginia Department of Highways dismissed a large
number of lower echelon employees because of an alleged need for a
substantial reduction in expenditures.' 2 The dismissed employees brought suit
against West Virginia officials 3 alleging wrongful termination of employment
constituting a violation of the employees' constitutional rights.'4 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the Department of Highways terminated only Republican
employees, indicating that the sole criterion for dismissal was political party
affiliation." The dismissed employees sued the West Virginia officials both
in their official and individual capacities.' 6 The plaintiffs' complaint sought
both monetary damages and injunctive relief.17 The claim for equitable relief
included a request to reinstate the plaintiffs in their former jobs.
At trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia, the West Virginia officials asserted a defense of qualified
immunity from the damage claim and moved for summary judgment. '9 The
district court denied the defendants' motion. 20 The defendants thereafter
petitioned the West Virginia district court for a permissive interlocutory
appeal certificate2 ' but the district court denied the certification. 22 The
11. 724 F.2d at 1085.
12. Id.
13. Id. In Bever, the plaintiffs brought suit against West Virginia officials including
Governor John D. Rockefeller, IV, Charles L. Miller, Commissioner of the West Virginia
Department of Highways, Walter Gilbertson, District Engineer of the Department of Highways,
John Gum, County Supervisor of Highways in Doddridge County and Wilton Williams,
Chairman of Doddridge County Democratic Executive Committee. Id.
14. Id. In Bever, the terminated employees alleged that the terminations violated the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights of free association. Id. Free association is a right protected by
the first amendment to the United States Constitution. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
460-62 (1958) (elevating free association to right covered by first amendment); U.S. CONST.
amend.I (providing that citizens shall have freedom of religion, freedom of speech and right to
assemble). The Bever plaintiffs claimed a violation of first amendment free association rights
because the defendants allegedly dismissed the plaintiff employees solely on the basis of political
affiliation. Id. at 1088; see Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (employees cannot be
terminated for purely political reasons); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (employees
have constitutional right not to be discharged for solely political reason); see also infra note 49
(explanation of Elrod and Branti).
15. 724 F.2d at 1085; see supra note 14 (employee cannot be terminated solely for political
reason).




20. Id. The The district court in Bever denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity because the district court asserted that the defendants
could not have believed that political dismissals were constitutionally permissible. Id.; see supra
note 8 (qualified immunity does not protect acts that violate constitutional rights).
21. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982) (allowing permissive interlocutory appeal at the
district court's discretion); see also supra note 1 (explanation of § 1292(b) permissive appeal).
22. 724 F.2d at 1085.
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defendants then appealed to the Fourth Circuit pursuant to section 1291,
claiming that a denial of qualified immunity was within the collateral order
exception to the final judgment rule. 23 The Fourth Circuit dismissed the
defendants' appeal, holding that the defendants' qualified immunity claim
was not within the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule and
that the defendants must await final district court judgment before appeal-
ing. 24
In deciding that the denial of qualified immunity was not within the
collateral order exception, the Bever court noted that the landmark Supreme
Court case of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.2 established four
criteria for a successful appeal of an interlocutory order under section 1291.26
In Cohen, the plaintiffs initiated a shareholder derivative suit27 against
Beneficial and several of Beneficial's directors alleging fraud and misman-
agement of corporate funds.2 The defendants, acting according to state
statute, sought an order compelling the plaintiffs to post security to pay the
costs of litigation in the event that the defendants obtained a favorable
judgment. 29 The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
denied the defendants' motion for security, holding that a federal court was
not required to follow the state security statute. 0 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court and held that a
23. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (allowing appeal as matter of right after final
judgment); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949) (orders that
meet four collateral order requirements immediately appealable); see also supra note 1 (expla-
nation of § 1291 appeals as matter of right).
24. 724 F.2d at 1089.
25. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
26. 724 F.2d at 1085; see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949) (matter must be conclusively determined, separate from and collateral to main issue,
effectively unreviewable at final judgment, and must present serious and unsettled question to
be appealable prior to final judgment); supra note 3 (explanation of Cohen collateral order
requirements).
27. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 7 F.R.D. 352, 353 (D.N.J. 1947) (plaintiffs
brought shareholder derivative action against defendants), rev'd, 170 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1948),
aff'd, 337 U.S. 541 (1949). A shareholder derivative action is a suit by a shareholder or
shareholders on behalf of a corporation in which the corporation itself does not bring the
action. See General Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 563 F. Supp. 970, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(derivative action is by shareholders for corporation); 7A C. WRIOHr AND A. MILLER, supra
note 1, § 1821 (derivative action is enforcement of corporate cause of action by one or more
shareholders); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (procedural guidelines for derivative action by
shareholders).
28. Cohen, F.R.D. at 353.
29. Id. at 353-54; see N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 14:3-15, 14:3-17 (1945) (requiring security in
derivative actions). Sections 14:3-15 and 14:3-17 of the New Jersey Revised Statutes provided
that a corporation on whose behalf a derivative action is brought may require a security deposit
by the plaintiff to cover the costs of litigation. Id. The statutes had the effect of forcing a
plaintiff to reimburse the corporation if the plaintiff did not bring a successful complaint.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 544, 544-45 (1949). As a result of the security
requirement, the statute discouraged insubstantial claims. Id.
30. Cohen, 7 F.R.D. at 353-54.
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federal court is bound by state statutes and should follow state law.3
On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court in Cohen
examined whether the district court's denial of the defendants' motion to
compel security was appealable. 32 The Cohen Court held that the order
denying the motion for statutory security was appealable immediately and
identified four criteria for determining the interlocutory appealability of a
district court order. 33 First, the Cohen Court stated that the order must not
involve the subject matter of the litigation. 34 Rather, the Cohen Court noted
that the order must be collateral to the case.3 5 Second, the Supreme Court
asserted that the order must resolve conclusively an important independent
question. 36 Third, the Cohen Court noted that the issue must be effectively
unreviewable if the parties wait until final judgment. 37 Finally, the Supreme
Court added that the order must present a serious and unsettled question to
the court.3 8 The Cohen Court concluded that the denial of the defendants'
motion to compel security satisfied the collateral order criteria because the
denial of the motion for security was a final disposition of an issue that was
not an ingredient of the main cause of action. 39 Additionally, the Supreme
Court held that the right to security was a serious and unsettled question.
40
In analyzing the Bever decision within the Cohen framework for deter-
mining the existence of a collateral order exception, the Fourth Circuit stated
that the Bever case failed to meet several of the four Cohen collateral order
exception requirements. 4' Initially, the Bever court observed that the defend-
ants claimed qualified immunity, which protects a public official from
litigation only when a reasonable person would believe that the official's
conduct violated no individual's constitutional rights.42 The Fourth Circuit
31. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44, 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1948), aff'd sub
nom. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
32. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949).
33. Id. at 546.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note I, § 3911 (issue must be
separate from and collateral to main issue of litigation for interlocutory appeal); see also supra
note 3 (discussion of Cohen collateral order requirements).
36. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546; see 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note I,
§ 3911 (district court must determine issue conclusively for collateral order exception to apply);
see also supra note 3 (district court's decision must not be tentative or incomplete to fall within
collateral order exception).
37. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546; see 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1,
§ 3911 (issue must be unreviewable at final judgment if not appealed immediately for collateral
order exception to apply); see also supra note 3 (for collateral order exception to apply issue
must require immediate appeal to avoid irreparable harm).
38. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546; see 15 C. WRioGH, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1,
§ 3911 (serious and unsettled question required for collateral order exception to apply); see also
supra note 3 (discussion of Cohen collateral order doctrine).
39. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
40. Id.
41. 724 F.2d at 1088.
42. Id. at 1086. The Bever majority did not explain the derivation of the defendants'
qualified immunity. Id. The Supreme Court case of Scheuer v. Rhodes, however, suggested that
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also noted that qualified immunity only applied to immunity from suits for
damages. 43 The Bever court stated that the defendants received no immunity
from the requested equitable relief of an injunction and job reinstatement.4
The Bever majority noted that with no immunity from equitable relief, the
defendants would proceed to trial whether or not a court granted qualified
immunity from the monetary damages claim.45 The Fourth Circuit reasoned,
therefore, that since trial would continue on the equitable relief, the appeal
of qualified immunity would not conclusively determine the defendants'
amenability to trial. 46 Additionally, as the trial would continue on equitable
relief, the Bever court noted that the denial of the qualified immunity claim
was not effectively unreviewable because the defendants were free to appeal
the qualified immunity denial in an appeals court after final judgment.47
The second reason given by the Fourth Circuit for dismissal of the
interlocutory appeal in Bever was that the case did not meet the Cohen
"serious and unsettled" question requirement for a collateral order excep-
tion. 4 According to the Bever court, the law is well established that an
employer may not dismiss an employee solely on the basis of political party
affiliation. 49 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the West Virginia De-
qualified immunity applied to a governor and his aides because of the importance and breadth
of executive duties. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1974) (state executives receive
qualified immunity since members of state executive branch often must act quickly and rely on
information provided by others).
43. 724 F.2d at 1086.
44. Id.; see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 n.34 (1982) (expressing no view as
to applicability of injuctive relief on official immunity); Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326,
1331 (4th Cir. 1974) (immunity has no application to suit for injuctive relief); cf. Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731-32 (1980) (state legislators have
absolute immunity from injuctive relief).
45. 724 F.2d at 1986-87.
46. Id. at 1087.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1088; see supra note 3 (discussion of Cohen serious and unsettled question
requirement).
49. 724 F.2d at 1088; see Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (termination of
employees on solely political criteria is unconstitutional); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356
(1976) (first amendment protects employees from political dismissal); see also Wren v. Jones,
635 F.2d 1277, 1286 (7th Cir. 1980) (balancing test weighs first amendment and state interests
in determining legality of political terminations); cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981). The Elrod
and Branti opinions present the proposition that an employer may not terminate employees
solely for political affiliation or non-affiliation as long as such affiliation is not a critical part
of required job performance. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 515-16 (employer may not terminate
employee solely for political reason); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356 (politically based employee
terminations are unconstitutional). Both the Elrod and Branti Courts noted that the first
amendment protects employees from political dismissal absent an overriding interest on behalf
of the government. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 515-16 (employees protected by first amendment);
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356 (first amendment protects employees from political dismissals).
In arguing that the Bever dismissals were not purely political, the defendants in Bever
relied on a Seventh Circuit opinion in which 25 Republican state employees sued for wrongful
termination from the Illinois Transportation Department for political affiliation. See Wren v.
[Vol. 42:447
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
partment of Highways had some fiscal considerations in terminating the
employees but that an economic motive did not entitle the West Virginia
officials to use a political criteria for selecting which employees to terminate. 0
With clear Supreme Court precedent forbidding politically motivated termi-
nations, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the West Virginia officials knew
they could not terminate employees for political reasons and, therefore, the
terminations did not present a "serious and unsettled" question.',
In addition to asserting that the facts in Bever did not meet the
requirements for a Cohen collateral order exception, the Fourth Circuit noted
that a number of courts have examined the appealability of official immu-
nity. 2 Several courts, including the Bever court, have noted that absolute
immunity protects an individual from going to trial at all and that an order
denying absolute immunity must be immediately appealable or the right not
to be put to trial is irrevocably lost. 3 The Bever court stated, however, that
the appealability of qualified immunity is less clear.14 The Fourth Circuit
observed that the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
recently had ruled that an order denying a qualified immunity claim is
Jones, 635 F.2d 1277, 1279 (7th Cir. 1980) (allowing political termination), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 832 (1981). The dismissal of the Republicans in Wren resulted from the earlier Illinois
case of Bradley v. Cellini which required that 25 previously terminated Democratic employees
of the Illinois Transportation Department be reinstated in the Transportation Department. See
Bradley v. Cellini, No. 2795-69 slip op. at I (Circuit Court of Sangor County, 1973). Since
Bradley required reinstatement of the 25 Democrats to the Illinois Transportation Department,
the Illinois government terminated the existing 25 Republican members of the Illinois Trans-
portation Department to make room for the Democrats. Wren, 635 F.2d at 1280. In Wren,
therefore, the termination of the 25 Republicans was not purely political. Id. The Republican
employees were dismissed to comply with the Bradley court order to reinstate 25 Democrats.
Id. The Illinois Transportation Department only required 25 employees to operate so the 25
existing Republican Transportation Department employees had to be removed for fiscal reasons.
Id at 1283. In reaching a decision, the Wren court used a balancing test in which the court
weighed the competing interests of the State of Illinois and of the first amendment. Id. at 1286.
The Seventh Circuit in Wren determined that the defendants proved that fiscal constraints
justified the terminations. Id. at 1287. The Bever majority disregarded the Wren decision,
noting that the court-ordered reinstatement of Democratic employees in Wren took the Wren
decision out of the sphere of politically motivated dismissals. 724 F.2d at 1089. The Fourth
Circuit noted that the Wren dismissals were in response to a court order. Id. The Fourth Circuit
stated, however, that the Bever terminations were politically motivated. Id.
50. 724 F.2d at 1088-89.
51. Id. at 1088.
52. 724 F.2d at 1086; see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982) (immediate appeal
available for presidential absolute immunity denial); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508
(1979) (denial of absolute immunity of member of Congress under speech and debate clause of
constitution immediately appealable); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (pretrial
claims of double jeopardy immediately appealable); see also Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 700 F.2d
104, 105 (3d Cir. 1983) (denial of absolute immunity of United States Attorney General
immediately appealable); Chavez v. Singer, 698 F.2d 420, 421 (10th Cir. 1983) (denial of
absolute immunity of Department of Energy employee immediately appealable).
53. 724 F.2d at 1086; see supra note 52 (discussion of cases holding absolute immunity
immediately appealable).
54. 724 F.2d at 1086.
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appealable immediately.5 5 The Bever court indicated, however, that a panel
of Fourth Circuit judges has disagreed with the District of Columbia Circuit's
decision.5 6 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, concluded that the Bever action
did not meet the minimum requirements for a Cohen collateral order
exception and the court dismissed the interlocutory appeal of the qualified
immunity issue.
57
The Fourth Circuit was correct in denying immediate appeal of the Bever
defendants' qualified immunity claim under the collateral order exception.
58
All federal circuits are not in accord, however, on the interlocutory appeal-
ability of a qualified immunity claim. 9 The point of contention among the
circuits centers on the United States Supreme Court case of Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,60 which held that the test for determining the existence of qualified
immunity is purely objective.
6'
55. Id.; see McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (qualified immunity
immediately appealable for same reasons as immediate appeal of absolute immunity); infra
notes 74-83 and accompanying text (discussion of McSurely case allowing immediate appeal of
qualified immunity); cf. Benford v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., No. 83-1168, slip
op. at 7 (.4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1983) (cited at 707 F.2d 504 (1983) (Fourth Circuit disagreed with
District of Columbia Circuit and held qualified immunity not appealable immediately), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 107 (1983).
56. 724 F.2d at 1086; see Benford v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., No. 83-
1168, slip op. at 7 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1983) (qualified immunity not immediately appealable
when not effectively unreviewable upon final judgment) cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 107 (1983);
infra note 85 and accompanying text (discussion of Benford).
57. 724 F.2d at 1089. Notwithstanding the majority's conclusion that the Bever action did
not meet the minimum Cohen collateral order requirements, the Bever dissent asserted that the
facts of Bever did meet the Cohen collateral order exception requirements. Id. at 1090 (Hall,
J., dissenting). The dissent disagreed with the Bever majority's finding that Bever did not
present a serious and unsettled question. Id. at 1092. The dissenting opinion stated that economic
necessity, not political motivation required the elimination of the plaintiff's jobs. Id. at 1092
n.5, 1093. Judge Hall asserted, therefore, that the defendants' action in dismissing the plaintiffs
presented a serious and unsettled question because the motive for terminating the employees
was a combination of political and fiscal reasons. Id. Finally, the dissent argued that the Bever
majority's reliance on the plaintiff's request for equitable relief was unfounded because the
defendants were not the proper parties for an equitable suit and, therefore, not subject to
equitable claims. Id. at 1091. According to the dissent, the refusal to allow immediate appeal
of the defendants' qualified immunity denial causes irreparable loss of the rights of qualified
immunity. Id. at 1093.
58. See infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text (discussion of proper decision by Bever
court).
59. Id. at 1086. Compare Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 729 F.2d 267, 274 (3rd Cir. 1984)
(qualified immunity denial not immediately appealable) and England v. Rockefeller, 739 F.2d
140, 143 (4th Cir. 1984) (no interlocutory appeal of qualified immunity) and Benford v.
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., No. 83-1168, slip op.. at 8 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1983)
(denial of qualified immunity not immediately appealable), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 107 (1983)
with McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (qualified immunity immediately
appealable under Harlow). Cf. Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 1983) (qualified
immunity not appealable unless essential facts are not in dispute and immunity question solely
a point of law).
60. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
61. Id. at 819; see Comment, Immunity: Eliminating The Subjective Element From the
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In Harlow, a civilian Air Force employee sued two senior White House
aides for monetary damages. 62 The plaintiff in Harlow alleged that the
defendants conspired to terminate the plaintiff's employment because the
defendants feared that the plaintiff would reveal fraudulent purchasing
practices within the government. 6 The defendants moved in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for summary judgment based on
qualified and absolute immunity but the district court denied the defendants'
motion. 64 The defendants appealed the qualified immunity denial to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which
dismissed the appeal without an opinion. 65 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and ruled that senior White House aides are entitled to
receive qualified immunity. 66 In granting immunity to the aides, the Supreme
Court eliminated the old subjective test which required a factual determina-
tion of the officials' intentions. 67 The Harlow Court reasoned that the
elimination of the subjective prong better facilitated resolution of qualified
immunity claims on motion for summary judgment because the availability
of qualified immunity would be determined by an objective legal test, not a
subjective factual determination. 68 According to the Harlow Court, the
qualified immunity test concerns whether a reasonable person would believe
that his conduct violated established constitutional rights of another.69
In eliminating the subjective examination of an official's intentions when
evaluating a qualified immunity claim, the Supreme Court evidenced an
intention to allow more qualified immunity cases to be resolved on summary
judgment. 70 Harlow did not, however, overrule or modify Cohen in any
Qualified Immunity Standard in Action Brought Against Government Official, 22 WASHBURN
L. J. 577, 586-88 (1983) (discussion of Harlow).
62. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802.
63. Id. at 802-05.
64. Id. at 805-06.
65. Id. at 806.
66. Id. at 813.
67. Id. at 816-19.
68. Id.; see Comment, Immunity: Eliminating The Subjective Element From the Qualified
Immunity Standard in Action Brought Against Government Official, 22 vaSMURN. L. J. 577,
587-88 (1983) (subjective aspect of qualified immunity required factual determination and was
incompatible with goal of eliminating frivolous suits).
69. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. In Harlow, the Supreme Court noted that the subjective
prong requirement of a qualified immunity defense, which required an examination of an
official's permissive intentions, was incompatible with the overall goal of eliminating frivolous
suits against public officials because the subjective aspect required a factual determination by a
court of law. Id. at 815-16; see Butz v. Economu, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978) (insubstantial
claims should not proceed to trial).
70. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (judge may determine qualified
immunity on summary judgment); see also Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir.
1984) (Supreme Court in Harlow sought to facilitate summary judgment of claims against
government officials); McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Supreme
Court's Harlow decision evidenced intention to allow more qualified immunity summary
dispositions).
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way. 71 For an issue to qualify as a collateral order exception, all four of the
Cohen criteria still must apply. 72 The federal circuits disagree, however, on
whether the Supreme Court in Harlow manifested an intention to allow
immediate appeal of an order denying a qualified immunity claim. 73
The District of Columbia Circuit in McSurely v. McClellan74 determined
that the Harlow decision revealed an intention by the Supreme Court to
allow immediate appellate review of qualified immunity claims because
Harlow eliminated the subjective prong of the qualified immunity determi-
nation and thereby sought to facilitate summary judgment. 5 In McSurely,
the plaintiffs sued a Kentucky state prosecutor and a United States Senator
for damages resulting from alleged violations of constitutional rights when
the Kentucky Commonwealth Attorney prosecuted the plaintiffs for sedition
and a Senate Committee seized the plaintiffs' private papers. 76 Specifically,
71. See 724 F.2d at 1086 (Harlow did not mention collateral order doctrine of Cohen).
72. See id.; (Fourth Circuit requires adherence to Cohen collateral order requirements).
73. See id.; supra note 59 (discussion of Third, Fourth, Eighth and D.C. Circuit opinions
on qualified immunity appealability).
74. 697 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
75. Id. at 316.
76. Id. at 312-14. In McSurely v. McClellan, the plaintiffs sued the defendants, alleging
violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985 and
under the first, fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. Id. at 314; see
U.S. CONST. amends I, IV, V, XIV; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, & 1985 (1983) (providing freedom
from illegal searches, self-incrimination, discrimination, freedom of association). The plaintiffs
were field organizers for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. in Pike County,
Kentucky. Id. at 312. The Pike County Commonwealth's Attorney had the plaintiffs arrested
under a local statute prohibiting sedition and the Commonwealth's Attorney seized the plaintiff's
private papers. Id. at 313. Subsequently, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Kentucky ruled that the Kentucky Sedition Statute was unconstitutional. See McSurely v.
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848, 852 (E.D. Ky. 1967). The district court in McSurely, therefore,
ordered the Commonwealth's Attorney to place the seized papers in safekeeping. McSurely, 697
F.2d at 313. The assistant counsel for the Senate Committee on Government Operations learned
about the papers and telephoned the Pike County Commonwealth's Attorney to talk about the
seized items. Id. The Senate committee confirmed that the seized papers contained information
on several organizations being investigated by the Committee. Id. at 314. The Committee
attorney took copies of 234 seized papers back to Washington. Id. at 314. Upon learning that
the Senate Committee had the papers, the plaintiffs sued to get back the papers and won. See
McSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F.2d 817, 818 (6th Cir. 1968). The Senate Committee then subpoenaed
the papers from the plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs refused to produce the subpoenaed documents.
McSurely, 697 F.2d at 314. The Senate, therefore, initiated a contempt action which resulted in
the plaintiffs' conviction for contempt of Congress. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the conviction on appeal because the subpoenas were issued as a result of an illegal
search that was unconstitutional because the search warrant was not based on probable cause.
See United States v. McSurely, 473 F.2d 1178, 1194 (D. C. Cir. 1972). The plaintiffs thereafter
sued the defendants for damages. McSurely, 697 F.2d at 314. The defendants moved to dismiss
the action based on legislative immunity. Id. The District of Columbia stayed the proceedings
pending resolution of the prior criminal charges against the plaintiffs. Id. Finally, the District
of Columbia Circuit vacated the stay and remanded the case for further proceedings. See
McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1970). On remand, the district court denied
the defendants' motion for immunity. McSurely 697 F.2d at 314. On appeal to the District of
Columbia Circuit, the McSurely court ruled that summary judgment was proper for the
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the plaintiffs sought damages for loss of employment, invasion of privacy
and humiliation and embarrassment caused by the actions of the defendants."
The defendants moved to dismiss in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia based on absolute legislative immunity.7 8 The district
court denied the defendants' motion 9 and the District of Columbia Circuit
assumed jurisdiction on appeal under section 1291.80 The District of Columbia
Circuit remanded the case to district court to consider whether a state
prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity for investigative actions."' The district
court again denied a motion to dismiss by the defendants based on qualified
or absolute immunity and the District of Columbia Circuit granted an
appeal.8 2 The McSurely court ruled that the district court's denial of the
defendants' qualified immunity was appealable immediately because the
Supreme Court in Harlow evidenced an intention to allow immediate appeal
of denial of qualified immunity claims by eliminating the subjective prong
of the qualified immunity analysis.8 3 The Third,8 ' Fourth8 5 and
defendants on the matter of the legality of the initial search of the plaintiffs' premises, but
remanded the case for further consideration of immunity. McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d
1277, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
77. McSurely, 697 F.2d at 314.
78. Id. at 315.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (allowing appeal from district court decision only
after district court renders final judgment); supra note I (discussion of § 1291).
81. MeSurely, 697 F.2d at 314.
82. Id. at 315.
83. Id. at 316.
84. See Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 729 F.2d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 1984) (qualified immunity not
appealable immediately). Forsyth v. Kleindienst was the third in a series of Third Circuit
Forsyth cases. See id. at 268-69 (Forsyth 111); see Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 700 F.2d 104, 105 (3d.
Cir. 1983) (Forsyth I1) (absolute immunity immediately appealable); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599
F.2d 1203, 1208-09 (3d. Cir. 1979) (Forsyth 1) (allowing immediate appeal of absolute immunity),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). In Forsyth III, the plaintiff sued former Attorney General
John Mitchell for unconstitutional electronic surveillance of plaintiff's telephone conversations.
Forsyth III, 729 F.2d at 268-69. The defendant moved for summary judgment based on absolute
and qualified immunity. Id. at 269. the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denied the defendant's motion and the Third Circuit, on appeal, remanded the
case to the district court to consider absolute immunity. Forsyth I, 599 F.2d at 1209. Again the
district court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on absolute and
qualified immunity and the defendant appealed. Forsyth III, 729 F.2d at 269. In Forsyth III,
the defendant claimed that the Harlow Court's elimination of the subjective prong of the
qualified immunity defense facilitated appeal of qualified immunity. Id. at 273. The Third
Circuit ruled that Forsyth III was not a case with an insubstantial claim against the defendants
like McSurely and, therefore, dismissed the qualified immunity appeal as premature. Id. at 274.
85. See Benford v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., No. 83-1168, slip op. at 2
(4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 107 (1983). In Benford, the plaintiff was an
independent insurance agent who alleged that members of the Select Committee on Aging of
the United States House of Representatives, the American Broadcasting Companies (ABC) and
an ABC employee infiltrated the plaintiff's business. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants
set him up to make a cancer presentation to an elderly group and surreptitiously filmed the
meeting for broadcast on the ABC news. Id. The plaintiff sued the American Broadcasting
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Eighth" Circuits have stated, however, that the District of Columbia
Circuit in McSurely interpreted Harlow too broadly and that in order
to become a collateral order exception the appealed issue must satisfy the Cohen
collateral order requirements.8 '
While the conflict among the federal circuits concerning the interpreta-
tion of Harlow is enlightening on the qualified immunity doctrine, a more
important consideration is the Bever court's interpretation of the Cohen
collateral order requirements. 88 The Bever court did not state that no qualified
immunity claim is ever appealable interlocutorily. 89 The Fourth Circuit merely
required strict adherence to Cohen collateral order requirements.9 The four
Cohen collateral order requirements are an attempt to balance the section
1291 policy of avoiding the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal appeals
against the danger of creating injustice by delaying appeal until final judg-
ment. 91 The policies behind the collateral order requirements remain true to
Company and members of the Select Committee on Aging of the United States House of
Representatives in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Id. The district
court denied a summary judgment motion by the House Committee based on qualified immunity.
Id. The Fourth Circuit, on appeal, held that the defendant could not appeal the qualified
immunity denial immediately because the qualified immunity defense was not finally determined
in the lower court. Id. The Benford court stated that the defendants still could prove the
qualified immunity defense during trial. Id. at 19. The Fourth Circuit noted that the District of
Columbia Circuit allowed immediate appeal of qualified immunity in McSurely, but the Fourth
Circuit observed that the Supreme Court still intended to require a "serious and unsettled
question" for interlocutory appeal. Id. at 7. Further, the Benford court noted that the Supreme
Court did not intend to allow immediate appeal where the disappointed defendant still could
prove qualified immunity at trial. Id.
86. See Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 1983) (McSurely interpreted
Harlow too broadly). In Evans, a former prisoner brought suit against the former United States
Attorney for the Eastern District of Arkansas alleging slander and a violation of the prisoner's
fifth amendment rights. Id. at 829. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a
claim. Id. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. Evans v. Dillahunty, 662 F.2d 522, 527
(8th Cir. 1981). On remand to the Arkansas district court, the defendants moved for summary
judgment based on official immunity and the district court denied the motion. Evans, 711 F.2d
at 829. The defendants appealed to the Eighth Circuit. Id. The Eighth Circuit asserted that the
District of Columbia Circuit interpreted Harlow too broadly. Id. at 830. The Eighth Circuit
observed that the purpose of the requirement of final judgment before appeal is to avoid
piecemeal appeals. Id. Therefore, in examining the appealability of an absolute or qualified
immunity claim, a court should utilize two criteria. Id. First, the Eighth Circuit required that
there be no dispute on the essential facts of the case. Id. Second, the immunity question must
be a pure question of law. Id. Under the Eighth Circuit's analysis, qualified immunity is
appealable if a case meets the dual requirements for immediate appeal. Id. at 830.
87. See supra notes 84-86 (discussion of Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuit holdings
concerning McSurely).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 89-94 (Bever court's interpretation of collateral
order requirements).
89. Id. at 1089.
90. Id.
91. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950) (goal of
finality balances between avoiding injustice and avoiding piecemeal appeals); 15 C. WRGHT, A.
MILLER, & E. CooPER, supra note 1, § 3911 (collateral order doctrine seeks to balance between
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the section 1291 policy of avoiding piecemeal appeals by ensuring that the
district court contemplates no further review of the issue appealed.9 2 Addi-
tionally, under the collateral order doctrine the appealed issue cannot be a
step toward resolution of the merits of the case, and, therefore, immediate
review will not be repetitive of issues concerning the merits of the case.
93
Finally, the requirements of irreparable injury and a serious and unsettled
question ensure that courts only review important, nondiscretionary matters
on interlocutory appeal. 94
Based on the Fourth Circuit's strict adherence to the collateral order
requirements, the Bever case was not appealable as a collateral order because
the case did not present a "serious and unsettled question."95 In addition,
Bever was not effectively unreviewable upon final judgment since the case
involved a request for equitable relief.9 6 Other pre-Bever Fourth Circuit cases
decided after Harlow also failed to meet all four Cohen collateral order
requirements.9 7 The Fourth Circuit may be more amenable to allowing
interlocutory appeal of a qualified immunity claim if a case arises that meets
all four Cohen collateral order requirements.' One consideration that may
be important in the examination of future Fourth Circuit cases concerning
the appealability of qualified immunity denials is the policy behind both the
qualified immunity defense and the absolute immunity defense.9 Absolute
immunity provides total protection to a public official for official acts.100
Absolute immunity must be appealable immediately to protect an official
from the burdens imposed by trial.'0' Conversely, qualified immunity only
piecemeal appeals and denying justice); infra note 111 (citing cases in support of avoiding
piecemeal appeals).
92. See 15 C. Waicirr, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 3911 (Cohen final
disposition requirement means that district court contemplates no further review).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 724 F.2d at 1088; see supra note 3 (case must present a serious and unsettled question
for collateral order exception to apply).
96. 724 F.2d at 1086-87; see supra note 3 (issue must be effectively unreviewable upon
final judgment for collateral order doctrine to apply).
97. See England v. Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140, 143 (4th Cir. 1984) (adhering to Bever
holding that qualified immunity denial not appealable until final judgment if Cohen collateral
order requirements not met); Benford v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., No. 83-1168,
slip op. at 8 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1983) (issue not effectively unreviewable upon final judgment
because defendants could prove qualified immunity during trial), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 107
(1983).
98. See 724 F.2d at 1086 (reasons why qualified immunity defense not traditionally
appealable immediately).
99. See Freed, Executive Official Immunity For Constitutional Violations: An Analysis
And A Critique, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 526, 529 (1977) (notions of fairness, encouragement of
accepting public duties and avoiding distraction of public official's attention from public
business provide rationale for official immunity).
100. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (absolute immunity provides
complete protection from litigation); Freed, supra note 99, at 527 (absolute immunity protects
defendant not only from ultimate liability but from burdens of trial).
101. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982) (denial of absolute immunity for
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protects an official from the burdens of trial for reasonable acts within the
realm of the official duties of the public official. 0 2 Limiting the qualified
immunity protection only to reasonable acts makes it difficult for a qualified
immunity claim to meet the Cohen effectively unreviewable requirement for
collateral order appeals because the defendants are free to prove the qualified
immunity defense any time during or after the trial. 03
The Fourth Circuit's narrow reading of Harlow in Bever and other
cases,'04 and the emphasis on the "serious and unsettled question" require-
metit in those cases, indicate that the Fourth Circuit requires strict adherence
to Cohen collateral order principles to allow interlocutory appeal of an
issue. 05° In the three cases concerning qualified immunity that the Fourth
Circuit has examined since Harlow, the Fourth Circuit has denied the
appealability of the denial of a qualified immunity claim. 0 6 The Fourth
Circuit denied appealability of the qualified immunity denials because the
cases did not meet the full Cohen requirements of finally determining a
serious and unsettled question and because the cases involved either a request
for equitable relief' °7 or the potential for proof by the defendants of the
qualified immunity defense during trial. 0 The Bever court's reliance on the
President immediately appealable to avoid burden of trial).
102. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982) (qualified immunity affords
protection when defendant does not violate known constitutional rights of another).
103. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (description of
collateral order requirements); Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir.) (defendants
free to prove qualified immunity defense during trial on merits), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 349
(1984); see also Benford v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. No. 83-1168, slip op. at 9
(4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1983) (qualified immunity defense may be proven during trial on merits),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 107 (1983).
104. See Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir.) (Harlow did not automatically
allow interlocutory appeal of qualified immunity denials), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 349 (1984);
see also England v. Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140, 143 (4th Cir. 1984) (companion case to Bever
holding that qualified immunity not immediately appealable); Benford v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc., No. 83-1168, slip op. at 9 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1983) (qualified immunity not
immediately appealable where collateral order requirements not met), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
107 (1980).
105. See 724 F.2d at 1086-89 (Fourth Circuit requires strict adherence to Cohen collateral
order principles for interlocutory review); see also Benford v. American Broadcasting Compa-
nies, Inc., No. 83-1168, slip op. at 9 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1983) (Benford does not meet Cohen
collateral order exception requirements), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 107 (1983).
106. See England v. Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140, 143 (4th Cir. 1984) (qualified immunity
appeal denied as not within collateral order doctrine); Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1086
(4th Cir.) (case did not meet collateral order requirements for appeal), cert denied, 105 S. Ct.
349 (1984); Benford v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., No. 83-1168, slip op. at 9 (4th
Cir. Apr. 11, 1983) (interlocutory appeal of qualified immunity disallowed as not within
collateral order doctrine), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 107 (1983).
107. See England v. Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140, 143 (4th Cir. 1984) (Bever dispositive in
denying qualified immunity appeal where defendants subject to request for equitable relief);
Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1086-89 (4th Cir.) (presence of claim for injunctive relief
caused suit to continue regardless of qualified immunity from damages and case did not present
serious and unsettled question), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 349 (1984).
108. See Benford v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., No. 83-1168, slip op. at 9
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defendant's demands for equitable relief may serve to limit Bever to cases
involving requests for injunctive relief or reinstatement of a defendant's job.
The Bever court's denial of interlocutory appeal of a qualified immunity
denial, however, is consistent with the finality requirement of section 1291,19
with the section 1291 overall goal of avoiding piecemeal appeals," 0 and with
the Supreme Court precedent in Cohen."'
STOKELY G. CALDWELL, JR.
D. Res Judicata: Alternative Claims in a Single Lawsuit-
A Simple Principle Well Stated
Once a court renders a valid' and final 2 judgment on the
(4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1983) (issue of qualified immunity not effectively unreviewable at final
judgment), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 107 (1983).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982); see supra note I (discussion of § 1291).
110. See Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 1983) (avoidance of piecemeal
appeal is important goal of rule requiring final judgment before appeal); 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1982) (appeal available after final judgment); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,
449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (§ 1291 prohibits piecemeal appeal because allowing piecemeal appeal
would inhibit district judge independence); United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
666 F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir.) (confining appeal to final judgment minimizes disruption, delay
and costs of piecemeal appeal), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118 (1982); United States v. Gurney,
558 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977) (avoidance of piecemeal appeal underlies § 1291); 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 3907 (discussion of purpose of § 1291).
111. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (discussion of collateral order requirements); supra notes
25-40 and accompanying text (discussion of Cohen).
1. See 7 J. MooRE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.25[2], at 225 (1983)
(judgment is valid when court rendering judgment has jurisdiction over subject matter of lawsuit
and over parties) [hereinafter cited as MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].
2. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 714 F.2d 178, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(failure to appeal judgment makes judgment final and bars relitigation of matters court actually
decided or that parties could have litigated); Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,
605 F.2d 990, 995-96 (7th Cir.) (judgment is final for purposes of res judicata if decision is
immune from reversal or amendment), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1979); Lummus Co. v.
Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961) (whether judgment that is final
under statute governing appeals in federal courts is final for purposes of res judicata depends
upon adequacy of hearing, opportunity for review, and lack of tentative aspect in decision),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a judgment
is final when entered pursuant to rule 58, which governs the entry of a judgment by a court
clerk, and rule 79, which sets forth the books a court clerk must keep and entries the clerk
must make in the books. See 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, 0.409 [1.-I], at
301 & n.2 (when court clerk enters judgment in compliance with rules 58 and 79 judgment is
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merits3 of a case, the doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent suit
upon the same claim5 between the same parties.6 Application of res
effective for purposes of res judicata); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 58(2), 79(a) (rule 58(2) states
judgment is effective only from time court clerk enters decision in accordance with record
keeping procedures of rule 79(a)). To constitute a final judgment, a decision must dispose of
at least one entire claim against a single party. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S.
737, 742-43 (1976) (court can not enter separate final judgment disposing of less than one claim
against single party). An appeal from a judgment or a motion to set aside, vacate, or amend a
judgment generally does not destroy the conclusive effect of the judgment. See IB MOoRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, 0.416 [1], at 514 (if party takes appeal from judgment or
moves to set aside, vacate, or amend judgment, judgment's finality is not affected). See generally
18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 4432, at 298-304
(1981) (discussion of res judicata requirement of finality) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT &
MILLER].
3. See Harper Plastics v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 657 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir. 1981) (for
purposes of res judicata judgment on the merits is defined as judgment based on legal rights as
opposed to matters of practice, jurisdiction, procedure, or form) (citing Fairmont Aluminum
Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 622, 625 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 838 (1955)); Keys v.
Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936, 940 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (judgment is on merits if record shows that
parties might have had their contentions determined according to their legal rights if parties
had presented all their evidence and court had applied all relevant law), aff'd, 496 F.2d 876
(5th Cir. 1974); see also Swift v. McPherson, 232 U.S. 51, 56 (1914) (judgment on the merits
does not include dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or absence of parties, or dismissal because
plaintiff brought suit prematurely); 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 4427, at 270-71 (1981)
(listing examples of court actions that constitute judgment on the merits); but see id. § 4435, at
330 ("on the merits" is inaccurate phrase and serves only to maintain idea that extent of res
judicata preclusion is measured by factors other than validity and finality).
4. See IB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, 0.405[l] at 178-88 (general
discussion of definition, function, and policy of res judicata). The term "res judicata"
encompasses two doctrines that attach preclusive effect to a prior judgment. See 18 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 2, § 4402, at 7. The first doctrine, claim preclusion or true res judicata,
bars reassertion of all issues relevant to the same claim between the same parties, whether or
not the parties raised the issues at trial. Id.; see Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597
(1948) (res judicata precludes parties from relitigating issues that they raised or could have
raised in earlier action); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 528 F.2d 934, 936-37 (4th Cir.)
(res judicata bars issues actually litigated and susceptible of litigation), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
946 (1976). Claim preclusion bars assertion in a later case of the same transactional facts of a
prior case in the form of a different cause of action or theory of relief. Young Engineers, Inc.
v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The second
doctrine, issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, proscribes relitigation between the same parties
or their privies of substantially identical issues actually litigated in and necessary to a prior
judgment. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327 (1955). The bar of
collateral estoppel adheres regardless of whether the prior case was based upon the same
underlying transaction or occurrences. Lawlor, 349 U.S. at 327; see RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS (1982) § 13, introductory note (discussion of terminology included within concept
of res judicata).
5. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 24 (claim includes all or any part of transaction or
series of transactions out of which action arose). Considerations for determining whether a set
of facts constitutes a transaction include the relation of the facts in time, origin, space or
motivation, convenience of assessing the facts in a single trial, and business understandings or
expectations that the parties would normally treat the facts underlying the suit as a group. Id.
6. See Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (final judgment
on merits precludes parties from relitigating issues raised in prior action); Saylor v. Lindsey,
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judicata effectively allocates limited judicial resources, enforces the
finality of judgments, and protects individuals from burdensome and
repetitive litigation.7 The knowledge that res judicata bars a second suit should
motivate the parties to a lawsuit to litigate the action seriously.8 Additionally,
res judicata bars later assertion of any claim or theory that a party could have
presented but neglected to present at the first trial.' The doctrine of res judicata,
therefore, encourages parties to present all related claims in a single suit."0
Furthermore, for res judicata purposes, a dismissal with prejudice constitutes
a final adjudication on the merits." When a party dismisses an action with
391 F.2d 965, 968 (2d Cir. 1968) (res judicata bars subsequent action between same parties
upon same claim or demand following earlier valid and final judgment rendered on merits); see
also Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955) (judgment on merits in
prior suit bars subsequent suit between same parties on same cause of action); Nash County
Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir.) (essential elements of res judicata
include final judgment on merits in earlier suit, identity of cause of action in earlier and later
suit, and identity of parties in suits), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); Englehardt v. Bell &
Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30, 32 (8th Cir. 1964) (in subsequent action involving same parties, res
judicata attaches to judgment on merits rendered in former action that was based upon same
underlying transaction and precludes relief); 1B Mooi's FEDERAL PRAcTicE, supra note I,
0.405[l], at 185 (valid, final judgment on merits is absolute bar to subsequent lawsuit on same
claim or demand between parties).
7. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) (res judicata prevents vexatious
litigation and fosters respect for judicial decisions); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591,
597 (1948) (doctrine of res judicata based on concerns of judicial economy and on public policy
that certainty must exist in legal relations); see also 18 WsGHr & MILLER, supra note 2, § 4403,
at 12-13 (policies underlying res judicata include conservation of limited judicial resources,
fostering of respect for final judgments, and prevention of repetitive litigation). Res judicata is
not a technical rule but reflects a judicial interpretation of public policy and a desire to leave
previous litigants free of repetitive and burdensome litigation. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (citing Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294,
299 (1917)).
8. See 18 WRIoH & MILLER, supra note 2, § 4403, at 14 (parties' awareness that res
judicata prevents second opportunity to litigate case will motivate parties to regard immediate
litigation seriously).
9. See Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (res judicata
prohibits relitigation of issues that were or could have been raised in earlier action between
parties); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979) (res judicata forecloses all issues that
parties could have litigated in prior action); Harper Plastics v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 657 F.2d
939, 945 (7th Cir. 1981) (res judicata bars later assertion of all grounds for relief that plaintiff
could have raised in prior suit). See generally lB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1,
0.405[l], at 181, 186-87, 0.410[2], at 363-64 (by proscribing relitigation of claims that plaintiffs
could have presented in prior suit, res judicata prevents plaintiffs from splitting single cause of
action into separate suits that state different grounds for recovery).
10. See 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 4403, at 14 (since plaintiff knows res
judicata prevents future presentation of claims that plaintiff could have raised along with related
claims in earlier suit, plaintiff will present all claims in first suit).
11. Young Engineers, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (res judicata may apply even though judgment results from dismissal with
prejudice). A voluntary dismissal with prejudice operates as a final adjudication on the merits.
See Astron Indus. Assocs. Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 405 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir. 1968)
(stipulation of dismissal with prejudice constitutes final judgment on merits with res judicata
effect); see also Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327 (1955) (dismissal of
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prejudice, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata precludes the party from in-
stituting a subsequent action grounded on the same transaction or occurrence
that formed the basis for the first suit.'2 In ITCO v. Michelin Tire Corp., I the
Fourth Circuit considered whether a voluntary dismissal with prejudice of
one claim should provide a res judicata bar to assertion of a related
alternative claim in the same lawsuit. 14
In ITCO, Michelin Tire Corp., a manufacturer of auto tires, and ITCO,
a regional distributor of auto tires, had signed a yearly renewable dealer
sales agreement authorizing ITCO as a retail dealer and servicer of Michelin
products. 5 When Michelin refused to renew the dealership contract after
three years, ITCO brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina challenging Michelin's termination of the
dealer relationship.' 6 ITCO claimed that Michelin's termination of the dealer
relationship constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade violating section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act).'7 Since ITCO had purchased
tires from Michelin in large volume at quantity discount prices, ITCO was
able to underprice smaller authorized Michelin dealerships. 8 ITCO contended
that Michelin had conspired with disgruntled smaller dealers to remove ITCO
from the tire market so that Michelin could combine with the smaller dealers
to fix prices. 9 ITCO argued, therefore, that Michelin's termination of ITCO's
previous suit with prejudice is adjudication on merits for res judicata purposes); Gambocz v.
Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 840 (3rd Cir. 1972) (dismissal with prejudice adjudicates merits as
effectively as order entered after full trial).
12. See Young Engineers, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (claim preclusion or true res judicata bars subsequent lawsuit based upon same
transactional facts involved in prior action).
13. 722 F.2d 42 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd per curiam on rehearing, 742 F.2d 170 (1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1191 (1985).
14. Id. at 50, 52.
15. Id. at 45.
16. Id. at 46.
17. Id.; see Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (out-lawing agreements designed
to restrain interstate trade or commerce).
18. 722 F.2d at 45-46. In ITCO, the Fourth Circuit found that besides underpricing
smaller Michelin dealerships on the retail market, ITCO could compete effectively with Michelin
itself in the wholesale market by selling Michelin products to tire retailers who were not parties
to dealership agreements with Michelin. Id. The smaller authorized Michelin dealerships were
thereby undersold by both ITCO and the unauthorized dealers to whom ITCO sold on a
wholesale basis. Id.
19. Id. The Fourth Circuit in ITCO noted ITCO's assertion that Michelin had responded
to the complaints of smaller dealers by terminating dealership agreements with four large
distributors of Michelin products. Id. Prior to ITCO, the Fourth Circuit had decided antitrust
claims that two of the three other large dealers had brought against Michelin. Id. at 44 nn.1,
2; see Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1220 (4th Cir.) (directed verdict
for Michelin on Bostick's related state act claim was improper since Bostick had presented
evidence sufficient to send Sherman Act claims to trial), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 242 (1983);
Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15, 16-17 (4th Cir.) (upholding
decision of trial court that Michelin's trade restraints primarily were for purpose of promoting
interbrand competition and were not illegal under Sherman Act), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 324
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dealership contract was part of an anticompetitive conspiracy violative of
the Sherman Act. 20 In addition to the Sherman Act claim, ITCO alleged that
Michelin's termination of the dealership violated section 75-1.1 of the North
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (North Carolina Act).2' Section 75-1.1
provides that unfair or deceptive acts affecting commerce are unlawful. 22 To
invoke the North Carolina Act claim ITCO relied upon the district court's
pendent jurisdiction23 or, alternatively, upon diversity of citizenship jurisdic-
tion.
2 4
(1981). Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., involved a factual situation virtually identical
to the facts in ITCO. See 722 F.2d at 44 n.2 (facts and claim presented in Bostick closely
parallel facts and claim raised in ITCO); Bostick, 702 F.2d at 1210-13 (discussion of facts and
claim in Bostick). Bostick had alleged that Michelin's termination of the dealership agreement
constituted a restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 39-5-20(a) of the
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act. Bostick, 702 F.2d at 1209; South Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a) (Law. co-op. 1976) (unfair methods of
competition or deceptive practices in trade or commerce are unlawful). The trial court in Bostick
granted a directed verdict for Michelin on both of Bostick's claims. Bostick, 702 F.2d at 1209.
The fourth Circuit in Bostick reversed the district court's directed verdict and remanded both
claims for trial. Id. at 1221. The Bostick court decided that Michelin's motivation for terminating
the dealership contract with Bostick presented a factual issue requiring jury determination. Id.
at 1215. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held that if Michelin had terminated the dealership
contract to placate smaller Michelin dealers who were complaining that Bostick undersold the
dealers, a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act would exist. Id.
20. 722 F.2d at 46. In ITCO, Michelin answered ITCO's complaint of anticompetitive
conspiracy by citing ITCO's failure to provide adequate retail servicing of Michelin products as
the reason for termination of the dealership agreement. Id. at 45. ITCO contended that the
question of sufficiency of ITCO's retail service presented only a minor dispute between Michelin
and ITCO. Id. ITCO maintained that the smaller dealers complaints that ITCO was underpricing
the smaller dealers prompted Michelin to terminate the dealer sales agreement with ITCO. Id.
at 46.
21. Id.; see North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981)
(North Carolina Act) (unfair methods of competition and deceptive acts or practices affecting
commerce are illegal).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981); see infra note 27 (discussion of relationship between
North Carolina Act and Sherman Act).
23. 722 F.2d at 46; see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction provides that if state claim is so closely related to federal claim that two
claims comprise in essence one case, federal court should hear state claim in connection with
federal claim). Under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, a federal court can adjudicate a state
claim even if the court has no independent basis of jurisdiction to hear the state claim. Id. The
rationale behind the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is that the Constitution allows federal
courts to try all cases and controversies arising under the laws of the United States and that a
closely related state claim merges with a federal claim to become one claim arising under the
laws of the United States. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (federal courts may hear all cases
and controversies arising under Constitution and laws of United States). To exercise pendent
jurisdiction, a federal court must first find that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over
the federal claim. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. Second, the court must determine that both the
federal and state claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. Id. Finally, the court
must decide whether the plaintiff normally would be expected to bring the two claims in one
lawsuit. Id. See generally Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts: A Revised Rationale
for Pendent Jurisdiction, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 245 (1980) (discussion of evolution and purposes
of pendent jurisdiction).
24. 722 F.2d at 46; see U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2 (Congress may prescribe actions of
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Without specifying a basis for jurisdiction, the North Carolina District
Court accepted cross motions for summary judgment from ITCO and
Michelin.25 The district court denied both ITCO's and Michelin's motion for
summary judgment on ITCO's Sherman Act claim but granted summary
judgment in Michelin's favor on the North Carolina Act claim. 26 Since ITCO
interpreted the North- Carolina Act as allowing more legal theories of relief
than the Sherman Act provided, 2 iTCO petitioned the district court for an
immediate interlocutory appeal of the summary judgment decision on the
North Carolina Act claim.Y The district court denied ITCO's request for an
interlocutory appeal. 29 ITCO then moved to dismiss the Sherman Act claim
without prejudice so that a final, appealable judgment would exist20 Noting
that the .court already had expended considerable resources in preparing for
trial, the district court denied ITCO's motion to dismiss without prejudice.3 '
federal courts by such constitutionally acceptable rules as Congress chooses to establish); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (providing diversity of citizenship jurisdiction to federal courts).
Diversity jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear claims based on state law if the plaintiffs
and defendants are citizens of different states and if the lawsuits involve amounts in controversy
greater than $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
25, 722 F.2d at 47. The opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina in ITCO is not published.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 47 n.7. In ITCO, ITCO's understanding that the North Carolina Act allowed
more legal theories of relief than the Sherman Act appears to have been correct. See id. (ITCO's
understanding that scope of North Carolina Act was broader than Sherman Act). Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act provides, word for word, the same proscription
against unfair competition found in § 75-1.1 of the North Carolina Act. Compare 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(1) (1982) (declaring unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive practices in or
affecting commerce unlawful) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1981) (proscribing unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting commerce). The North
Carolina Supreme Court has stated that the court would look to federal decisions construing
the FTC Act for aid in interpreting § 75-1.1 of the North Carolina Act. Johnson v. Phoenix
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 262, 266 S.E.2d 610, 620 (1980). The Supreme Court has
interpreted the proscriptions of the FTC Act to be broader than the proscriptions of the Sherman
Act and to include the proscriptions of the Sherman Act. See FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,
257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922) (Sherman Act serves to declare public policy as guide to FTC in
determining unfair methods of competition); ITCO v. Michelin Tire Corp., 722 F.2d 42, 48
(4th.Cir. 1983) (section 5 of FTC Act draws within expanse of prohibitions conduct violative
of § 1 of Sherman Act), aff'd per curiam on rehearing, No. 82-2177(L), slip op. at 3 (4th Cir.
Aug. 29, 1984). Since the North Carolina Act parallels a statute broader than the Sherman Act,
the North Carolina Act also must be broader than the Sherman Act.
28. 722 F.2d at 47 n.7; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982) (district court judge may allow
immediate appeal of interlocutory order if judge decides that order involves question of law
subject to substantial differences of opinion and that resolution of question would materially
advance ultimate termination of lawsuit).
29. 722 F.2d at 47 n.7.
30. Id. at 47, 53. In denying ITCO's request to dismiss the Sherman Act claim without
prejudice, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina reasoned
that to dismiss the claim without prejudice would, in effect, allow ITCO's motion for a
preliminary appeal of the adverse summary judgment on the North Carolina Act claim. Id. at
53.
31. Id. at 53.
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The district court ordered that the parties should proceed immediately to
trial on the Sherman Act claim.2
Since the district court had denied both interlocutory appeal and ITCO's
motion to dismiss the Sherman Act claim without prejudice, ITCO reluctantly
dismissed the federal claim with prejudice so that the Fourth Circuit imme-
diately could review the adverse summary disposition on ITCO's North
Carolina Act claim."a ITCO recognized that the same evidence would be
relevant to both the Sherman Act claim and the North Carolina Act claim.
34
Consequently, ITCO sought to preserve the right to present evidence relevant
to the Sherman Act claim but also probative of a North Carolina Act
violation if and when the Fourth Circuit overturned the trial court's summary
disposition and remanded for retrial on the North Carolina Act claim.31
ITCO appealed to the Fourth Circuit the district court's order granting
summary judgment for Michelin on the North Carolina Act claim. 36 Although
on appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment,
Michelin contended that the court could not remand the case for retrial3 7
because ITCO had dismissed the Sherman Act claim with prejudice.3 8 Mich-
elin contended that since dismissal with prejudice prevents retrial of the issue
or claim dismissed, the doctrine of res judicata should preclude ITCO from
asserting, under the North Carolina Act, the same price-fixing and unfair
competition theory already dismissed with prejudice as part of ITCO's
Sherman Act claim.39
In arguing that the district court's final disposition of the Sherman Act
claim should bar ITCO from asserting on remand the related North Carolina
Act claim, Michelin relied on the Fourth Circuit's earlier decision in Nash
County Board of Education v. Biltmore Co.40. In Nash, the Fourth Circuit
32. Id. The ITCO district court stated that having prepared for the ITCO case and having
invested much time, the court was as conversant with the case as the court could ever be during
the course of another trial. Id. Consequently, the court determined that dismissing the case
without prejudice would have been inappropriate. Id.
33. Id. at 47, 53. The district court's summary disposition of ITCO's North Carolina Act
claim did not constitute a final appealable judgment since the court left the Sherman Act claim
for trial. Id.; see 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE, supra note 1, 56.21 [1.-2], at 1271 (summary
adjudication of less than all claims in lawsuit constitutes interlocutory order that is not
automatically appealable). To secure immediate review of the state law claim, ITCO had no
choice but to dismiss the Sherman Act claim with prejudice. See 722 F.2d at 53 (refusing to
grant preliminary appeal on North Carolina Act claim or dismissal of Sherman Act claim
without prejudice).
34. Id. at 48-49; see supra note 27 (discussion of overlap of North Carolina Act and
Sherman Act).
35. Id. at 51-52.
36. Id. at 47.
37. Id. at 50; see infra text accompanying notes 38-39 (summary of Michelin's res judicata
argument in ITCO).
38. 722 F.2d at 50.
39. Id.; see supra note 12 (dismissal with prejudice operates as final adjudication of
claim).
40. 722 F.2d at 52 n.15; see Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484
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held that a previous consensual dismissal with prejudice of a North Carolina
Act claim acted as a res judicata bar to a later suit under the Sherman Act. 4'
The Fourth Circuit in Nash noted that the plaintiff had based the North
Carolina Act suit and the Sherman Act suit upon a common nucleus of
operative fact and that the wording of the Sherman Act and the North
Carolina Act was almost identical.4 2 The Nash court determined, therefore,
that the first and second lawsuits presented substantially identical claims.
43
Since the Nash case involved two distinct actions based on similar claims
and both suits involved the same parties or their privies, the Fourth Circuit
found that Nash satisfied the basic requirements of res judicata.4 The Nash
court, therefore, held that the final consent judgment on the North Carolina
Act claim was a res judicata bar to the maintenance of a subsequent suit
under the Sherman Act.
4
In rejecting Michelin's argument that the trial court properly had granted
summary judgment on the North Carolina Act claim, the ITCO court
determined that Michelin's motivation for terminating the dealership agree-
ment with ITCO presented a genuine issue of material fact crucial to ITCO's
state law claim.46 Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue
of material fact relevant to the claim exists.47 The Fourth Circuit, therefore,
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussion
of Nash).
41. Nash, 640 F.2d at 497.
42. Id. at 488.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 486, 497.
45. Id. at 497.
46. 722 F.2d at 45, 49. The Fourth Circuit in ITCO determined that Michelin's motivation
for terminating the dealership agreement with ITCO presented a factual dispute. Id. at 45. The
Fourth Circuit concluded that resolution of the factual dispute would determine whether
Michelin's curtailment of the dealership contract constituted anticompetitive behavior violative
of the Sherman Act and, therefore, the North Carolina Act. Id. at 49; see Donald B. Rice Tire
Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15, 16 (4th Cir.) (if Rice had demonstrated that complaints
of smaller rival tire dealers concerning Rice's price-cutting prompted Michelin to terminate
dealership agreement with Rice, Rice might have proven conspiracy violative of Sherman Act),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981). The ITCO court found significant that in Bostick Oil Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp., the Fourth Circuit had held that a fact finder could have decided that
Michelin's termination of the dealership agreement with Bostick violated § 1 of the Sherman
Act. 722 F.2d at 49; see Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1215 (4th Cir.)
(if jury were to make factual determination that Michelin had terminated Bostick's contract
because of smaller dealers' complaints, then Michelin would have violated § 1 of Sherman Act),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 242 (1983); supra note 19 (discussion of Bostick). The Fourth Circuit
in ITCO noted the similarity of the factual situations and claims raised in Bostick and ITCO.
722 F.2d at 44 n.2, 49; see Bostick, 702 F.2d at 1210-13, 1215 (factual background and issues
involved in Bostick). Additionally, the ITCO court noted that conduct violative of the Sherman
Act also would violate the North Carolina Act. 722 F.2d at 48. The Bostick decision, therefore,
suggested to the ITCO court that a fact finder could have decided in ITCO that Michelin's
decision to terminate the dealership agreement violated the North Carolina Act. See id. at 49
(noting availability of theory of relief that would allow ITCO to prove violation of North
Carolina Act).
47. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (court may grant summary judgment on claim only when
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reversed the district court's summary disposition of ITCO's North Carolina




In remanding the state act claim to the district court, the ITCO court
rejected Michelin's res judicata argument. 49 The Fourth Circuit determined
that applying a final decision on one claim as a bar to a related claim within
the same suit would exceed the intended scope of the doctrine of res
judicata.5 0 The ITCO court found that Michelin had offered no case law
supporting the argument that a final decision on a claim can bar assertion
of a related claim within the same suit.' Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit
noted that Michelin had relied on Nash to support the res judicata argument
but the ITCO court concluded that the Nash decision was inapposite. 2 The
court in ITCO noted that the basic judicial statement of res judicata requires
two lawsuits.53 Although Nash involved two distinct lawsuits brought in
succession, ITCO concerned only one suit. 54 The Fourth Circuit decided,
therefore, that Nash was distinguishable from ITCO and that since Nash
involved two suits and ITCO involved one suit, only Nash fell within the
scope of the rule of res judicata." The Fourth Circuit determined that res
judicata was inapplicable between the two claims in ITCO because the
plaintiff had asserted both the North Carolina Act claim and the Sherman
Act claim in the same lawsuit.5 6
In addition to stating that the basic rule of res judicata requires two
lawsuits, the Fourth Circuit explained the rationale for not applying the
doctrine to related claims within the same suit." The ITCO court noted that
two of the purposes res judicata serves are prevention of wasteful, duplicative
lawsuits and enforcement of the finality of judgments., The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that by dismissing the Sherman Act claim voluntarily, ITCO
there is no genuine issue of material fact).
48. 722 F.2d at 49, 53; see Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132,
1138 (7th Cir.) (citing Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464 (1962)) (courts should
avoid summary judgment in antitrust cases where factual questions are central), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 828 (1970).
49. 722 F.2d at 50.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 52.
52. Id. at 52 n.15; see supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussion of Nash).
53. 722 F.2d at 52 n.15; see supra text accompanying notes 1-6 (party to lawsuit must
bring subsequent action for res judicata to apply).
54. 722 F.2d at 47, 52 n.15 (unlike ITCO, Nash involved two lawsuits); see Nash, 640
F.2d at 486 (plaintiff school district in Nash instituted action after consent judgment rendered
in earlier state suit brought by Attorney General).
55. 722 F.2d at 52 n.15; see Nash, 640 F.2d at 497 (concluding that district court was
correct in applying res judicata in Nash).
56. 722 F.2d at 52 & n.15.
57. Id. at 50-51, 52 n.15.
58. Id. at 52 n.15; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (purposes of res judicata
include enforcement of finality of judgments and protection of individuals from vexatious
litigation).
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actually had furthered the res judicata principle of avoiding repetitive liti-
gation. 9 The ITCO court noted that if ITCO had litigated the Sherman Act
claim and lost, ITCO could have challenged on appeal the adverse grant of
summary judgment of the North Carolina Act claimA0 If the Fourth Circuit
had reversed the summary disposition on appeal, a remand and an entire
second trial would have followed. 61 The ITCO court decided, therefore, that
ITCO's voluntary dismissal of the federal claim and immediate appeal of
the state claim avoided the possibility that the ITCO case would require two
trials. 62 The Fourth Circuit also recognized that res judicata serves to enforce
the finality of judgments. 63 The ITCO court stated, however, that parties
jeopardize society's interest in the finality of a judgment only when the
parties attempt to litigate more than one lawsuit.1
4
The Fourth Circuit then examined the lower court record and determined
that although the trial court had dismissed the Sherman Act claim with
prejudice, the trial court had reserved ITCO's right to present evidence
relevant to the Sherman Act claim as proof of a violation of the North
Carolina Act.6 The Fourth Circuit quoted conversations from the record
between the district court judge, counsel for ITCO, and counsel for Mich-
elin. 66 As the Fourth Circuit interpreted these discussions, the trial judge and
counsel for Michelin had understood that if ITCO were successful on appeal,
ITCO would have reserved the right to present evidence probative of a
violation of the dismissed Sherman Act claim as long as ITCO were to offer
the evidence to prove the North Carolina Act claim.67
While the Fourth Circuit determined that ITCO had reserved the right
to use evidence relevant to the Sherman Act claim, the dissent in ITCO
concluded that the parties and the North Carolina district court had not
reached an understanding that ITCO could prove the state law claim with
evidence relevant to the Sherman Act claim.6" The dissent also adopted
59. 722 F.2d at 50.
60. Id. at 50-51.
61. Id. at 51. Had ITCO lost on the Sherman Act claim and challenged the North Carolina
district court's summary disposition of the North Carolina Act claim on appeal, the Fourth
Circuit in ITCO could have permitted ITCO to go to trial based on any of the theories ITCO
raised under the North Carolina Act. Id.
62. Id. at 51 (by dismissing Sherman Act claim ITCO prevented possible expense of
second trial); see supra note 7 and accompanying text (res judicata serves to prevent repetitive
litigation).
63. 722 F.2d at 52 n.15; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (effect of res judicata
enforces finality of judgments).
64. 722 F.2d at 52 n.15.
65. Id. at 51; see infra note 94 (discussing ITCO court's examination of trial court record
to determine intended res judicata effect of dismissal with prejudice).
66. 722 F.2d at 51-52.
67. Id.
68. 722 F.2d at 54 n.1 (Russel, J., dissenting). As did the majority in ITCO, the dissent
quoted at length from discussions between the district court judge and counsel for both ITCO
and Michelin. Id. at 54-55. The ITCO dissent noted that the district court judge had refused to
rule on whether ITCO's voluntary dismissal of the Sherman Act claim would preclude ITCO's
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Michelin's position that the Nash decision compelled the Fourth Circuit to
give res judicata effect to the dismissal with prejudice of ITCO's Sherman
Act claim. 69 The dissent found only one relevant distinction between Nash
and ITCO.70 The ITCO dissent noted that in Nash res judicata attached to
a final judgment on a state antitrust claim and barred maintenance of a
Sherman Act claim. 7' In ITCO, however, the defendant sought to use a
dismissal with prejudice of a Sherman Act claim to bar a state antitrust
claim. 72 The dissent stated that the Nash decision necessitated application of
res judicata to the opposite order of claim preclusion presented in ITCO and
did not distinguish Nash from ITCO on the basis that Nash involved two
suits.73 Instead, the ITCO dissent cited to a footnote in the Fourth Circuit
case of Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin74 for the proposition that res judicata
attaches to a final judgment to bar resurrection of the claim either in a
subsequent action or on appeal in the same case.
75
Bostick, like ITCO, concerned a large volume dealer of Michelin products
which brought suit following Michelin's termination of a dealership agree-
ment. 76 As the ITCO court noted, the facts in Bostick were virtually identical
to the facts presented in ITCO.77 The footnote that the ITCO dissent cited
from Bostick stated that the Bostick court refused on appeal to hear a fraud
claim that appeared identical to a fraud claim dismissed with prejudice at
the district court level. 78 The Bostick court held that the plaintiff could not
reassert the dismissed fraud claim under a different heading on appeal. 79 The
future use of evidence relevant to both the Sherman Act claim and the North Carolina Act
claim. Id. at 54 n.l. The dissent concluded, therefore, that the district court judge's statement
suggested that the parties and the court had not reached a mutual understanding that ITCO
had reserved the right to present evidence relevant to the Sherman Act claim for the purpose
of proving the North Carolina Act claim. Id.
69. Id. at 54; see supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
application of res judicata in Nash); supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussion of
Fourth Circuit's basis for distinguishing Nash from ITCO).
70. 722 F.2d at 54 (Russel, J., dissenting).
71. Id.; see Nash, 640 F.2d at 485, 497 (holding that res judicata precluded plaintiff from
maintaining Sherman Act claim because of final judgment in earlier suit brought against same
defendant on basis of state antitrust act).
72. 722 F.2d at 54 (Russel, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. 702 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 242 (1983).
75. 722 F.2d at 54 (Russel, J., dissenting); see Bostick, 702 F.2d at 1218 n.22 (since
parties had agreed to dismiss plaintiffs fraud claim with prejudice at trial, plaintiff could not
reassert on appeal same fraud claim under different statute); supra note 19 (discussion of
Bostick).
76. Bostick, 702 F.2d at 1209. In Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., Bostick alleged
that Michelin's termination of the dealership agreement constituted restraint of trade and
monopolization violative of the Sherman Act and the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices
Act. Id.
77. 722 F.2d at 44 n.2; see Bostick, 702 F.2d at 1210-13 (discussion of facts in Bostick).
78. 722 F.2d at 54; see Bostick, 702 F.2d at 1218 n.22 (since parties had agreed at district
court to dismiss Bostick's fraud claim, Bostick could not re-label fraud claim and assert claim
again on appeal).
79. Bostick, 702 F.2d at 1218 n.22.
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dissent in ITCO interpreted the Bostick court's refusal to allow the plaintiff
to proceed with the fraud claim as an application of res judicata to bar
similar claims within the same lawsuit.8 0 The dissent reasoned that Nash and
ITCO could not be distinguished on the basis that Nash involved two lawsuits
and ITCO involved only one suit. 8' The ITCO dissent, therefore, would have
applied res judicata to bar ITCO from asserting portions of the North
Carolina Act claim on remand.8 2 The dissent, however, would have barred
only those theories of relief available under the North Carolina Act that
.were similar to the theories available under the Sherman Act claim that
ITCO had dismissed with prejudice.8" The ITCO dissent would have allowed
ITCO to present any theories of relief available under the North Carolina
Act that were additional to and different from the theories available under
the Sherman Act.
8 4
Notwithstanding the dissent's assertion that res judicata can apply in the
context of a single suit to bar an alternative claim, cases addressing the
doctrine of res judicata support the ITCO majority's holding that the doctrine
can bar only a second lawsuit." The Supreme Court has stated specifically
that res judicata applies only when a party brings a second or subsequent
action.86 The Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts consistently have
phrased the rule of res judicata as requiring two distinct lawsuits for the
doctrine to bar a cause of action . 7 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
80. 722 F.2d at 54 (Russel, J., dissenting). The ITCO dissent may have misinterpreted the
Bostick court's refusal to allow Bostick to maintain an Unfair Trade Practices Act fraud theory
as an application of res judicata to bar similar claims within the same suit. Compare 722 F.2d
at 54 (citing footnote in Bostick for proposition that res judicata will attach to final judgment
to bar resurrection of claim on appeal in same case) with Bostick, 702 F.2d at 1218 n.22
(footnote that ITCO dissent cited to support res judicata argument does not refer to res
judicata). The Bostick court did not explain the rationale for refusing to allow Bostick to
proceed with the fraud claim and did not refer to res judicata for support. See Bostick, 702
F.2d at 1218 n.22. Since the Bostick court concluded the discussion of Bostick's fraud claim by
stating that the trial court properly had dismissed the fraud theory, the court simply may have
decided that the fraud claim lacked merit. See id (lower court properly enforced parties'
agreement to dismiss Bostick's fraud claim with prejudice).
81. 722 F.2d at 54 (Russel, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 55.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955) (doctrine
of res judicata requires prior and second suit to operate to bar claim); Lovell v. Mixon, 719
F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir. 1983) (doctrine of res judicata bars second suit); Premier Elec. Constr.
Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132, 1138-39 (7th Cir.) (doctrine of res judicata contemplates
two seperate actions involving same parties), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
86. See G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, 28 (1916) (res judicata applies
only when party to earlier suit brings subsequent action).
87. See Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 336 (1955) (Supreme Court's
statement of doctrine of res judicata as requiring prior and second suit); Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) (res judicata applies to repetitive suits); Heiser v. Woodruff,
327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946) (res judicata bars renewal of litigation in another court after first
court has adjudicated original suit fully); Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 199 (1932) (according
res judicata effect to final judgment in prior suit to bar party to prior suit from instituting
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stated repeatedly that before applying res judicata, a court must first
determine that the case before the court falls within the intended scope of
the doctrine. 88 In ITCO, the Fourth Circuit correctly determined that the
doctrine of res judicata should not apply in the context of a single lawsuit
to bar alternative claims. s9
In addition to appropriately defining the scope and basic application of
res judicata, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in ITCO manifests a clear under-
standing of the policies and purposes res judicata serves. 9° By barring later
assertion of any claim or theory that a party could have or did present at
an earlier trial between the same parties, res judicata prevents wasteful and
repetitive litigation.9' As the Fourth Circuit noted, by voluntarily dismissing
the Sherman Act claim ITCO circumvented the possible necessity of two
complete trials. 92 ITCO's voluntary dismissal with prejudice actually fur-
thered the res judicata principle of preventing wasteful litigation. 93 The
Fourth Circuit's refusal to use the dismissal of the Sherman Act claim as a
res judicata bar to ITCO's assertion of the state law claim on remand may
encourage other plaintiffs to follow ITCO's example and seek more efficient
resolution of claims.
94
second suit); Young Engineers Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (res judicata allows prior judgment to bar reassertion of claim in later suit);
Lovell v. Mixon, 719 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir. 1983) (doctrine of res judicata bars subsequent
suit); Nash County Bd. of Ed. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 486, 488-89 (4th Cir.) (description
of res judicata as doctrine for courts to apply between an earlier and later suit), cert denied,
434 U.S. 878 (1981); Astron Indus. Assocs. Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 405 F.2d 958, 960
(5th Cir. 1968) (citing Bait. S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 319 (1927)) (effect of judgment
as res judicata is dependent upon similarity of cause of action in second suit); see also Dobbs,
Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment,
51 MINN. L. Rv. 491, 496 (1967) (res judicata applies only when there was final judgment in
earlier suit and party to earlier suit brings second and distinct action based on same transaction).
88. See Brown v. Felson, 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979) (since res judicata governs claims not
previously litigated doctrine should be invoked only after inquiry demonstrates that specific
case falls within intended scope of rule); see also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619
(1983) (res judicata does not operate to bar party from attacking final judgment if party attacks
judgment in same judicial proceeding and before same court that rendered judgment); Kremer
v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982) (judgment must dispose of entire
claim for doctrine of res judicata to bar subsequent suit).
89. 722 F.2d at 52; see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit correctly
interpreted scope of res judicata to exclude single suit on direct appeal).
90. See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's ITCO decision furthered
res judicata principles of avoiding excess litigation and preventing splitting of cause of action).
91. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (discussion of purposes and effect of res
judicata).
92. 722 F.2d at 50; see supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussion of Fourth
Circuit's reasoning in ITCO that by voluntarily dismissing Sherman Act claim, ITCO avoided
possibility of wasteful second suit).
93. See supra note 62 (ITCO's voluntary dismissal of Sherman Act claim furthered res
judicata principle of preventing needless litigation); IB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
1, 0.405[l], at 179 (res judicata prevents repetitive suits and embodies legal precept that courts
should avoid needless litigation).
94. See 722 F.2d at 52 (Fourth Circuit refused to use final judgment on Sherman Act
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Another manner in which the doctrine of res judicata serves to curb
repetitive litigation is by discouraging plaintiffs from splitting one cause of
action into serveral suits.95 Since res judicata will attach to a final judgment
in a lawsuit to bar the parties to the suit from relitigating any claims that
the parties could have raised in the action, res judicata prevents parties from
splitting related claims into seperate suits. 96 Because ITCO did not split the
Sherman Act claim and the North Carolina Act claim into seperate suits,
ITCO could expect that res judicata would not attach to the final judgment
on the Sherman Act claim to bar assertion of the North Carolina Act claim. 97
To defeat ITCO's expectation that res judicata could not bar the North
Carolina Act claim, as the ITCO dissent would have done, might have set a
precedent that would have discouraged future plaintiffs from bringing related
claims in single, efficient actions.9 8 By refusing to apply res judicata to
claim to bar assertion of North Carolina Act claim on remand); id. at 47 n.7, 51 n.14 (ITCO
considered economics of litigation in deciding to dismiss Sherman Act claim voluntarily and to
seek review of summary judgment decision on state act claim). In refusing to use the judgment
on ITCO's Sherman Act claim to bar the North Carolina Act claim, the Fourth Circuit in
ITCO relied on the trial judge's right to exempt certain issues from the scope of res judicata's
bar in addition to relying upon basic principles of res judicata. Id.; see id. at 54 (Russel, J.,
dissenting) (court may provide that plaintiff's voluntary dismissal with prejudice of suit will not
constitute final judgment on suit for purposes of res judicata); IB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 1, 0.405[1], at 188 (courts may specifically exempt certain issues from scope of res
judicata's bar). A court may expressly reserve the plaintiff's right to bring a second action
based upon the same underlying claim or transaction. Id. The Fourth Circuit interpreted the
trial court transcript to indicate that the district court had sought to qualify the order dismissing
ITCO's Sherman Act claim with prejudice. 722 F.2d at 51. The ITCO court decided that the
district court had sought to reserve ITCO's right to use evidence relevant to the dismissed
federal claim to prove the North Carolina Act claim in the event of a remand on the North
Carolina Act claim. Id. If the Fourth Circuit correctly interpreted the lower court record, res
judicata would have been inapplicable in ITCO because the district court would have reserved
ITCO's right to present all the North Carolina Act theories of relief on remand. See Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 295 (1943) (courts should determine
intended res judicata effect of dismissal with prejudice from entire record); IB MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 1, 0.40511], at 188 (court may reserve right to bring later action on
same underlying transaction in dismissal order). But see Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d
795, 798 (5th Cir. 1970) (courts should not attempt to modify normal res judicata effect of
dismissal with prejudice by looking beyond formal order).
95. See 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, 0.410[2], at 363 (res judicata
prevents parties from splitting one cause of action into several suits).
96. See 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 4403, at 14 (res judicata encourages
plaintiffs to bring all related claims together rather than splitting claims into piecemeal litigation);
supra note 9 and accompanying text (res judicata bars later assertion of any claim or theory
that parties could have raised at first trial).
97. See 722 F.2d at 46 (ITCO brought federal and state claims together in single action
before federal district court).
98. See 722 F.2d at 55 (Russel, J., dissenting) (dissent would have barred ITCO's North
Carolina Act claim on remand by according res judicata effect to dismissal with prejudice of
Sherman Act claim). If the ITCO court had applied res judicata to bar ITCO's North Carolina
Act claim, ITCO would have lost the advantage of avoiding the preclusive effect of res judicata
by bringing alternative claims together in one suit. See 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, §
4403, at 14 (res judicata's preclusive effect encourages plaintiffs to bring all related claims
together in one lawsuit).
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alternative claims within a single suit, therefore, the Fourth Circuit furthered
the purpose of res judicata of encouraging parties to present all related
claims in one suit.Y
In ITCO, the Fourth Circuit discussed the res judicata effect of a
dismissal with prejudice of one claim upon a similar claim within the same
suit.100 The ITCO court simply adhered to the basic requirement that the
doctrine of res judicata only applies as between two distinct suits.'0' The
ITCO court's opinion, however, does provide a rare discussion of the
rationale for not according res judicata effect to a final judgment on one
claim to bar another claim within the same suit.'02 Additionally, the ITCO
holding should induce plaintiffs to gather all related claims together in one
suit. 103 The Fourth Circuit's decision in ITCO should encourage future
plaintiffs to handle claims in an efficient manner consistent with the under-
lying principles of res judicata.'04
Jom4 L. RADDER
99. See 722 F.2d at 52 (application of res judicata in ITCO would defeat purpose courts
designed doctrine to promote); supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (res judicata operates
to encourage parties to gather all related claims in one efficient suit).
100. 722 F.2d at 50-52; see supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text (ITCO court's
discussion of res judicata's applicability to alternative claims within same suit).
101. See 722 F.2d at 52 (refusing to apply res judicata within context of single suit); supra
notes 86-88 and accompanying text (courts have stated that application of res judicata requires
two lawsuits).
102. See 722 F.2d at 52, 54 (inability of Michelin and ITCO dissent to produce any cases
specifically holding that res judicata applies within single case indicates question is rarely
addressed).
103. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (by refusing to apply res judicata
between claims within single lawsuit, ITCO decision furthers res judicata policy of preventing
parties from splitting causes of action into separate suits).
104. See supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text (in refusing to apply res judicata in
ITCO, Fourth Circuit recognized that ITCO had furthered principles of res judicata by
presenting single, efficient action and thereby avoiding potential second lawsuit).
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E. Rule 45(d): Territorial Limits of Effective Service
of Deposition Subpoenas
Rule 45(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the issuance
of subpoenas for the taking of depositions.' Rule 45(d) details the proof of
service procedure for issuance of the subpoena and authorizes the party
requesting discovery to command the production of specified documents.
2
Rule 45(d) sets forth the attendance limitations for persons designated in the
subpoena, distinguishing between residents and nonresidents of the deposing
district. 3 Although rule 45(d)(2) provides for compulsory attendance at
depositions of both resident and nonresident witnesses beyond district juris-
dictional lines, 4 rule 45(d)(2) does not explicitly provide for a similar grant
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d) applies only to witnesses
or nonparties and does not include parties to the litigation. Id.; see Grey v. Continental Mktg.
Assocs. Inc., 315 F. Supp. 826, 832 n.15 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (rule 45(d) inapplicable to parties);
Young v. Clearing, 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 789, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (rule 45 applies only to
witnesses, not parties); see also 4 J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTiCE 26.70[1.-I], at p.
447-49 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing location at which party may take deposition of nonparty witness
under rule 45(d)). A party may compel a witness to attend a deposition only pursuant to the
issuance of a subpoena. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a); see Cleveland v. Palmby, 75 F.R.D. 654, 656
(W.D. Okla. 1977) (nonparty can be compelled to appear at deposition only by issuance of
subpoena). The party compelling a witness' attendance at a deposition must give notice to other
parties to the action. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1); see Srybnik v. Epstein, 13 F.R.D. 248, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (subpoena improper when defendant failed to give notice to plaintiff of witness'
deposition).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). Rule 45(d)(1) provides in part:
(1) Proof of service of a notice to take a deposition as provided in Rule 30(b) and
31(a) constitutes a sufficient authorization for the issuance by the clerk of the district
court for the district in which the deposition is to be taken of subpoenas for the
persons named or described therein. Proof of service may be made by filing with the
clerk of the district court for the district in which the deposition is to be taken a
copy of the notice together with a statement of the date and manner of service and
of the names of the persons served, certified by the person who made service. The
subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to produce and permit
inspection and copying of designated books, papers, documents, or tangible things
which constitute or contain matters within the scope of the examination permitted by
Rule 26(b), but in that event the subpoena will be subject to the provisions of Rule
26(c) and subdivision (b) of this rule.
Id.
3. Id. 45(d)(2). Rule 45(d)(2) provides:
A resident of the district in which the deposition is to be taken may be required to
attend an examination only in the county wherein he resides or is employed or
transacts his business in person, or at such other convenient place as is fixed by an
order of court. A nonresident of the district may be required to attend only in the
county wherein he is served with a subpoena, or within 40 miles from the place of
service, or at such other convenient place as is fixed by an order of court.
Id.
4. Id. The 1946 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 gave the district courts
the express power to compel a nonresident of the district to attend a deposition in a neighboring
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of district jurisdictional limitations for valid service of a subpoena requesting
appearance at a deposition.5 Rule 45(d) thus is silent on the question of
whether a district court has authority to serve a deposition subpoena outside
the judicial district in which the court sits.6 In In re Guthrie7 the Fourth
Circuit considered whether rule 45(d) authorizes a district court to issue and
serve a deposition subpoena outside the judicial district.'
The rule 45(d) issue in Guthrie arose during the course of discovery
proceedings in an action stemming from an undercover investigation by the
United States House of Representatives Select Committee on Aging concern-
ing abuses in the sale of health insurance. 9 The plaintiff, an independent
insurance agent, brought suit against staff members of the Select Committee
on Aging, the American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., and several other
individuals for the surreptitious videotaping and subsequent broadcast of a
cancer insurance sales promotion meeting.10 The United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at the request of the plaintiff, served a subpoena
duces tecum upon the Clerk of the House of Representatives at the United
States Capitol in Washington, D.C., ordering the clerk to appear at a
judicial district by inserting the qualifying phrase "or at such other convenient place as is fixed
by an order of court." 5A J. MOORE, supra note 1, 45.08 n.3, at 80-81.
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); supra note 3 (text of rule 45(d)(2)).
6. See FED. R. Crv. P. 45(d)(2). Contra id. 45(e). Rule 45(e) addresses service of a
subpoena for a hearing or trial. Id. Rule 45(e)(1) permits service of a trial subpoena up to one
hundred miles from the site of the hearing or trial regardless of whether service is within or
outside the district. Id. 45(e)(1); see infra note 50 (text of rule 45(e)(1)).
7. 733 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1984).
8. Id. at 636-39.
9. Id. at 635. The Fourth Circuit in In re Guthrie addressed a collateral discovery issue
arising out of Benford v. American Broadcasting Co. Id. See generally Benford v. American
Broadcasting Co., 554 F. Supp. 145 (D. Md. 1982) (suit brought by plaintiff insurance salesman
alleging various violations of federal statutes and common law torts for defendant's surreptitious
videotaping and subsequent broadcast of plaintiff's sales presentation), dismissed and remanded,
707 F.2d 504 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 107 (1983); Benford v. American Broadcasting
Co., 520 F. Supp. 1159 (D. Md. 1980) (ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss); Benford v.
American Broadcasting Co., 502 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Md. 1980) (ruling on defendant's motion
for summary judgment), aff'd, 661 F.2d 917 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981).
10. 733 F.2d at 635. Through arrangements made by an undercover congressional aid
acting as an insurance sales trainee, the plaintiff in In re Guthrie presented his standard cancer
insurance promotion to two Select Committee affiliates who were posing as elderly Maryland
women. Benford v. American Broadcasting Co., 565 F. Supp. 139, 140 (D. Md. 1983). The
American Broadcasting Companies surreptitiously videotaped the presentation. Id. The video-
tape aired on the ABC Nightly News. Id. The plaintiff in Guthrie alleged that the defendant's
videotaping violated the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution, and title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act in addition to various common law violations. Id; see U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV;
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1984) (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN . § 10-401 (1977) (Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act).
The defendants in Guthrie primarily relied upon the speech or debate clause of the Constitution
and qualified immunity as defenses to the plaintiff's request for specified documents. Guthrie,
734 F.2d at 636; Benford, 565 F. Supp. at 140; see U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, cl. I (speech or
debate clause grants members of Congress privilege of free legislative debate).
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deposition and requiring production of documents relevant to the Select
Committee's investigation."
The Clerk moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that the Maryland
district court lacked jurisdiction to serve the deposition subpoena because
the United States Capitol is located outside the District of Maryland, thirty-
seven miles from the Maryland district court.' 2 The Clerk asserted that rule
45 does not grant district courts the authority to serve deposition subpoenas
on nonparty witnesses residing outside the judicial district in which the
district court sits. 3 The district court, however, maintained that rule 45
permits service of a deposition subpoena on a witness residing within forty
miles of the issuing court regardless of whether the witness resides outside
the district.
14
11. 733 F.2d at 635-36. The district court in Guthrie served the subpoena upon Mr.
Edmund L. Henshaw, who preceded Mr. Guthrie as Clerk of the House of Representatives. Id.
at 635 n.2. Prior to March 22, 1982, the plaintiff had caused the District Court for the District
of Columbia to serve a similar subpoena duces tecum upon the Clerk. Id. at 636. The plaintiff
took the deposition of a representative for the Clerk on December 23, 1981. Appellant's Brief
at 4, In re Guthrie, 733 F.2d 534 (4th Cir. 1984). At the deposition, the Clerk's representative
delivered only some of the requested documents and answered questions. Id. Following the
deposition, the plaintiff made a motion that the court demand compliance with the subpoena.
Id. Counsel for the Clerk opposed the plaintiff's motion contending that the withheld documents
were protected by the speech or debate clause of the Constitution. Id. The plaintiff, however,
subsequently withdrew the subpoena issued by the District of Columbia district court. Id.
A court issues a subpoena duces tecum requesting the production of documents from a
nonparty only in conjunction with the taking of a deposition. Ghandi v. Police Dept. of City
of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 118 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1977). In Ghandi, the plaintiffs did not intend
to take a deposition but nonetheless served upon a nonparty a subpoena duces tecum requesting
the production of documents. Id. at 117-18. The Ghandi court determined that a district court
improperly serves a subpoena duces tecum if the discovery party has no intention of deposing
the nonparty. Id. at 118, 118 n.3. See generally Welling, Discovery of Nonparties Tangible
Things Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 110, 118-19 (1983)
(discussing drawbacks of issuance of subpoena duces tecum being dependent upon litigants
request to depose witness).
12. 733 F.2d at 636, 636 n.4.
13. See Appellant's Brief at 7, supra note 11 (Rule 45(d) does not provide for extraterri-
torial service of process).
14. Id. In Guthrie, the Maryland district court insisted that the court had inherent power
to serve the subpoena outside the district despite commentary by Professor Moore suggesting
lack of jurisdiction. Benford v. American Broadcasting Co., 98 F.R.D. 40, 41 (D. Md. 1983)
(Maryland district court's Guthrie ruling); see 5A J. MooRE, supra note 1, 1 45.06 [1] n.6, at
56. Professor Moore has suggested that a district court must serve a deposition subpoena within
the district in which the issuing court sits. See 5A J. MooRE, supra note 1, 45.06 [1] n.6, at
56; infra note 37 and accompanying text (discussion of Moore's views); infra note 38 (discussion
of Application of Johnson and Johnson). In Benford, the Maryland district court inferred that
rule 45(e) and rule 45(d) presented inconsistent provisions regarding service of subpoenas. 98
F.R.D. at 41-42. In suggesting that rule 45(d) and rule 45(e) are inconsistent, the Benford court
apparently was referring to the absence of a service provision in rule 45(d) similar to the service
provision of rule 45(e)(1) which provides for extraterritorial service. See id. at 41; supra note 3
(text of rule 45(d)(2); infra note 50 (text of rule 45(e)(1)). The Benford court determined that it
was unnecessary to initiate the subpoena process in an auxiliary district court, maintaining that
when dealing with inconsistent provisions of rule 45 the need for uniformity prevailed. 98
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The Select Committee on Aging moved to intervene in the action and to
obtain a protective order to prevent the plaintiff from inspecting the sub-
poenaed documents held by the clerk.' 5 The district court, noting the
Committee's already adequate representation in the litigation, denied the
Committee's motion to intervene. 6 The Select Committee subsequently di-
rected the Clerk to withhold the subpoenaed records from the plaintiff. 7 In
response to the Clerk's failure to obey the subpoena, the Maryland district
court issued a show cause order which directed the Clerk to show cause for
refusing to permit inspection and copying of the requested documents.,' The
district court rejected the Clerk's defenses to the show cause order and held
the Clerk in contempt of court. 9 The Clerk then filed a timely appeal from
the contempt order.
20
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment
holding the Clerk in contempt, maintaining that the district court lacked
F.R.D. at 41-42, citing SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 76 F.R.D. 214, 215-16 (D. Conn. 1977) (in
deference to uniformity of interpretation, district courts must measure 100 mile provision
included in several of federal rules along straight line on map); see FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)
(territorial limits of effective service); id. 32(a)(3)(B) (use of deposition in court proceedings of
witness who is at distance greater than 100 miles from place of trial); id. 45(e)(1) (service of
subpoena for hearing or trial). The district court in Benford, in asserting the need for uniformity,
stated that the court's proximity to the witness eliminated the need to bifurcate the subpoena
process. 98 F.R.D. at 42. In discussing bifurcation of the subpoena process, the Benford court
presumably was referring to the necessity of having to initiate the subpoena process in an
auxilliary district court when the court in which the action is pending lacks jurisdiction to serve
the witness. See id.
15. 733 F.2d at 636. In Guthrie, the Select Committee cited the speech or debate clause
of the Constitution as authority for a Committee's request order against disclosure of the
documents. Id.; see U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (speech or debate clause). The speech or
debate clause of the Constitution grants members of Congress a constitutional privilege or
immunity of free legislative debate without fear of criminal liability. See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 581 (3d Cir. 1977) (speech or debate clause grants immunity to
members of Congress and their aides); U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, cl. I (speech or debate clause).
16. Benford, 98 F.R.D. 42, 47 (D. Md. 1983). The district court in Benford stated that
adequate representation, unnecessary delay and additional expense constituted reasons for denial
of the Select Committee's request for intervention. Id. In response to the Select Committee's
speech or debate clause defense to disclosure of the requested documents, the district court
suggested that the defendants assert the defense at the trial stage if the plaintiffs attempt to
admit the documents into evidence. Id.
17. 733 F.2d at 636; see H. R. Res. 176, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H2456
(daily ed. April 28, 1983) (House Resolution ordering Clerk not to disclose requested documents
to plaintiff); see also Appellant's Brief at 9-10, supra note 11 (discussing House Resolution
176).
18. 733 F.2d at 636. See Appellant's Brief at 11, supra note 11. The Clerk in Guthrie, in
response to the show cause order, asserted that he was legally unable to comply with the order
and that the Maryland district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the subpoena. Id. The Clerk
also contested the show cause order on constitutional theories based on the publication clause
and the speech or debate clause of the constitution. Id.; see U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, § 6,
cl. I (publication clause and speech or debate clause).
19. 733 F.2d at 636.
20. Id.
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jurisdiction to serve the subpoena outside the District of Maryland. 2' The
Fourth Circuit refused to accept the district court's determination that the
court possessed inherent power to serve a deposition subpoena on a witness
located outside the district of Maryland but within the forty mile bulge
discussed in rule 45(d)(2). 22 The Guthrie court observed that although rule
45(d)(2) specifies the attendance limitations for persons designated in the
subpoena, rule 45(d)(2) does not prescribe the territorial service limitations
for deposition subpoenas. 23 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held that under
rule 45(d) a district court must serve a deposition subpoena within the judicial
district.
24
In considering the territorial limits of service of a deposition subpoena,
the Fourth Circuit analyzed rule 45 with reference to rule 4(f) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the territorial limits of effective
service of process. 25 Recognizing that rule 4(f) defers treatment of service of
subpoenas to rule 45, the Fourth Circuit focused on the provisions of rule
45 and in particular rule 45(d) in discerning the territorial service limitations
of a deposition subpoena. 26 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that rule 45(d) may
21. Id. at 639. The Fourth Circuit in Guthrie found it unnecessary to address the Clerk's
claim that the speech or debate clause constituted reason for noncompliance with the subpoena.
Id. at 636-37; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (speech or debate clause).
22. 733 F.2d at 637. In Guthrie, the Fourth Circuit maintained that a district court's
deposition subpoena power is limited to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules. Id. The
Fourth Circuit noted, however, that the district court might have believed that the court had
implicit power under rule 45 to issue the subpoena. Id. A district court has inherent power to
enforce all orders that the court validly implemented under the Federal Rules. See Shillanti v.
United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966), citing United States v. Mine Workers of America, 330
U.S. 258, 330-32 (1947) (Black, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing
district court's power to enforce compliance with court orders through civil contempt). Addi-
tionally, district courts maintaining pending actions have inherent jurisdiction to compel answers
at the taking of depositions from parties over whom the court has personal jurisdiction. Lincoln
Laboratories, Inc. v. Savage Laboratories, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 476, 480 (D. Del. 1961). A district
court in which an action is pending, however, cannot enforce deposition orders against a witness
over whom the court lacks jurisdiction. Id.; cf. Shawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 11
F.R.D. 562, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (district court sitting in district in which deposition is taken
has power to limit oral examination and to modify subpoena issued pursuant to rule 45(d);
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d) (providing that either court maintaining principal litigation or court in
district where litigant is taking deposition may terminate or limit deposition). In Guthrie, the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland served both as the court maintaining
the primary litigation and the court located in the district where the plaintiff was taking the
deposition. 733 F.2d at 635.
23. 733 F.2d at 638; see supra notes 2-3 (text of rule 45(d)).
24. See 733 F.2d at 639 (Fourth Circuit's Guthrie holding).
25. Id. at 637. Rule 4(f) provides in part:
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial
limits of the state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a
statute of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that
state. . . . A subpoena may be served within the territorial limits provided in Rule
45.]
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
26. 733 F.2d at 637; see supra notes 2-3 (text of rule 45(d)). The Guthrie court recognized
that rule 45 creates a distinction between deposition subpoenas and trial subpoenas. 733 F.2d
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operate as a remedial discovery device available to litigants who are unable
to compel the attendance of witnesses at a hearing or trial because of service
and attendance limitations. 27 The Guthrie court noted that under rule 45(d)
a litigant may cause any district court to serve a subpoena on a witness
requesting the witness to appear at a deposition in the district in which the
witness works or resides. 28 The Fourth Circuit suggested that the opportunity
available to litigants to obtain deposition subpoenas in any district court
provides litigants with access to nationwide discovery regardless of the
location of the principal pending litigation.29 The Guthrie court stated,
however, that rule 45(d) imposes two restrictions on discovery through
depositions.30 First, a party must take a witness' deposition within the district
of the court issuing the subpoena?' Second, the attendance limitations of
rule 45(d)(2) restrict the distance a court may compel a witness to travel to
attend a deposition.32
The Fourth Circuit maintained that rule 45(d)(2), which prescribes at-
tendance limitations for persons designated in the subpoena, was not an
attempt to address the territorial limits of effective service, but was intended
to prevent the undue burden on subpoenaed nonparty witnesses of traveling
long distances to attend depositions.3 3 The Guthrie court noted, however,
that under rule 45(d)(2) a relationship exists between the place of service of
a nonresident witness and the location at which the district court may compel
at 637; FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d), (e); see 5A J. MooRE, supra note 1, 45.07-45.09, at 59-84
(discussing subpoenas for taking depositions and subpoenas for hearing or trial). The Fourth
Circuit additionally observed that rule 45(e)(1) prescribes the territorial service limitations of
trial subpoenas. 733 F.2d at 637; see infra note 50 (text of rule 45(e)(1)).
27. 733 F.2d at 638; see Busch v. Sea World of Ohio, 95 F.R.D. 336, 341-42 (W.D. Pa.
1982) (rule 45(d)(1) permits deposing of witnesses to preserve testimony for trial). In Busch, an
Ohio corporation wanted to call witnesses to trial but could not subpoena them because of the
100 mile service limitation of rule 45(e). 98 F.R.D. at 340-41. The corporate defendant in Busch
asserted its inability to serve the nonresident witness as reason for transferring the case to the
Northern District of Ohio. Id. The Busch court, however, denied the transfer request suggesting
that the corporation should make use of depositions pursuant to rule 45(d)(1) to preserve
testimony for trial. Id.; see Tatham v. Hoke, 469 F. Supp. 914, 917 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (suggesting
discovery through depositions as alternative to joinder of parties). In Tatham, the plaintiff sued
the defendant for negligently performing an abortion. 469 F. Supp. at 915. In an effort to
establish his defense, the defendant in Tatham sought to join additional third party defendants
who had also treated the plaintiff. Id. The district court maintained that the defendant need
not join the third party defendants under rule 19 because those persons were available to
defendant by way of deposition. Id. at 917; see FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (joinder of persons needed
for just adjudication).
28. 733 F.2d at 638; see supra note 2 (text of rule 45(d)(1)).
29. 733 F.2d at 638.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see FED. R. Crv. P. 45(d)(1) (discussing proof of service requirements); supra
note 2 (text of rule 45(d)(1)).
32. 733 F.2d at 638; see FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2) (attendance limitations for persons
designated in subpoena); supra note 3 (text of 45(d)(2)).
33. 733 F.2d at 638. In Guthrie, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Advisory Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure has proposed amending rule 45(d)(2). Id. at 638 n.9; see
infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussion of proposed amendment to rule 45(d)(2)
in relation to Fourth Circuit's Guthrie holding).
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that witness to attend.14 Rule 45(d)(2) provides that a district court may
compel a nonresident witness to attend a deposition only in the county where
the court serves the subpoena or within forty miles of the place of service.3"
Rule 45(d)(2) also authorizes the district court to compel a nonresident
witness to attend a deposition at a convenient location determined by the
court.3 6 In ascertaining whether the provisions of rule 45(d)(2) permit a
district court to serve a deposition subpoena outside the district but within
forty miles of the court, the Fourth Circuit, recognizing the paucity of case
law addressing the issue, relied on the work of one commentator which
suggests that a district court issuing a deposition subpoena is powerless to
serve the subpoena outside the judicial district.3 7 This commentator noted
that a district court must serve a deposition subpoena within the judicial
district since rule 45(d)(2) does not have a provision similar to that embodied
in rule 45(e), which governs trial subpoenas and permits extraterritorial
service of subpoenas up to one hundred miles from the place of the trial.
38
34. 733 F.2d at 638.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); see supra note 3 (text of rule 45(d)(2)).
36. FED. R. Crv. P. 45(d)(2); see supra note 3 (text of rule 45(d)(2)).
37. 733 F.2d at 638-39. The Guthrie court quoted a footnote in Moore's treatise on civil
procedure which states:
Rule 45(d)(2) deals with the place at which a witness can be called upon to
appear. It does not deal with the place at which the subpoena may be served. This is
left governed by the general principles of territorial jurisdiction. Since service of a
subpoena to take a deposition is unaided by the 100 mile provision of Rule 45(e), the
subpoena must be served within the district.
Id.
38. Id.; 5A J. MooRE, supra note 1, 46.0611] n.6, at 56. In commenting that a district
court must serve a subpoena within the district, Professor Moore relied upon Application of
Johnson and Johnson. 5A J. Mooa,, supra note 1, 46.0611] n.6, at 56; see also Application
of Johnson and Johnson, 59 F.R.D. 174 (D. Del. 1973). In Johnson and Johnson, the petitioner
caused the United States District Court for the District of Delaware to issue deposition subpoenas
pursuant to § 24 of title 35 of the United States Code, which governs the issuance of subpoenas
for the taking of depositions in patent and trademark cases. 59 F.R.D. at 176. Section 24
embodies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, which governs the attendance of witnesses and
the production of documents at depositions. See 35 U.S.C. § 24 (1984); FED. R. CIV. P. 45;
Johnson and Johnson, 59 F.R.D. at 178. The petitioners in Johnson and Johnson had the
subpoenas in question served on a corporate agent within the Delaware federal district where
the corporation was incorporated. 59 F.R.D. at 176. The deposition subpoena requested
individual affiliates of the corporation who resided in Connecticut and Norway to appear for
depositions in Delaware. Id. In ruling on the validity of service of the subpoenas, the district
court determined that the subpoenas did not fulfill the personal service requirements of rule
45(e) and that the court lacked subpoena power to compel attendance of the nonparty witnesses.
Id. at 177-78. Johnson and Johnson is distinguishable from Guthrie because the witnesses in
Johnson and Johnson did not reside or work within the attendance limits of rule 45(d)(2). See
id. at 176; Guthrie, 733 F.2d at 635-36. The district court in Johnson and Johnson, therefore
could not compel the witnesses to appear at the deposition regardless of the validity of service.
See Johnson and Johnson, 59 F.R.D. at 176 & 178. Moreover, § 24, under which the court
issued the subpoenas, expressly provides that a district court sitting within the district in which
the deposition is held can only issue a subpoena for a witness residing or located within the
district. 35 U.S.C. § 24 (1984). Accord 5A J. MoopE, supra note 1, 45.0611] n.6, at 56; supra
note 37 (text of Professor Moore's comment on service of deposition subpoenas).
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The Fourth Circuit adopted the view that under rule 45(d) territorial
jurisdiction governs service of deposition subpoenas. 9 The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that the language of rule 45(d), which restricts the site of the
deposition to the district in which the court issued the subpoena, indicates
that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not intend
service of a deposition subpoena to across district lines.4° The Fourth Circuit
also observed that litigants wanting to depose nonresident witnesses may
overcome a territorial service limitation by causing the district court sitting
in the witnesses' judicial district to issue and serve the deposition subpoena. 4'
The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held that rule 45(d) authorizes a district court
to serve a deposition subpoena only within the judicial district from which
the court issued the subpoena. 42 The Guthrie court accordingly quashed the
subpoena issued by the Maryland district court for lack of jurisdiction to
perfect service of process.
43
The Guthrie problem of whether rule 45(d) places territorial limitations
on service of a deposition subpoena was a question of first impression in
the Fourth Circuit.4 As the Guthrie decision indicates, rule 45 is subject to
39. 733 F.2d at 639.
40. Id. at 639, 639 n.11.
41. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d) (proof of service of notice for taking depositions of
witness); supra note 2 (text of rule 45(d)(1)).
42. 733 F.2d at 639. The Guthrie court noted several cases that the parties cited in their
briefs and determined that none of the cited cases squarely addressed the issue of whether a
deposition subpoena must be served within the district. Id. at 368 n.10. For example, the
appellant, the Clerk of the House of Representatives cited Norris v. Georgia and Central
Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of Am. in support of the assertion that the Maryland district
court lacked personal jurisdiction to issue the subpoena in the District of Columbia. Appellant's
Brief at 16, supra note 11; see Norris v. Georgia, 522 F.2d 1006, 1009 n.2 (4th Cir. 1975)
(district court cannot serve process outside district unless authorized by statute or rule); Central
Operating Co. v. Utility Members of Am., 491 F.2d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1974) (district court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over nonresident defendant unless served with process as authorized
by federal statute or rule). The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that neither Norris nor Central
Operating involved service of a deposition subpoena under rule 45(d). 733 F.2d at 638 n.10; see
Norris, 522 F.2d 1006; Central Operating, 491 F.2d 245. The Guthrie court similarly distin-
guished Johnson and Johnson by pointing out that Johnson and Johnson addresses the issue
of where a corporate officer may be deposed pursuant to service on the corporation. Id.; see
Application of Johnson and Johnson 59 F.R.D. 174, 176-78 (D. Del. 1973); supra note 38
(discussing Johnson and Johnson). Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Guthrie maintained that the
plaintiff's only case authority in support of extraterritorial service concerned the attendance
limitations of rule 45(d)(2) rather than the place of service of a deposition subpoena. 733 F.2d
at 638 n.10; see United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 75 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La.
1948) (ruling that court may recognize nonresident witness residing 37 miles from site of
deposition to attend deposition).
43. 733 F.2d at 639.
44. See supra note 42 (Fourth Circuit distinguished cases cited by parties in Guthrie). A
number of courts have considered the provisions of rule 45(d) in various contexts, but few, if
any, have focused on the validity of a deposition subpoena served on a nonparty witness
residing within the 40 mile provision of rule 45(d)(2) but beyond the district line. See, e.g.,
Celanese Corp. v. Duplan Corp., 502 F.2d 188, 189 (4th Cir. 1974) (upholding general rule that
witnesses and parties attending judicial proceeding outside territorial jurisdiction of residence
are immune from process for purposes of another suit while in that jurisdiction), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 929 (1975); Cates v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 480 F.2d 620, 623 (4th Cir. 1973) (person
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alternative interpretations concerning geographic service requirements be-
cause of the absence of a provision in the rule delineating the limits of valid
service.4 The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of rule 45 provides that a
district court must serve a deposition subpoena within the court's judicial
district. 46 An alternative construction, which the district court in Guthrie
asserted, would permit a district court to serve a deposition subpoena beyond
district lines provided that the court could compel the witness' attendance at
the deposition in accordance with the attendance limitations of rule 45(d)(2).47
As the Fourth Circuit's inquiry in Guthrie indicates, rule 45 provides
little guidance in ascertaining which interpretation of rule 45(d) the drafters
of the rule intended. 4 Other provisions of the Federal Rules that operate
similarly to rule 45(d) suggest that rule 45(d) was not drafted for the purpose
of precluding extraterritorial service. 49 Rule 45(e)(1), for example, authorizes
extraterritorial service of a subpoena for a hearing or trial.5 0 Rule 45(e)(1)
prevents inconvenience to witnesses and minimizes the cost of litigation.5
Similarly, rule 17(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is
substantially similar to rule 45(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
permits extraterritorial service of a subpoena requesting a witness' appearance
at a deposition.5 2 Rule 17(f) takes into account the convenience of the witness
designated by organization pursuant to rule 30(b)(6) to attend deposition and produce documents
not required to travel outside limits prescribed by rule 45(d)(2)); Sykes Int'l Ltd. v. Pilch's
Poultry Breeding Farms, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 138, 139 (D. Conn. 1972) (deposition issued in
Connecticut and served on corporate official in Netherlands is void under rule 45(d)(2)); Elder-
Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't. Stores, 45 F.R.D. 515, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (foreign
corporation doing business in judicial district is subject to subpoena duces tecum issued by
district court although documents are physically located outside jurisdiction).
45. See 733 F.2d at 637-39 (Fourth Circuit's analysis of rule 45 to determine proper
construction of that rule); FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d); supra notes 2-3 (text of rule 45(d)).
46. 733 F.2d at 639.
47. See Benford, 98 F.R.D. at 41-42 (Benford court's interpretation of effective service
under rule 45(d)(2)); FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); supra note 3 (text of rule 45(d)(2)).
48. See 733 F.2d at 637-39 (Fourth Circuit's analysis of rule 45(d)); FED. R. Civ. P.
45(d)(2); supra note 3 (text of rule 45(d)(2)).
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(1) (addressing service of a subpoena for hearing or trial);
infra note 50 (text of rule 45(e)(1)); FED. R. CRim. P. 17(e), (f) (service and deposition
provisions).
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(1). Rule 45(e)(1) provides in part:
A subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a hearing or trial may be served
at any place within the district, or at any place without the district that is within 100
miles of the place of the hearing or trial specified in the subpoena, or at a place
within the state where a state statute or rule of court permits service of a subpoena
issued by a state court of general jurisdiction sitting in the place where the district
court is held.
Id.
51. See Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 234 (1964); FED. R. Civ. P.
45(e)(1) (service of subpoena for hearing or trial).




and the parties in determining where the court may require the witness to
attend the deposition.53 Rule 45(d)(2), which was also intended to protect
witnesses from having to travel inordinate distances to attend a deposition,
therefore, does not appear to present an intentional bar to extraterritorial
service of a deposition subpoena.
54
The Fourth Circuit's construction of rule 45(d) as precluding extraterri-
torial service, however, may create undue inconvenience for both the discov-
ering party and the subpoenaed witness.5 5 For example, under the Fourth
Circuit's Guthrie decision a subpoenaed witness residing relatively close to
the site of the deposition but outside the judicial district in which the
deposition is to be taken is not amenable to service of process by the district
sitting in that judicial district.5 6 The same witness, nonetheless, is amenable
to service of a deposition subpoena issuing from a district court sitting in
the witness' judicial district.5 7 The Guthrie ruling, therefore, forces the litigant
to take the additional step of initiating the subpoena process in an ancillary
court located in the witness' judicial district.5 5 More importantly, under the
Fourth Circuit's view, a district court located within the witness' judicial
district may compel a witness to travel a greater distance than would be
necessary if a neighboring district court located outside the district were
53. See id. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(f)(2) provides: "The witness whose
deposition is to be taken may be required by subpoena to attend at any place designated by the
trial court, taking into account the convenience of the witness and the parties." Id. 17(f)(2). A
district court's deposition subpoena power is broader in criminal than civil cases. 8 J. MOORE,
supra note 1, 17.08, at 30.
54. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); supra note 3 (text of rule 45(d)(2)); see also Sykes Int'l
Ltd. v. Pilch's Poultry Breeding Farms, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 138, 139 (D. Conn. 1972). In Sykes,
the Connecticut district court cited rule 45(d)(2) and Doble v. United States Dist. Court for the
proposition that service of a subpoena is limited by territorial restrictions. 55 F.R.D. at 139;
see Doble v. United States Dist. Court, 249 F.2d 734, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1957) (under rule 45(c)(1)
trial subpoena is void where witness resides more than 100 miles from place of trial); FED. R.
Civ. P. 45(d)(2). In relying on Doble, the Sykes court apparently believed that rule 45(d)(2)
operates similarly to rule 45(e)(1) in providing for effective service where compliance with
attendance limitations is met. See 55 F.R.D. at 139.
The Advisory Committee's note of 1980 regarding rule 45(e)(1) indicates that the subpoena
power of a particular district court is at least as extensive as, and often greater than, that of a
state court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court sits. 5A J. MOORE,
supra note 1, 45.01119], at 14. See Wallace Prods. Inc. v. Falco Prods. Inc., 193 F. Supp.
520, 523 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (records of nonresident corporation with its place of business within
100 miles of district court are subject to subpoena by court but corporation itself is not subject
to service of process issued out of such court). The drafters of the rules imposed attendance
restrictions on district courts' subpoena power to prevent undue inconvenience to witnesses. 5A
J. MOORE, supra note I, 45.01[19], at 14.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 56-60 (effect of Guthrie holding on litigants and
witnesses).
56. See 733 F.2d at 638 (Fourth Circuit's holding in Guthrie).
57. See id. '(Guthrie requires district court to serve deposition subpoena within judicial
district).
58. See id. (under rule 45(d)(2) litigant may cause only district court sitting within witness'
judicial district to issue and serve deposition subpoena).
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permitted to serve the subpoena. 9 Because the court issuing the subpoena
maintains the authority to order a subpoenaed person to attend a deposition,
the issuing court may compel the witness to attend the deposition at a distant
site determined by the party requesting discovery even though a more
convenient location exists in the neighboring judicial district. 60 Rule 45(d)(2),
however, empowers the district court with the authority to designate the site
of the deposition in a neighboring judicial district if that site would be more
convenient for the witness and parties.
6'
A district court's option of setting the site of the deposition at a
convenient place to facilitate attendance by the witness and parties is embod-
ied in an amendment to rule 45 proposed by the Advisory Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure. 62 The Advisory Committee's proposed
amendment would increase the forty mile attendance limitation of rule
45(d)(2) to one hundred miles while disposing of the distinction between
residents and nonresidents of the district. 63 The proposed amendment pro-
vides that a district court may require a subpoenaed person to attend a
deposition within one hundred miles of the person's residence, place of
business, location of actual service or at a convenient location fixed by the
court. 64 In effect, the Advisory Committee's proposed amendment presents
59. See id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); supra note 3 (text of rule 45(d)(2)). Rule 45(d)(2),
in part, provides that the court may require a resident of the district to attend a deposition at
any location within the county where the witness works or resides. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2).
Consequently, the court may compel the witness to attend a deposition at a distant site even
though a more convenient location exists in the neighboring judicial district. See id. The court,
however, may fix as the site of the deposition a location in a neighboring judicial district. See
id. (providing that district court may require witness to appear for deposition at such other
convenient place court orders). But see Producers Releasing Corp. de Cuba v. PRC Pictures,
Inc., 176 F.2d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 1949) (convenience of witness is not dispositive factor under rule
45(d)(2) in district court's determination of convenient place).
60. See Ghandi v. Police Dept. of City of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 120 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(district court obtains jurisdiction over witness by subpoena issued pursuant to rule 45(c)); FED.
R. Crv. P. 45(c) (service requirements for subpoenas); id. 45(d)(2); supra note 3 (text of rule
45(d)(2)).
61. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2); supra note 3 (text of rule 45(d)(2)).
62. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment To The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Fed. R. Serv. 2d, Special Release at 4-5 (Aug. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary
Draft]. The proposed amendment to rule 45(d)(2) provides that:
A person to whom a subpoena for the taking of his deposition is directed may be
required to attend at any place within 100 miles from where he resides, is employed
or transacts business, or is served, or at such other convenience place as is fixed by
an order of court.
Id. at 4.
63. See id. In the Preliminary Draft, the Advisory Committee's notes indicate that under
today's conditions no basis exists for distinguishing between residents and nonresidents of a
district. Id. at 5. The Advisory Committee commented that the distinction between residents
and nonresidents in the existing rule 45(d)(2) often causes logistical problems in conducting
litigation. Id. at 4.
64. Id.; supra note 62 (text of Preliminary Draft). Although at first glance the proposed
amendment in the Preliminary Draft increasing the forty mile attendance limitation of rule
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no solution to the issue of extraterritorial service as addressed in Guthrie
because as in existing rule 45(d)(2), the proposed amendment measures
attendance limitations in terms of either the witness' residence or place of
business65 and the site of the deposition." Under both the existing rule
45(d)(2) and the proposed amendment, the location of the district court is
not a consideration in determining where the district court may compel the
witness to attend a deposition. 67 Consequently, the issue of whether a district
court may serve a deposition subpoena by virtue of the court's proximity to
the subpoenaed person remains uncertain under the proposed amendment to
the rule. 6 The Fourth Circuit's decision in Guthrie, although potentially
creating inconvenience to litigants as well as witnesses, nonetheless, creates
certainty under both the existing rule and the proposed amendment concern-
ing the proper district court for serving a deposition subpoena. 69 Rather than
basing the district court's authority to serve a deposition subpoena on the
court's proximity to the witness, the Guthrie ruling requires that the district
court, in order to issue and serve the subpoena, be located in the witness'
judicial district.
70
In confining service of deposition subpoenas to within the judicial
district, the Fourth Circuit in Guthrie has injected into rule 45(d), otherwise
lacking a service requirement, a rigid rule for the territorial limits of service
of deposition subpoenas. 7' After Guthrie, parties conducting discovery in the
Fourth Circuit who seek to depose a nonresident, nonparty witness must
cause the district court sitting within the witness' judicial district to issue
45(d)(2) to one hundred miles appears to result in a provision similar to 45(e)(1), the two
provisions remain remarkably dissimilar because the proposed amendment addresses attendance
limitations whereas rule 45(e)(1) discusses service of trial subpoenas. See Preliminary Draft,
supra note 62 at 4; FED. R. Crv. P. 45(e)(I) (subpoena for hearing or trial may be served at
any place outside district that is within 100 miles of hearing or trial).
65. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 62 at 4. In the Preliminary Draft, the proposed
amendment provides that a witness may be required to attend a deposition within one hundred
miles of where the witness is served as an alternative to the distance from the witness' residents
or place of work. Id.
66. See supra note 62 (Advisory Committee's proposed amendment to rule 45(d)(2));
supra note 3 (text of rule 45(d)(2)). Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2) with Preliminary Draft,
supra note 62 (prescribing attendance limitations in terms of witness' residence or place of
business and site of deposition).
67. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2) (describing where district court may require subpoenaed
witness to attend deposition but not addressing district court's location in relation to witness or
site of deposition); Preliminary Draft, supra note 62, at 4 (proposed amendment to rule 45(d)(2)
prescribing attendance limitation for subpoenaed persons in terms of witness' residence, place
of business or where court served witness); supra note 3 (text of rule 45(d)(2)); supra note 62
(Advisory Committee's proposed amendment to rule 45(d)(2)).
68. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 62, at 4 (Advisory Committee's proposed amend-
ment to rule 45(d)(2)); supra notes 65-67 (discussion of proposed amendment to rule 45(d)(2)).
69. See 733 F.2d at 639 (Fourth Circuit's holding in Guthrie); supra notes 56-60 (practical
effects of Guthrie holding on discovering parties and witnesses).
70. See 733 F.2d at 639 (Fourth Circuit's holding in Guthrie).
71. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's reasoning and holding
in Guthrie).
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and duly serve the subpoena. 72 The Advisory Committee's proposed amend-
ment to rule 45(d)(2), increasing the distance a witness may be compelled to
travel to attend a deposition, does not effectuate the intent of the drafters
of rule 45 with respect to service of deposition subpoenas since the Advisory
Committee drafted the proposed amendments in terms substantially similar
to those found in the existing rule.7 3 Perhaps the Advisory Committee will
take notice of the confusion now existing under rule 45(d) as indicated in
Guthrie, and insert into the rule a provision clarifying the proper limits of
effective service for deposition subpoenas.
PETER J. WALSH, JR.
F. The Writ of Mandamus: An Unlikely Means of Appellate Relief
for an Erroneous Change of Venue Order
The writ of mandamus' is an appellate device which provides immediate
review of a district court's interlocutory order. 2 Interlocutory orders do not
72. See 733 F.2d at 639 (Fourth Circuit's holding in Guthrie).
73. See supra notes 62-68 (discussion of Advisory Committee's proposed amendment to
rule 45(d)(2)).
1. See Berger, The Mandamus Power of the United States Courts of Appeals: A Complex
and Confused Means of Appellate Control, 31 BUFFALo L. REv. 37, 39 (1982). The writ of
mandamus descended from the common law prerogative writ developed in England in the
seventeenth century. Id. Developed within the province of the King's Bench, the common law
prerogative writ compelled a public official to perform his public duty. Id. See generally Jenks,
The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523 (1923) (origin and historical purposes
of prerogative writs). Sir Edward Coke considered the prerogative writ of mandamus as a
judicial writ that issued from the King's Bench to compel a recalcitrant body to act under a
Crown charter. Jenks, 32 YALE L.J. at 530.
2. See 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILER, E. COOPER, & E. GraEssmN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3932, at 184 (1977 & Supp. 1983) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT &
MILLER]. A writ of mandamus may issue to provide interlocutory review of a district court's
order. Id. Interlocutory appeals provide review of preliminary decisions in a case prior to the
entry of a final judgment that completely disposes of all matters and issues in the case. See 16
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 3920 at 6; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982) (providing additional
means for discretionary interlocutory appellate review). Section 1292(b) provides for interlocu-
tory review if a federal district judge certifies that the order in question involves a controlling
question of law and that appellate review of the interlocutory order will advance the disposition
of the case. Id. After the district judge certifies interlocutory appellate review, the court of
appeals may in its discretion permit or deny the appeal. Id.; see also Berger, supra note 1, at
38-39 (comparison of mandamus and § 1292(b) as means of attaining interlocutory appellate
review). A writ of mandamus provides a broader means of acquiring an interlocutory appellate
review than § 1292(b) because § 1292(b) requires both the district judge's certification of the
issue and the court of appeals discretionary approval. Id. at 38.
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address the merits of an action, but instead decide nondispositive issues or
matters.' Appellate courts generally withhold review of interlocutory orders
until the trial court renders a final judgment because interlocutory appeals
would lead to piecemeal litigation and delay.4 The writ of mandamus,
therefore, provides a narrow exception to the general rule that the federal
appellate courts may review only final judgments.
5
A federal appellate court has the authority to issue a writ of mandamus
in cases that lie within the court's prospective jurisdiction or that have come
within the court's jurisdiction in the past. 6 A federal appellate court's
3. See Note, Mandamus As A Means of Federal Interlocutory Review, 38 OHo ST. L.J.
301, 301 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mandamus]. Interlocutory orders are preliminary determi-
nations of nondispositive issues or matters that generally are subject to appeal only after the
entry of a final judgment. Id.
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). The final judgment rule states that federal courts of
appeals have appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments of the district courts of the United
States. Id.; see also Note, Mandamus, supra note 3, at 303. The federal courts of appeals
generally favor postponing appellate review of interlocutory orders until a final judgment is
rendered for a number of policy reasons. Id. For example, immediate review of interlocutory
orders can delay the process of trial, frustrate judicial economy, and present additional burdens
to already congested appellate court dockets. Id. For these reasons, interlocutory appeal by a
writ of mandamus traditionally is reversed for exceptional cases. Id. at 311.
5. See Berger, supra note 1, at 40. The writ of mandamus exists to provide interlocutory
appellate review in exceptional circumstances when courts of appeals should not follow the final
judgment rule. Id.; see also Exparte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (mandamus is extraordinary
remedy resorted to only in exceptional cases). In Ex parte Fahey, the United States Supreme
Court denied a petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate a district court's order awarding
attorney's fees. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy that should be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances. Id. The Fahey Court
withheld mandamus review stating that the petitioners could appeal the order awarding attorney's
fees after the district court entered a final judgment in the case. Id.; see also Kerr v. United
States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (petitioner must demonstrate clear and indisput-
able right to mandamus review). In Kerr v. United States District Court, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed a denial of mandamus review of a district court's discovery order. Id.
at 406. The Supreme Court stated that a party seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus must
demonstrate an indisputable and unmistakable right to mandamus review and must prove special
circumstances that prevent any other means of effective appeal. Id. at 403. The Kerr Court
denied mandamus review because the petitioner could seek an in camera inspection of the
documents requested by the district court's discovery order if the documents contained privileged
material. Id. at 404-06.
6. See All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982). The All Writs Act empowers the
federal appellate courts to issue extraordinary writs, such as the writ of mandamus, that are
necessary or appropriate in aid of the court's jurisdiction. Id.; see also 16 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 2, § 3932 at 185 (general discussion of All Writs Act). The statutory requirement in
the All Writs Act states that the writ of mandamus may issue in aid of the court's jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982). The requirement that a writ issue in aid of the court's jurisdiction
means that the writ may issue if the case lies within the prospective jurisdiction of the court of
appeals or has come within the court of appeals' jurisdiction in the past. 16 WGIrT & MILLER,
supra note 2, § 3932 at 185.
Appellate courts must consider two separate requirements in determining whether a writ
of mandamus would issue in aid of the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 188. First, the case must
have some independent basis of jurisdiction in the court in which the writ is sought. Id. Second,
the writ of mandamus must issue in support of that independent basis of jurisdiction. Id. The
two considerations indicate that a court may not issue a writ of mandamus to review a case
that could never come before the court on appeal. Id. at 189.
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authority to issue a writ of mandamus properly may be invoked to prevent
a district court from acting outside the scope of its jurisdiction or to compel
a district court to exercise its prescribed authority.7 An appellate court's
power to issue writs of mandamus is not confined, however, to a technical
definition of jurisdiction. 8 A writ of mandamus properly may issue whenever
a district court exceeds the boundaries of its judicial authority. 9
Change of venue orders' 0 are among the most common interlocutory
orders that federal appellate courts review by writs of mandamus." The
courts' willingness to provide immediate review of change of venue orders
7. See Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976) (mandamus issues
to correct judicial usurpation of power). In Kerr v. United States District Court, the United
States Supreme Court stated that the writ of mandamus may issue to confine a district court to
its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel an action a district court lacked the power to withhold.
Id. The Supreme Court emphasized, however, that the availability of the writ of mandamus lies
within the discretion of the federal appellate courts. Id. at 403; see also Ex parte Fahey, 332
U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (mandamus is extraordinary remedy reserved for exceptional cases).
8. See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967). In Will v. United States, the United
States Supreme Court stated that courts traditionally have issued the writ of mandamus only to
confine an inferior court to its prescribed jurisdiction. Id. The Supreme Court noted, however,
that the availability of a writ of mandamus is not confined to technical notions of subject
matter or personal jurisdiction. Id. Rather, the Supreme Court emphasized that the writ of
mandamus properly may issue to correct any judicial usurpation of power. Id.
9. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953). In Bankers Life
& Cas. Co. v. Holland, the United States Supreme Court held that a writ of mandamus may
issue to correct a district court's decision that involved an abuse of judicial power. Id. The
Court stated, however, that a writ of mandamus may not issue to review an interlocutory order
that the appellate court merely thinks is erroneous. Id. at 383. The Supreme Court noted that
a writ of mandamus provides r~view only in the exceptional case where there is a clear abuse
of judicial discretion or authority. Id.
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982). Federal regulations provide that a federal district
court may change the venue of any civil action to another district in order to provide a more
convenient forum for both witnesses and parties and to support the interest -of justice. Id. A
district court, however, may change the venue of a civil action only to another district in which
the suit could have been brought initially. Id.
11. See Berger, supra note 1, at 61. The largest percentage of published opinions
concerning the issuance of writs of mandamus involve district court orders for change of venue.
Id.; see also 16 WRIGHT & MMLER, supra note 2, § 3935 at 251. Numerous courts have sought
to establish a standard for determining whether an appellate court should issue a writ of
mandamus to review a district court's order for change of venue. 16 WIGrr & MLLER, supra
note 2, § 3935 at 251; see, e.g., Roofing & Steel Metal Servs. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, 689
F.2d 982, 985 (l1th Cir. 1982) (implying that mandamus may not issue to review district court's
change of venue order unless district court abused its discretion); In re McDonnell-Douglas
Corp., 647 F.2d 515, 516 (5th Cir. 1981) (district court's change of venue order is not reviewable
by writ of mandamus unless district court abused its discretion); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 592 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979),
(implying that mandamus may issue to review district court's change of venue order if district
court disregarded compelling reasons for change of venue); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
579 F.2d 215, 218 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), (mandamus may issue to
correct change of venue order if district court abused its discretion); Toro Co. v. Alsop, 565
F.2d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978), (mandamus may issue to




reflects the federal courts' concern that effective appeal of a change of venue
order may be impossible after the entry of a final judgment. 2 Moreover, the
expense and delay that accompany an improper change of venue order may
not be susceptible to correction on appeal from a final judgment. 3 In In Re
Ralston Purina Co.,' 4 the Fourth Circuit addressed the question whether a
writ of mandamus may issue to provide immediate review of a change of
venue order. 5
In Purina, three plaintiffs filed a civil action against the Ralston Purina
Company (Purina) in the United States District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina. 6 The plaintiffs alleged that Purina practiced a company-
wide policy of age discrimination 7 in violation of the Federal Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act.' Two of the Purina plaintiffs resided in Georgia
and the third plaintiff resided in Pennsylvania.19 None of the three Purina
plaintiffs resided in the Western District of North Carolina.20 The plaintiffs
12. See Note, Appellate Review of § 1404(a) Orders-Misuse of an Extraordinary Writ,
I J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 297, 298 (1968). After the entry of a final judgment in an
appropriate forum, a change of venue order granting transfer to and retrial in another forum
may compound the expense and inconvenience to the appealing party. Id. Moreover, after the
district court enters a final judgment, an appellate court may hesitate to reverse the change of
venue order and require a new trial. Id. In addition, after the district court enters a final
judgment, the appellate court may consider the appeal of the change of venue order moot. Id.
13. See Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, 408 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1969)
(erroneous change of venue order may not receive adequate appellate review after final
judgment). In Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recognized that courts must narrow the scope of mandamus review to
avoid the delay and expense of piecemeal interlocutory appeals. Id. at 19-20. The Ninth Circuit
admitted, however, that a narrow scope of mandamus review essentially may deny effective
appellate review in certain instances. Id. at 20. The Ninth Circuit recognized that without
mandamus review, the delay and expense resulting from an erroneous change of venue order
may not be capable of correction on appeal of a final judgment. Id.; see also Note, Appealability
of 1404(a) Orders: Mandamus Misapplied, 67 YALE L.J. 122, 124 (1957) (successful appeal of
change of venue order after final judgment will not enable inconvenienced party to recoup
expenses resulting from erroneous change of venue order).
14. 726 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1984).
15. Id. at 1004.
16. Id. at 1003. In Purina, plaintiff George King alleged that the Ralston Purina Company
terminated King's employment in the Company's Chow Division in Georgia because of King's
age. Id. Plaintiff Walter Elmer claimed that Purina's Grocery Products Division in Pennsylvania
demoted Elmer to Assistant Regional Manager because of Elmer's age. Id. The third plaintiff,
Morris Nelson asserted that Purina's Private Label Sales Group in Georgia demoted Nelson to
salesman because of Nelson's age. Id.
17. Id. The plaintiffs in Purina alleged that the Ralston Purina Company engaged in a
company-wide policy of dismissing or demoting employees approaching the age of 55. Id.
18. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-623(a)(1) (1982). The stated purpose of the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act is to prohibit arbitrary discrimination in employment practices on
the basis of age. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982). The Act prohibits employers from discriminating
against any person with regard to compensation or conditions of employment because of the
individual's age. Id. at § 623(a)(1).
19. 726 F.2d at 1003. In Purina, plaintiffs King and Nelson resided in Georgia. Id. The
third plaintiff, Elmer, resided in Pennsylvania. Id.
20. Id.
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contended, however, that the Western District of North Carolina was the
most convenient forum because it was an equidistant point between the
plaintiffs' residences in Georgia and Pennsylvania.
21
Purina filed a motion with the district court to dismiss the plaintiffs'
complaint for improper venue since the plaintiffs did not reside in the
Western District of North Carolina and the transactions at issue did not
occur in North Carolina. 22 Alternatively, Purina requested that the district
court sever the plaintiffs' claims and transfer the claims to the respective
jurisdictions in which each plaintiff resided. 23 The district court denied
Purina's alternative motions to dismiss or to sever and transfer the plaintiffs'
claims. 24
After analyzing Purina's motions, the district court concluded that
Purina's business operations in Charlotte, North Carolina made the Western
District of North Carolina a corporate residence of the Ralston Purina
Company and therefore a place of proper venue for suits against Purina.
2
21. Id. at 1003-04. In addition to alleging that the Western District of North Carolina
was equidistant from the plaintiff's homes, the plaintiffs in Purina also emphasized that the
Western District of North Carolina was the most convenient forum because a number of present
and former employees of Purina who would testify on behalf of the plaintiffs resided in or
near the district. Id. The plaintiffs further stated that the Western District of North Carolina
was the most convenient forum because all of the plaintiffs had retained the services of counsel
located in the district. Id. at 1004.
22. Id. at 1003. In Purina, defendant Purina sought to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for
improper venue because the plaintiffs' claims arose in different districts and had no logical or
legal relationship to the Western District of North Carolina. Id. Purina also emphasized that
the plaintiffs' claims would be controlled by the substantive law of Pennsylvania and Georgia
and not by the law of North Carolina. Id.
23. Id. In Purina, the Ralston Purina Company contended that the plaintiffs' respective
home jurisdictions in Georgia and Pennsylvania would provide more convenient forums for the
litigation of the plaintiffs' claims. Id. First, Purina stated that the basis of each plaintiff's claim
arose in their respective home jurisdictions of Pennsylvania and Georgia and not in the Western
District of North Carolina. Id. Purina also alleged that Purina's witnesses located in Georgia
and Pennsylvania would be inconvenienced by having to travel to North Carolina if the
plaintiffs' claims were not severed and transferred. Id.; see Brief for Petitioner at 5, In re
Ralston Purina Co., 726 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1984). In support of Purina's motion to sever and
transfer the plaintiffs' claims, Purina also stated that the divisions in which the plaintiffs had
worked or were then working were administratively distinct and separate entities headquartered
in different districts. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Purina. Purina emphasized that the specific
circumstances leading to each plaintiffs' alleged termination or demotion therefore would be
litigated more conveniently in the districts where the plaintiffs' claims arose. Id. But see supra
note 21 and accompanying text (discussion of plaintiffs' arguments in Purina opposing change
of venue order).
24. 726 F.2d at 1004.
25. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982). Federal law provides that the judicial district
where a corporation is incorporated, licensed to do business, or actually doing business may be
considered the corporation's residence and, therefore, a place of proper venue for suits against
the corporation. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982). Purina's business offices in Charlotte, North
Carolina included the South Atlantic Regional Office of Purina's Grocery Products Division, a
sales office of Purina's Chow Division, and a Purina feed mill. 726 F.2d at 1003. Because of
Purina's business operations in Charlotte, the district court concluded that the Western District
of North Carolina was a place of proper venue for suits against Purina. Id.
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The district court also stated that the plaintiffs allegations of a company-
wide policy of discrimination permitted the plaintiffs to join their claims in
this action. 26 The district court emphasized that the plaintiffs' attempt to
prove a company-wide policy of discrimination might be prejudiced and the
presentation of evidence unnecessarily duplicated if the court severed and
transferred the plaintiffs' claims. 27 The district court noted that a combined
trial in North Carolina might inconvenience Purina and Purina's witnesses,
but the court stated that mere inconvenience did not warrant severance and
transfer of the plaintiffs' claims."
In response to the district court's refusal to dismiss or transfer the
plaintiff's claims, Purina filed a motion with the district court to permit an
immediate appeal of the motion to sever and transfer. 29 The district court
denied Purina's motion to permit an interlocutory appeal. 0 Purina subse-
quently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit'.3 Purina asserted that the plaintiffs' claims
should be severed and transferred because the claims arose in different
districts and were factually unrelated.3 2 Purina also alleged that the plaintiffs'
claims had no relationship to the Western District of North Carolina and
would not be governed by the law of North Carolina.Y3 Finally, Purina
26. 726 F.2d at 1004; see FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a). Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permits parties to join together in an action as plaintiffs if the parties' claims arise
out of a common series of transactions or occurrences. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a). The district court
in Purina held that each plaintiff asserted a right to relief arising out of the same series of
transactions or occurrences because each plaintiff alleged injury from the same company-wide
policy of age discrimination. 726 F.2d at 1004; see also Brief for Respondent at 7, In re Ralston
Purina Co., 726 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1984). The plaintiffs asserted that the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) specifically created a permissive joinder provision to enable
aggrieved employees to join their claims against their employer in one lawsuit. Brief for
Respondent at 7, Purina; see 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) (incorporating permissive joinder
provision of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) in ADEA); see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982) (any one or
more employees may maintain an action against their employer for themselves or on behalf of
other employees similarly situated). The plaintiffs emphasized that Congress included the
permissive joinder provision in the ADEA to achieve economy of time and effort and to grant
additional bargaining power to aggrieved employees. Brief for Respondent at 9, Purina; see 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) (incorporating permissive joinder provision of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) in
ADEA); see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982) (any one or more employees may maintain an action
against their employer for themselves or on behalf of other employees similarly situated).
27. 726 F.2d at 1004. In Purina, the district court stated that the plaintiffs' attempts to
prove a company-wide policy of discrimination would suffer if the court granted Purina's
motion to sever and transfer the plaintiffs' claims. Id. The district court reasoned that the
plaintiffs would suffer prejudice because each would be required to prove a company-wide
policy of age discrimination in a separate case. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see supra note 4 and accompanying text (appellate courts generally withhold
review of interlocutory orders until trial court enters final judgment).
31. 726 F.2d at 1004. In Purina, defendant Purina alleged that the district court abused
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contended that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence of a
company-wide policy of age discrimination to warrant joinder of their
claims .
3 4
In reviewing Purina's motion for a writ of mandamus, the Fourth Circuit
recognized that any delay in appellate review might prejudice Purina . 3 The
Fourth Circuit noted that hearing the plaintiffs' claims together in North
Carolina might inconvenience and prejudice Purina by requiring Purina to
undergo a trial on the merits and secure the testimony of witnesses located
in Georgia and Pennsylvania prior to an appellate ruling on the change of
venue issue.3 6 The Fourth Circuit emphasized, however, that the issuance of
a writ of mandamus is reserved for exceptional cases. 37 Following the
precedent established by the United States Supreme Court in Allied Chemical
Co. v. Daiflon, Inc.38 and Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association,39 the
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. In Purina, the Fourth Circuit stated that a writ of mandamus should not issue
merely because it would be inconvenient for Purina to undergo a trial on the merits prior to an
appellate ruling on the change of venue issue. Id.
37. Id. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (writ of mandamus is extraordinary
remedy reserved for exceptional cases).
38. 449 U.S. 33 (1980). In Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., the plaintiff brought
an antitrust suit against all domestic manufacturers of refrigerant gas. Id. After the jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for a new trial. Id.
The plaintiff then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for a
writ of mandamus to instruct the trial court to reinstate the jury verdict. Id. at 34. After the
Tenth Circuit granted mandamus review the plaintiff sought review of the Tenth Circuit's action
in the United States Supreme Court. Id.
The Supreme Court stated that a trial court's order granting a new trial rarely will justify
the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Id. at 36. The Allied Court held that before a writ of
mandamus can issue a mandamus petitioner must demonstrate first, that he has a clear and
indisputable right to mandamus review and second, that he has no other adequate means of
appellate relief. Id. The Supreme Court stated that because the authority to grant a new trial is
committed to the trial court's discretion, the plaintiff could not assert a clear and indisputable
right to mandamus review. Id. The Allied Court further stated that the plaintiff could not
establish that it had no other adequate means of appellate relief because the plaintiff could seek
review of the propriety of the trial court's order after the entry of a final judgment. Id. The
Supreme Court therefore reversed the Tenth Circuit's order granting mandamus review. Id. at
37.
39. 319 U.S. 21 (1943). In Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., the grand jury sitting in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California indicted the defendants for
conspiracy to fix evaporated milk prices. Id. at 22. The defendants filed pleas in abatement to
the grand jury's indictment. Id. at 23. The district court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike
the defendants' pleas in abatement. Id. at 24. The defendant then petitioned the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to present at trial the issues
raised in the pleas in abatement. Id. The Ninth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus stating that
the district court erred in striking the defendants' pleas in abatement. Id. On a writ of certiorari,
the Supreme Court in Roche stated that the issues presented in the case did not justify the
issuance of a writ of mandamus because the district court had exercised its prescribed jurisdiction
properly. Id. at 26. The Roche Court held that a writ of mandamus may issue only to correct
an abuse of judicial authority or the unjustifiable refusal to exercise judicial authority. Id. at
31. The Supreme Court stated that a writ of mandamus should not issue in Roche because the
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Fourth Circuit noted that a party seeking mandamus review must demonstrate
a clear and indisputable right to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. 4° In
Roche, the Supreme Court stated that because the mandamus review circum-
vents the general rule that appellate courts should review only final judg-
ments, a writ of mandamus may issue only to correct an abuse of judicial
authority. 4' In Allied, the Supreme Court refined its holding in Roche and
established a two-prong test for determining whether a writ of mandamus
may issue.42 First, the Allied Court stated that before a writ of mandamus
may issue, a mandamus petitioner must demonstrate an unmistakable and
indisputable right to mandamus review. 43 Second, the Allied Court empha-
sized that a mandamus petitioner must demonstrate that he has no adequate
means of appellate relief other than a writ of mandamus.
44
The Fourth Circuit noted that a change of venue order, which is within
a district court's discretion, 45 rarely can provide justification for the issuance
of a writ of mandamus.46 The Purina court emphasized that a writ of
Roche district court had not abused its judicial power. Id. at 27. The Roche Court further
stated that a writ of mandamus should not issue because any alleged error could be reviewed
on appeal from a final judgment. Id.
40. 726 F.2d at 1004; see supra note 38 (mandamus petitioner must demonstrate clear
and indisputable right to mandamus review and no other adequate means of appellate relief).
41. 319 U.S. at 31; see supra note 39 (Roche Court held that mandamus may issue only
to correct an abuse of judicial power).
42. 449 U.S. at 35; see supra note 38 (discussion of Allied opinion).
43. Id.; see supra note 38 (mandamus petitioner must demonstrate clear and indisputable
right to mandamus review).
44. 449 U.S. at 35; see supra note 38 (mandamus may not issue as substitute for appeal).
45. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n. v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 278-79 (9th Cir.
1979) (change of venue order is committed to district court's discretion). In Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n. v. Savage, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) filed suit
against a commodity trader in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California. Id. at 273. The CFTC alleged that the defendant had defrauded customers who
resided in the Central District of California. Id. at 278. The defendant in Commodity Futures
filed a motion in the district court to change the venue of the suit to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois because the defendant resided and had executed the
commodity transactions at issue in the Northern District of Illinois. Id. at 277. The district
court in Commodity Futures denied the defendant's motion for change of venue to the Northern
District of Illinois. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to
grant a writ of mandamus in Commodity Futures, to review the district court's denial of the
defendant's change of venue motion. Id. at 279. The Ninth Circuit stated that a district court
judge enjoys broad discretion to determine whether the convenience of parties and witnesses
and the interests of justice are best served by a change of venue. Id. at 279.
46. 726 F.2d at 1005. In stating that a change of venue order generally is not immediately
appealable, the Purina court relied upon an earlier Fourth Circuit holding in Jiffy Lubricator
Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp. Id.; see Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d
360, 362 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947 (1950). In Jiffy, the plaintiff, a North
Dakota corporation, filed a patent infringement suit against the defendant in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 177 F.2d at 361. The defendant, a Virginia
corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois, filed a motion in the district court
to change the venue of the suit to the Northern District of Illinois. Id. The district court granted
the defendant's motion and transferred the action to the Northern District of Illinois. Id. The
plaintiff sought immediate review of the district court's change of venue order. Id. In denying
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mandamus may issue only if a district court abused its judicial authority,
and not in cases of abuse of a district court's discretion.4 7 The Fourth Circuit
stated, therefore, that a discretionary change of venue order may not provide
a mandamus petitioner with a clear and indisputable right to mandamus
review unless the district court clearly abused its judicial authority.48 The
Purina court noted that although Purina alleged that the district court had
abused its discretion in denying Purina's change of venue motion, Purina
failed to show that the district court had abused its judicial authority. 49 The
Fourth Circuit held that for a mandamus petitioner to demonstrate a clear
and indisputable right to mandamus review, the petitioners must show
exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of authority.
50
The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that Purina's allegation that the
district court had abused its discretion by denying Purina's change of venue
motion would not satisfy the Supreme Court's standard for the issuance of
a writ of mandamus."'
Contrary to the majority's holding, the dissent in Purina contended that
the case presented an extraordinary situation justifying the issuance of a writ
of mandamus. 52 The dissent termed the plaintiffs' choice of venue a flagrant
example of forum shopping and claimed that the plaintiffs' conduct presented
substantial justification for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. 53 The dissent
the plaintiffs motion for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that a change of venue order is not appealable until the district court has entered a final
judgment. Id. The Jiffy court stated further that an order granting or denying a change of
venue rests within the district court's sound discretion. Id. at 362.
47. 726 F.2d at 1005; see Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. at 35
(mandamus may issue only to correct usurpation of judicial authority); see supra note 38
(discussion of the Allied Court's holding).
48. 726 F.2d at 1005; see Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. at 36. In
Allied, the Supreme Court stated that, unless a district court had abused its judicial authority,
a matter committed to the district court's discretion would not provide a mandamus petitioner
with a clear and indisputable right to mandamus review. 449 U.S. at 36.
49. 726 F.2d at 1004; see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (Purina alleged that
district court's denial of change of venue motion was abuse of discretion).
50. 726 F.2d at 1005; see Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. at 35
(mandamus petitioner must show that clear and indisputable right to mandamus review exists
and that no other adequate means of appellate relief is available); see supra note 38 (discussion
of Allied Court's holding).
51. 726 F.2d at 1006; see Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. at 35
(mandamus is drastic remedy issued to correct judicial usurpation of authority); Roche v.
Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. at 30 (mandamus may issue only to correct abuse of judicial
authority and not as substitute for appeal).
52. 726 F.2d at 1006. In Purina, the dissent stated that a writ of mandamus should have
issued because Purina would have been unable to obtain effective appellate relief after a final
judgment had been entered. Id. The dissent stated that after Purina had endured the expense
and inconvenience of defending against the consolidated actions an appeal of the change of
venue order would be futile because appellate courts would hesitate to reverse a change of
venue order and require a new trial. Id. Moreover, the dissent noted that appellate courts might
even consider the issue moot. Id.
53. Id. at 1006; see Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 783 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). In Pain v. United Technologies Corp., the United
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also asserted that the Fourth Circuit's failure to issue a writ of mandamus
would foster the practice of forum shopping, a practice specifically censured
by the Supreme Court.5 4 The dissent in Purina, therefore, asserted that
interests of fairness demanded that a writ of mandamus issue to sever and
change the venue of the plaintiffs' claims.
5
-
Substantial disagreement exists, however, among the federal circuit courts
of appeals concerning the appropriate use of mandamus as a remedy for a
district court's abuse of discretion.5 6 Specifically, the courts of appeals have
disagreed on the standard courts should apply in deciding whether to issue
a writ of mandamus to review a district court's change of venue order.17 In
Purina, the Fourth Circuit stated that a mandamus petitioner must show an
abuse of judicial authority, not merely an abuse of discretion, to warrant
issuance of a writ of mandamus. 58 Likewise, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also has held that a writ of mandamus may
issue to review a district court's change of venue order only if the district
court abused its judicial power and responsibility. 9
In Toro Co. v. Alsop,60 the plaintiff, the Toro Company, petitioned the
Eighth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to review a district court's change of
venue order.6' In Toro, the plaintiff had filed a patent infringement suit
against the defendant, Weed Eater, Inc. (Weed Eater), in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota. 62 On a motion by the defendant,
the district court had severed one count of the plaintiff's complaint and had
changed the venue of the severed count to the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas. 63 The plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandamus
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit defined forum shopping as a
party's strategy of forcing the trial at the most inconvenient forum for an adversary. 637 F.2d
at 783. The Pain court stated, however, that the plaintiff's choice of forum should not be
disturbed unless the plaintiff's choice would inflict unnecessary expense and trouble on the
defendant. Id.
54. 726 F.2d at 1006; see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). In Gilbert,
the United States Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff may not choose an inconvenient forum
for the purpose of harassing the defendant with unnecessary trouble and expense. 330 U.S. at
508.
55. 726 F.2d at 1006-07; see supra note 52 and accompanying text (dissent stated that
mandamus should have issued because Purina would be unable to obtain any other means of
effective appellate relief).
56. See supra note 11 (discussion of varying standards among courts of appeals for
issuance of mandamus to correct erroneous change of venue orders).
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (mandamus may issue to correct district
court's abuse or judicial authority but not to review an alleged abuse of discretion).
59. See Toro Co. v. Alsop, 565 F.2d 99g, 1000 (8th Cir. 1977) (mandamus may issue to
review district court's change of venue order only if district court abused its judicial power and
responsibility), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978).
60. 565 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1977).
61. Id. ,at 1000.
62. Id. at 999.
63. Id. In Toro, the district court severed the count of Toro's complaint which charged
that Weed Eater's patents were invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed. Id.
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to review the district court's change of venue order. 64 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a writ of mandamus may
issue to review a district court's change of venue order only if the district
court abused its judicial power and responsibility.65 In reviewing the plain-
tiff's claim, however, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court had
granted the defendant's change of venue motion because the patent infringe-
ment issues addressed in the severed count were embraced in a patent suit
pending in Kansas. 6 The Eighth Circuit, therefore, denied mandamus review
because the district court had not abused its judicial authority in granting a
change of venue.67
In contrast to the views of the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, other circuit
courts of appeals have stated that a writ of mandamus may issue whenever
a district court clearly has abused its discretion. 6 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for example, has held that a writ of
mandamus may issue to review a district court's change of venue order if
the district court clearly abused its discretion. 69 In In re McDonnell-Douglas
Corp.,70 the defendant, McDonnell-Douglas Corporation, petitioned the Fifth
Circuit for a writ of mandamus to review the district court's denial of the
defendant's change of venue motion.
7 '
In McDonnell-Douglas, the defendant had sought to change the venue
of an admiralty action from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas to the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri. 72 The Texas district court had denied the defendant's change of
venue motion because the plaintiffs were residents of Texas and the defendant
was authorized to do business in Texas. 73 In considering the defendant's
petition for a writ of mandamus, the Fifth Circuit noted that the convenience
of parties and witnesses did not weigh so heavily in favor of the defendant
as to justify a change of venue. 74 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, upheld the
district court's denial of the defendant's change of venue motion because
the district court had not clearly abused its discretion.7 5 The United States
Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Second Circuits also have held that
to warrant mandamus review a petitioner must demonstrate that a district
64. Id. at 1000.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1000-01.
68. See supra note 11 (discussion of varying standards among courts of appeals for
issuance of mandamus to correct erroneous change of venue orders).
69. See In re McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 647 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1981) (mandamus
may issue to review a district court's change of venue order if district court failed to consider
relevant factors or clearly abused its discretion).
70. 647 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1981).
71. Id. at 516.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 517.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 516-17.
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court clearly abused its discretion in granting or denying a change of venue
motion.76 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
agreed, holding that a writ of mandamus may issue to review a district
court's change of venue order if the district court disregarded a compelling
reason for change of venue or if the court abused its broad discretion.7
Despite varied standards among the United States circuit courts of
appeal, the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions strongly support
the Fourth Circuit's restrictive standard for mandamus review. 78 The Allied
Court emphasized that the congressional policy against piecemeal appellate
review would be undermined if mandamus issued in anything less than an
extraordinary situation.7 9 The congressional policy of avoiding the expense
and delay of piecemeal appeals is not furthered, however, when a circuit
76. See Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d 982, 984 (11th
Cir. 1982). In La Quinta, the plaintiff, Roofing & Sheet Metal Services, Inc. (Roofing), filed
suit in the Western District of Arkansas against the defendant, La Quinta Motor Inns (La
Quinta), who failed to pay for services and materials under a contract for the reroofing of a
La Quinta Motor Inn in Alabama. Id. at 984. The plaintiff brought suit in the Western District
of Arkansas because the plaintiff was an Arkansas corporation and the contract at issue was
executed in Arkansas. Id. On a motion by the defendant, the district court changed the venue
of the case to the Southern District of Alabama because the case required investigation into the
work performed in Alabama. Id. at 985. The plaintiff petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for
mandamus review, but the Eleventh Circuit rejected the petition on the grounds that the court
lacked the appellate jurisdiction to review a change of venue order of a district court located in
the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 985-86. The Eleventh Circuit stated, however, that a writ of mandamus
may issue to review a district court's change of venue order only if the district court clearly
abused its discretion. Id. at 988; see also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215,
218 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (implying that mandamus may not issue
to review a district court's change of venue order unless district court abused its discretion).
77. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 592 F.2d 364, 367 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979). In Citizens Bank, the plaintiff, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), filed suit against the defendant, Citizens Bank & Trust Company
(Citizens Bank), in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Id.
The defendant filed a motion to change the venue of the case to the Northern District of Ohio
where its witnesses were located. Id. at 367-68. The district court stated that a court must give
some weight to the plaintiff's choice of forum and denied the defendant's change of venue
motion. Id. In considering the defendants petition for a writ of mandamus, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a writ of mandamus may issue to review a
district court's change of venue order only if the district court disregarded a compelling reason
for change of venue or if the district court abused its broad discretion. Id. Since the plaintiff
asserted that it would need to depose Citizens Bank employees, whg resided in Illinois, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the convenience of the parties and witnesses did not weigh in favor
of a change of venue to the Northern District of Ohio. Id. The Seventh Circuit, therefore,
denied mandamus review stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Citizen Bank's change of venue motion. Id.
78. See supra note 38 (discussion of Supreme Court's holding in Allied).
79. See Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. at 35. In Allied, the United
States Supreme Court stated that since the Judiciary Act of 1789 Congress has favored
postponing appellate review until the trial court has rendered a final judgment. Id. The Allied
court emphasized that the issuance of a writ of mandamus in anything less than an extraordinary
situation would undermine the longstanding congressional policy against piecemeal appeals. Id.
at 36.
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court of appeals must evaluate the merits of a district court's discretionary
judgment before deciding whether to grant mandamus review. 0 In the Purina
case, the Fourth Circuit denied mandamus review only after evaluating the
merits of the district court's ruling on Purina's change of venue motion.,
For example, the Fourth Circuit had to analyze whether the plaintiffs'
allegations that a company-wide policy of age discrimination necessitated the
joinder of the plaintiffs' claims.12 The Fourth Circuit in Purina concluded
that the importance of hearing the plaintiffs' claims together outweighed any
potential inconvenience to Purina in securing the testimony of its witnesses
in Georgia and PennsylvaniaY3 If a petition for a writ of mandamus requires
limited review of the merits of a district court's interlocutory order the
mandamus process will involve the very expense and delay Congress sought
to avoid in enacting the final judgment rule.
8 4
In Purina, the Fourth Circuit's opinion stated and correctly applied the
Supreme Court's most recent standards for the issuance of writs of manda-
mus.85 The Fourth Circuit's holding is, therefore, consistent with a Supreme
Court precedent. If a circuit court of appeals will evaluate the merits of a
district court's change of venue order on a petition for a writ of mandamus
and involve the expense and delay of interlocutory review, however, it is not
sensible for the court to apply the stringent standard of abuse of judicial
authority and deny mandamus review merely to preserve the integrity of the
final judgment rule.86 After a district court renders a final judgment, an
appeal of an erroneous change of venue order will not provide adequate
appellate relief. Circuit courts of appeals may hesitate to reverse a change
of venue order and require a new trial or may consider the appeal of a
change of venue order moot. 7 Moreover, even if an appeal of an erroneous
80. See Berger, supra note 1, at 79. One commentator has noted that the restrictive
standards for the issuance of a writ of mandamus are not justified when circuit courts of
appeals provide limited review of the merits of a district court's order to determine whether a
writ of mandamus can issue. Id. The commentator stated first, that if a circuit court of appeals
provides limited review of a district court's order and determines that the district court erred,
it is not sensible for the court to refuse to issue a writ of mandamus merely to preserve the
integrity of the final judgment rule. Id. at 83. Second, the commentator emphasized that if a
circuit court of appeals allows the expense and delay of interlocutory review to determine
whether a writ of mandamus can issue, the appellate court is in effect incorporating a more
restrictive standard of review than normally applied on appeal from a final judgment. Id. at
79. Third, the commentator noted that the restrictive standards for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus are not justified as a deterrent to piecemeal appeals if the circuit courts of appeals
provide a limited review of a district court's orders whenever a party petitions for a writ of
mandamus. Id. at 83.
81. 726 F.2d at 1005-06.
82. 726 F.2d at 1006.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (policy against interlocutory appellate review
does not justify restrictive standards for mandamus review).
85. See 726 F.2d at 1004-05.
86. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (policy against interlocutory appellate review
does not justify restrictive standards for mandamus review).
87. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (circuit courts of appeals may hesitate to
reverse a change of venue order after a final judgment).
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